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ABSTRACT 
Contracts are promoted as a tool which governments can use to involve the private health care sector 
in the delivery of public sector services. In low and middle income (LMIC) countries they have been 
suggested as a useful means both for involving the private sector and for controlling it. However, 
evidence from developed countries suggests that the nature of contractual relationships with the 
public sector can be highly complex and that they may not always operate as envisaged by market- 
based economic theory. Very little evidence is available from the different setting of low or middle 
income countries. 
This research examined the nature of three different contractual relationships for primary care 
services in South Africa and Lesotho. A principally qualitative, case study approach, drawing on 
ideas from new institutional economics, was used to examine the broad context in which these 
contracts were set, and formal and informal controls upon their operation. A broad framework of 
factors for the analysis of contractual relationships was used throughout the study and to increase the 
generalisability of the case study findings. Theories about the varied shape and possible 
incompleteness of contracts were used as the basis for an examination of formal and informal 
controls on the operation of contracts in an LMIC setting. 
The contracts examined were all found to be incomplete and reliant on external factors to determine 
the way in which they operated and the nature of the contractual relationship. Primary care services 
were observed to be both difficult to specify in a contract and very problematic to monitor. The role 
of factors such as market competition, the nature of the provider, informal monitoring, trust and 
dependence were each highlighted in the results of the case studies. The importance of taking such 
factors into account, and recognising the highly variable nature of contracts likely to arise in different 
settings, were key findings of the study. These findings support a more cautious approach to some of 
the expectations placed on contracting in low and middle income settings, but also highlight its 
potential value when approached appropriately. 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
The research on which this thesis is based was conducted as part of a larger project examining the 
potential for new purchaser provider relationships, governed by a contract, in primary health care in 
Southern Africa'. This thesis focuses on these contracts and the nature of the contractual 
relationships which arose from them. It also examines the role played by factors outside of the 
written contract in determining the nature and operation of these contractual relationships. It is 
hoped that this will shed light on the most appropriate manner in which to approach contracting out 
primary care services in low or middle income country settings. 
Walsh et al (1997) observe that an interesting side-effect of global change lies in the exchange of 
ideas and experience that has taken place between countries. This is also particularly true between 
high and low income countries, and one aspect of it is an enthusiasm for exporting types of public 
sector reform, such as those coming under the umbrella title of New Public Management (NPM), to 
the rather different setting of low and middle income countries (LMICs). Contracting out of health 
services to the private sector, or performance agreements between different levels of government, is 
now a common component of reform packages promoted by bilateral and multilateral agencies for 
many such countries (England 1997; Mills 1998; World Bank 1997a; World Bank 1997b; WHO 
1999). However, this enthusiasm neither appears to be based on evidence specific to the settings of 
LMICs or to take into account recently emerging evidence on the nature of public sector contracts in 
developed countries, which increasingly highlights their multi-faceted and complex nature (Walsh et 
al 1997; Coulson 1998; Roberts, Bartlett and Le Grand 1998). 
1 'New purchaser provider relationships in health care: the desirability of contracts between health authorities and private 
providers' research funded by Department for International Development to Health Economics and Financing Programme, 
London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine, 1997-2000 
10 
Dunleavy and Hood (1994) refer to the dangers of inappropriate cloning of policies. The increased 
popularity of contracts as a reform prescription in LMICs highlights the need to understand their 
nature and the manner in which they are likely to operate in a developing country context. The 
subject for this thesis was chosen in recognition of the potential mismatch between the contracts 
envisaged by some proponents of contracting for health services in LMICs, and emerging evidence 
about the way in which contracts for public services actually operate. As the ideas of NPM are 
exported, there is a tendency to use the phrase "contract" as if it refers to a well-defined package of 
specifications and a certain type of relationship which can be guaranteed in all eventualities. Whilst 
important issues such as the identity and motivation of the contracting parties, the nature of the 
service being contracted, the nature of the market and the degree of trust between purchaser and 
provider are increasingly shown in developed country literature as important controls on behaviour 
under a contract, they have been given scant attention in any discussion of the desirability of 
contracts for LMICs. It may be that the over-enthusiastic promotion of contracts in inappropriate 
settings is more likely to hinder than assist the achievement o`health policy goals. 
The different organisational settings of most LMICs are likely to have implications for contracting, 
and some of the problems highlighted by evaluations of contracting in well resourced organisations 
such as the UK's National Health Service (NHS) are likely to be exacerbated. Characteristics 
common to the environments of LMICs, such as poorly developed institutional capacity, a shortage of 
administrative and contract writing skills, and poorly developed markets will further complicate the 
manner in which contracts function. Capacity of markets to behave competitively and transparently, 
or of government to support the creation of such markets, is likely to be limited in many LMICs 
(Schick 1998). Contracting with the private sector, the most likely option in most LMICs, is also 
fundamentally different from the type of internal market favoured in some high income countries. As 
control over contracted providers is lessened, issues of incentives and motivation become central, and 
yet are very difficult to tackle. The danger that a notion of contracting is superimposed on an existing 
hierarchy of traditional relationships and inter-dependency is also strong. Equally, resources for the 
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adequate specification and monitoring of contracts and overseeing the bidding process may be more 
severely lacking in an LMIC setting. Such factors could fundamentally alter the outcome of market- 
based reforms. Given that there is still considerable debate about the nature of the contractual 
relationships emerging in countries such as the UK (Walsh et al 1997; Flynn and Williams 1997) in 
an LMIC system it is perhaps even more important to evaluate to what extent market-based theory is 
reflected in reality. 
TIIEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL BACKGROUND 
The so-called New Public Management (NPM) has transformed public sector management in some 
OECD countries by its emphasis on the introduction of market incentives into the traditional domain 
of the public sector (Hood 1991; Deakin and Michie 1997; Ferlie et al 1996). It is now heralded by 
some as the solution to similar government failure in many low and middle income countries (Walsh 
et al 1997; Bennett McPake and Mills 1997; Turner and Hulme 1997). In health as in other sectors, 
this move is shaped by a co_zsensus that the state is overextended, inefficient and needs to be "rolled 
back". In its place it is assumed that private sector management practice will automatically be more 
effective (Bennett McPake and Mills 1997; Jackson and Price 1995; Turner and Hulme 1997). 
Contracts are promoted in low and middle income health sectors as a tool of NPM - moves away from 
hierarchical organisations towards the creation of a split between purchasers and providers often 
depend on a contract to govern the new relationship. 
Arguments in favour of the use of i, arket incentives, and especially contracts, in publicly financed 
health services are often couched in terms of potential gains to efficiency. It is argued first that 
increased provider competition will increase technical efficiency on the supply side, second that 
contractual relationships enhance efficiency via the incentive structure of the contract, and third that 
the contracting process itself promotes transparency in trading and the decentralisation of 
management responsibility, which will again have beneficial effects in terms of efficiency 
(Broomberg 1994). There is a tacit assumption that contracts will be adequately specified and 
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monitored, allowing such tasks to be fulfilled. However, initial research (Broomberg 1997; McPake 
and Banda 1994) has highlighted that this may not always be the case, and poor contract design or 
insufficient capacity to monitor may be a feature of many contracted out services. In some cases this 
may result in the poor operation of these services, in others it may be less important. Hence the 
spotlight is shifting from the desirability of contracts per se to issues of contract design and the 
nature and influences upon a range of contractual relationships. 
Preliminary evidence relating to the nature of contractual relationships in primary health care in the 
NHS shows that it is common for contracts to be vague about both risks and responsibilities, and that 
sanctions are rarely specified and even more rarely exercised (Flynn and Williams 1997; Spurgeon 
1997). In compulsory competitive tendering (CCT) for local government services where detailed 
contract specification is more the norm, a weakness is again observable, but this time in a lack of 
formal monitoring (Davis and Walker 1998). 
Different theories which can frame a discussion of how contracts operate come from neo-classical 
market theory and more recently from institutional economics. Each approach highlights different 
dimensions to be considered as influences on the shape that contracts will take. Ideas supporting the 
benefits of market mechanisms (and therefore the use of contracts) originate from the assumption that 
under a certain set of conditions, competition between multiple homogenous providers will increase 
technical and allocative efficiency. For such assumptions to hold, conditions include the existence of 
a sLfficient number of similar firms in the market place to create a competitive market, that all 
purchasers and providers have access to the same costless information, and that transactions are 
costless. No allowance is made for specialism either of knowledge, service or geographically. 
Important concepts for the analysis of contracting arising from these arguments are therefore the 
nature of competition between providers, the costs associated with accessing information, and 
whether there are other transaction costs which impinge on the smooth functioning of the market. 
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However, some economists argue that analysis of contracting along such nco-classical lines is 
altogether insufficient to accommodate a number of important phenomena in contracting (Hart 1995; 
MacNeil 1974,1978; Williamsonl975,1985). Recognition of factors such as transaction costs, 
uncertainty, limits to human comprehension (bounded rationality), and the difference between firms' 
capacity to deliver a specific service, has given rise to a different approach to contracts which allows 
for their costliness, their likely incompleteness, and therefore the existence of other factors 
determining the behaviour of the contracting parties. The dynamic of the broader relationship 
between the two contracting parties and their environment begins to come to the fore. In particular, 
issues such as the role of trust, mutual dependence and market power introduce a picture of the 
contracting landscape that has many more dimensions. 
Institutional economics focuses on contracts within this broader institutional and social setting and 
argues that they may take on a variety of forms according to this. That the term `contract' can 
describe a multitude of arrangements ranging from the very formal to the extremely flexible is 
increasingly recognised. The form that a contractual relationship takes can vary along a spectrum of 
contracts from the very formal and well defined to those where the relationship between the two 
contracting parties has become more important than the contract itself. In such a `relational' contract, 
the reference point has ceased to be the contract itself and becomes "the entire relation as it has 
developed through time" MacNeil 1974). There is also an important role for individuals in 
influencing how a contract operates. All this is far-removed from the homogenous firms and 
products in the anonymous market place of neo-classical theory. As well as undertakii. g neo- 
classical market analysis for the understanding of contracting for health services, it therefore appears 
highly relevant to assess issues such as the nature and motivation of both purchaser and provider, the 
nature of the service to be provided, and the degree to which it can be (and has been) specified and 
monitored. If it appears that a comprehensive contract cannot be written, as is often the case with a 
service as difficult to specify as health (Walsh et al 1997), then these become key to understanding 
what is driving the contractual relationship. 
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Tin: RESEARCH 
The research reported in this thesis set out to look at three examples of functioning contracts for 
primary care services in South Africa and Lesotho. Mainly qualitative methods were used in a case 
study approach. Such an approach to examining contracts has so far been more commonly used in 
countries such as the UK, where case studies have been used to develop a body of evidence 
examining different facets of the nature of contractual relationships (e. g. Allen 2000; Bartlett Roberts 
and Le Grand 1998; Coulson 1998; Flynn and Williams 1997; Walsh et al 1997). 
The case studies in this research examined the nature of contracts and their setting. Attention was 
paid to standard features such as their design, award process and monitoring. However, where 
contracts appeared incomplete, an attempt was made to understand additional informal contractual 
mechanisms which may also control or influence the contractual relationship. Particular attention 
was given to: 
1) how certain factors which make up a contract's setting would also determine the likely nature of 
its operation; 
2) what was controlling the behaviour of providers under a contract and to what extent these 
controls were formal or informal. 
Each of the contracts studied had to be recognised as a phenomenon taking place in a unique social 
setting. A case study approach was adopted to include allowance for the context of each contract and 
the potentially complex causal links between many variables which may have influenced its 
operation. It was also chosen because, despite the urgency of these questions as a policy issue, there 
were insufficient examples of functioning contracts in existence to allow for any type of large scale 
quantitative analysis of any aspect of the contractual relationship.. A principally qualitative approach 
was also felt most appropriate for trying to access information about such a complex social 
phenomenon. It was recognised that to a large extent the contractual relationship was defined by 
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those who worked within it and so a key part of the study design was to acknowledge the nature of 
the data to be collected as being personal, interpretive and relative. As with most qualitative case 
studies, the approach adopted was interviewing people, reading documents and observation. 
PURPOSE, SCOPE AND CONTENTS 
Purpose 
This thesis explores the reality of three contractual relationships in different settings for primary care 
services in LMICs. It aims to use findings to make recommendations to policy-makers on the best 
way to approach a policy of contracting out of services in different settings, and how to minimise 
potential conflict and pitfalls in the contracting process. 
The aim of this thesis is to evaluate the nature of three examples of contracts for primary care 
services in an LMIC and the context in which they operate, in order to inform policy-makers on the 
desirability of the use of different types of contract in different settings, and how to improve contract 
design and management. Objectives are: 
" To describe and analyse contracts in terms of their award process, design and specification 
" To describe the nature of the contractual relationship between purchaser and provider 
0 To identify and describe external factors and how they impact on the nature of the contractual 
relationship e. g. nature of provider, nature of service, degree of dependence, degree of trust 
0 To relate these factors to those which would be predicted to be important by theory supporting 
the use of contracts for health care 
" To explore both formal and informal controls potentially determining the nature of the 
contractual relationship and the behaviour of the contracted provider 
" To make recommendations on how policy-makers in South Africa and elsewhere could best 
approach a policy of contracting with the private sector, and what is likely to be appropriate for 
different types of service and different types of provider. 
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Scope 
The research focuses on contractual relationships in South Africa and Lesotho but the predominant 
focus is South Africa. South Africa was chosen as the focus for the larger research project because it 
was thought to offer a range of examples of contracting with the private sector for primary care 
services. At the time of the commencement of the research, the South African government's policy 
was to extend contracting out of primary care services to the private sector (South Africa 1995), 
although this policy initiative was subsequently not clearly implemented. South Africa has a very 
large and well resourced private sector which makes the issue of how to attempt to draw on its 
resources via use of selective contracting a particularly relevant one. The country also has difficulty 
attracting doctors to work in the public sector, which means that in some areas access to a doctor via 
the public sector automatically means some type of public private interface. 
The study focuses in depth on one contract, which governs the Part-time District Surgeon (PDS) 
system in South Africa, and then uses briefer case studies of two other contracts to broaden the 
discussion possible around the determinants of different contractual relationships. A common 
framework is used to analyse all three contracts, their surrounding context and the nature of their 
operation. 
The contracts examined in the study are as follows: 
1. The Part-time District Surgeon (PDS) contract governs the delivery of primary care, medico-legal 
and emergency services in rural towns in many parts of South Africa. The system has existed in 
some form since the inception of any government provided health services in South Africa ~ ýh 
towards the end of the last century. There are four categories of district surgeons, namely full- 
time, part-time, sessional and hospital-based, and the research reported here focuses on the part- 
time district surgeon system (PDS). An unofficial tally of PDS in South Africa in 1996 counted 
approximately 450 (De Villiers 1995). The form of the contract is as follows: an individual or 
group practice of general practitioners (GPs) are contracted to deliver curative services on behalf 
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of the state. Typically they do this alongside running a small private practice, operating two quite 
distinct practices, often of quite distinct quality, within the same building. The main component 
of their district surgeoncy work (80-90%) usually relates to the provision of curative primary care 
services. Preventive care and some other primary care services are usually provided at the public 
sector clinic in the same town. District surgeons are also required to provide certain forensic 
functions (e. g. the examination of victims of sexual and common assault, examination of drunken 
drivers, and the performance of post mortem examinations) and ex-officio functions (e. g. 
examination of persons for employment in the public service, persons applying for disability 
grants and prisoners in jail). 
The PDS contract is interesting because it is widespread and well established, and raises many 
highly relevant issues about the strengths and weaknesses of contracts in dictating or controlling 
the behaviour of private practitioners. The weakness of the PDS contract as an example is that it 
came into existence long ago to fill a gap in health service provision under the apartheid regime, 
and in many towns remains stigmatised and stigmatising in the way that it treats publicly funded 
patients. As a result, PDS contracts in all provinces in South Africa are under review. The fact 
that the system was in a state of change is likely to have heightened feelings of uncertainty and 
confusion expressed by both purchaser and provider and to have shown the weaknesses of the 
system in sharp relief. 
2. Also examined more briefly is a contract for the delivery of services by two clinics adjacent to 
construction sites in remote areas of Lesotho. A commercial South African company runs these 
clinics. The company is reimbursed for providing primary care services to members of the local 
community as well as to the workforce of the various construction companies operating at the 
site. This contract provides a second perspective on the successes and pitfalls of contracting for 
health services by demonstrating what can be achieved in a well resourced setting where 
expertise in writing and monitoring contracts is available. The model of using existing private 
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sector capacity and expertise in remote areas for the benefit of the local community is also one 
which is relevant to wherever mining, oil or other heavy industry or large scale commercial 
farming is taking place in LMICs. 
3. The third case study is of an arrangement functioning entirely within the private sector, where 
primary care services are delivered by a chain of commercially run clinics in urban areas 
throughout South Africa. Care is delivered to industrial workers under a capitated contract with 
the purchaser being an industrial company (the employer) and the provider the company that runs 
the clinics. Each clinic delivers services to patients subscribing under a number of similar 
contracts with different industrial companies, as well as to others who pay fee for service. 
Service delivery in all clinics is managed using strict internal controls and state of the art 
computerised financial and medical systems. The inclusion of this case study provides an 
additional perspective by demonstrating how a different contractual relationship can develop 
when external factors such as the nature of the market and the nature of the provider alter. 
Contents 
Chapter 2 reviews theoretical literature about the way in which contracts operate and evidence about 
the performance and nature of contracts from the UK and some LMICs. Key concepts of relevance 
for this study arising from the literature review are presented in a framework by which the case 
studies from this research can be analysed. 
Chapter 3 describes and justifies the methods that were used for the study and discusses the nature 
of the data they have generated. 
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Chapter 4 gives background description relevant to all of the contracts presented in the thesis. 
Information on the history and policy context of the South African situation is particularly drawn 
upon for the in-depth case study of the PDS contract. 
Chapters 5-7 then present data about the in-depth case study of the PDS contract. Chapter 5 
reviews the external factors shaping the context in which the PDS contract has to operate: e. g. nature 
of the market, nature of the service, government capacity. Chapter 6 reviews the contract design, 
award process and the opinions of both purchaser and provider on the design of the PDS contract. 
Chapter 7 explores the nature of the operation of the PDS contract. This includes the nature of 
service delivery, how monitoring is performed, payment by the purchaser and how changes to the 
contract are agreed upon. This leads into a discussion of other factors which appear to act as 
informal controls on the functioning of the PDS contract. In particular a dependent relationship 
between purchaser and provider and the individual motivation of providers are highlighted as 
influential in the operation of this contract. 
Chapter 8 reviews information on the same set of factors described for the PDS contract for two 
more case studies - the Lesotho contract and the private capitated scheme contract. In this much 
more abbreviated review of these contracts, similarities and differences between the case studies are 
highlighted. 
Chapter 9 discusses the findings of each case study, the strengths and weaknesses of the methods 
used and then compares findings across the case studies. 
Chapter 10 presents substantive conclusions about each of the case studies reviewed. The nature of 
generalisability of findings is then discussed and conclusions drawn of relevance elsewhere. Policy 
implications and areas for further research are then suggested. 
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CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW 
All exchange is mediated by some form of contract, some are in written form and others verbal. 
Verbal contracts are common in many exchanges where the two sides of the transaction occur almost 
simultaneously, and here the contractual element may be downplayed (Hart 1990). Other exchanges 
are formalised in advance by the issuing of a written contract which binds the buyer and seller to the 
conditions of the exchange (McPake and Banda 1994). The reshaping of organisations and greater 
emphasis on contractual forms heralded by NPM highlights a need for a greater understanding of the 
various forms that contracts can take (Ferlie et al 1996). 
This chapter reviews the literature describing what forms contracts can take and what influences this. 
Trends in public sector management which have encouraged the use of contracts are described and 
economic justifications and explanations of contracts and their operation discussed. The idea of 
different types of contracts being used to govern different transactions is introduced and institutioral 
and individual factors impacting on this discussed. The concept of trust and its role in determining 
the likely nature of contractual outcomes is also investigated. Last, evidence from the NHS and 
LMICs about the nature and performance of contracts for health is reviewed. 
CONTRACTS AND THE 'NEW PUBLIC MANAGEMENT' 
Since the late 1980s, contracts and contracting have become key components of the transformation in 
public sector management taking place in many countries often referred to as the `new public 
management' (Stewart 1993; Jackson and Price 1994; Deakin and Michie 1997, Walsh et al 1997; 
Hood 1991). This change of approach has been based on the belief that the state has failed in the key 
task of delivering efficient, quality public services. This failure is blamed upon fundamental 
deficiencies in the way that the public sector is managed, a critique associated primarily with theories 
of the political right and "public choice" (Walsh et al 1997). The standard prescription for such 
failure has become the increased use of market mechanisms, notably the creation of a split between 
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purchasers and providers governed by a contract (Stewart 1993; Hood 1991). The resulting 
contractual arrangements can take a variety of forms: purchasers are usually public or quasi-public 
organisations whilst providers range from public to private (for profit or non profit). The nature of 
the services being contracted can also vary from highly selective to wide-ranging. 
This trend towards the use of contracts is also common in health systems internationally, where 
contracting out is seen as a means of benefiting from private sector efficiency while maintaining 
control over what services are to be provided and to whom (Mills 1997). Contracts used in health 
services may range from a contract to provide laundry services to a hospital (selective) to one which 
governs the delivery of all health services in a particular region (comprehensive). They may exist 
between two parts of the same public sector organisation (public-public) or a private provider and a 
public purchaser (public-private). 
In relation to developing country health systems, selective contrasting out of services to the private 
sector is the form of `marketisation' most frequently discussed (ibid). The private sector is 
increasingly acknowledged as an important provider of health care services in developing countries, 
although there is considerable debate over the cost and quality of care which they deliver (Berman 
2000; Bhat 1993; McPake 1997; Swan and Zwi 1997; Uplekar 2000; Yesudian 1994). In particular, 
the ability of users to judge the technical quality of the care that they receive for important public 
health problems such as sexually transmitted infections (STIs) has been questioned (Brugha and Zwi 
1998; Schneider 2000) and there is considerable anecdotal evidence that patients judge the quality of 
private services according to inappropriate measures such as the frequency with which injections are 
given. Nevertheless, selective contracting out of services to the private sector is often a component 
of reform packages promoted by bilateral and multilateral agencies for low and middle income 
countries (England 1997; World Bank 1997a; World Bank 1997b; World Bank 1993; WHO 1999). 
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Whilst contracts are promoted as a means by which relationships within the public sector, or between 
public and private organisations, can be made more accountable, transparent and efficient, 
surprisingly little is known about their nature. Even in relatively well-resourced institutions such as 
the UK's National Health Service (NITS), evaluation of contractual relationships is still scarce 
(Walsh et al 1997; Robinson and Le Grand 1994) and their form and function often is shown to be 
still developing (Walsh et al 1997). Contractual relationships in LMIC health systems have attracted 
increased attention and evaluation recently (McPake and Banda 1994; McPake and Hongoro 1995; 
Broomberg 1997; Bennett, McPake and Mills 1997; Mills 1998; Mills Hongoro and Broomberg 
1997; Broomberg Masobe and Mills 1997; WHO 1997) but evidence as to their functioning is still 
scarce. In particular, with the exception of Broomberg (1997) little is known about the desirability of 
contracting for clinical services, and even less about the nature of the contractual relationships that 
tend to develop in an LMIC setting. 
LMIC contractual settings are likely to exhibit different features from their developed country 
counterparts, in particular, issues such as the institutional setting, the nature of purchaser and 
provider and the capacity available in LMICs may alter the nature of contracting. They therefore 
warrant specific examination in light of the enthusiasm to `export' policies promoting contracts from 
developed countries to LMICs (England 1997; WHO 1997; WHO 1999). 
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Bennett, Russell and Mills (1996) summarise several economic and institutional rationales for 
government purchase of private services: 
Table 2.1 Economic and Institutional rationale for government purchase of health services frone private 
providers 
-Ec6ribniic'rätionale ýr ., _, > ý. ý _ ,ý ;ý,. " , ,aý. w.....: ° 4: Institütiön`al rationale ,p'. 
Create competition amongst providers Clarification of organisational objectives promoting 
transparency and good planning 
Increase technical efficiency through economies of Autonomy: a means of protecting decision makers 
scale or economies of scope from unnecessary political or central government 
interference 
Improved allocation of risk: contracting allows a Freedom from bureaucratic regulations: e. g. escape 
redistribution of risk, which may be efficient if over-rigid personnel or procurement systems 
different actors have different degrees of risk 
averseness 
Innovation ; private sector niche players may bring 
creative ways of doin thins into the public sector 
source: nennca, Kusseii ana Miiis (1996) 
The explanation for contracting as a pragmatic attempt to capture private sector resources into the 
service of the public sector does not fit exactly into any of these theoretical rationales, but is 
nevertheless in many cases an additional motivation (Alvarez et at 1995; McIntyre 1997; McPake and 
Hongoro 1995; Bennett, McPake and Mills 1997; Abramson 1999). 
As in other sectors, the theoretical rationale for the introduction of contracts usually relates to public 
choice and property rights theories which diagnose government as failing in the efficient provision of 
quality services. Change is rooted in an emerging consensus that the state is overextended, inefficient 
and needs to be `rolled back', alongside a strong presumption that private sector management practice 
is more effective (Bennett McPake and Mills 1997; Turner and Hulme 1997). Arguments in favour 
of the use of market incentives in health care can be summarised as follows (Broomberg 1994): 
a) increased provider competition is argued to increase technical efficiency on the supply side and 
therefore allocative efficiency within the system 
b) contractual relationships enhance efficiency on the purchaser and provider side via the incentive 
structure inherent in the contract 
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c) the contracting process itself may promote transparency in trading and decentralisation of 
managerial responsibility, which may both have beneficial effects in terms of efficiency. 
These arguments are clearly rooted in the "clean" models of microeconomic theory, which tend to 
assume a well-defined information structure, that actors' preferences are pre-determined and that they 
have unlimited capacity for processing information (Clague 1997). The applicability of these 
conditions to markets for the delivery of health care services, especially in developing countries, 
is 
questionable (Schick 1998). Attempts to translate the above theory into practice highlight several 
tricky assumptions, particularly (Broomberg 1994): 
a) that enough potential providers exist to enable the creation of provider competition 
b) that provider competition, without any change on the purchasing side, can enhance efficiency 
c) that the benefits of introducing market incentives will outweigh the transaction costs (of their 
implementation and maintenance of the market structures) 
d) that government has adequate capacity to enter into and manage contractual relationsh'ps with the 
private sector. 
The question of whether the appropriate conditions exist in many government services for a policy of 
competitive contracting is further tackled by Walsh et al (1997), who refer to a: 
"potential contradiction between the declared sovereign virtue of competition (in principle) and the 
urgent necessity for co-operation (in practice). " (p. 11) 
They observe that: 
it is evident fi omn the outset that public authorities are significant if not monopsonistic purchasers of 
services which themselves tend to monopoly in provision. " (p. 31) 
Due to the local consumption of goods, which contain high levels of asset specificity in equipment or 
expertise, there may not be a great deal of competition within any local field. The special conditions 
of each situation may give rise to different types of contract. 
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MACNEIL'S CLASSIFICATION OF CONTRACTS 
The different types of contract which may arise are described usefully in the work of MacNeil (1974; 
1978), who draws attention to the fact that contracts govern a variety of transactions and can have a 
variety of shapes to match the varied attributes of these transactions. In his essay "The Many Futures 
of Contracts" (1974), MacNeil attempted to reconcile the simple concept of a contract as "a 
promise .... 
for the breach of which the law gives a remedy" with what he described as "the real life of 
contractual behaviour "(p. 693). He described a spectrum of relationships between parties wishing to 
exchange goods, and argued that different types of contract would be used to formalise exchanges 
along this spectrum. For instance, at one end of the spectrum, the purchase of fuel at a petrol station 
is illustrative of a transactional event - it is short, limited in scope, the exchange is measurable and 
there is no foreseeable or necessary future to the transaction. This is contrasted with the type of 
contractual relationship implied by marriage: 
"The latter consists not of a series of discrete transactions, but of what happened before (often long 
before), of what is happening now, and of what is expected to happen in the future. These continua 
form the relation without a high degree of consciousness of measured transactions. Nonetheless, 
exchange, both economic and social, takes place in such a relation, even if not in the measured terms 
of the transaction" (MacNeil 1974 p. 721). 
Corresponding to the different types of relationship which they must govern, MacNeil therefore 
developed the following classification of contracts: 
a) Classical contracts govern truly discrete transactions, occurring between total strangers, brought 
together by chance and sure never to see each other again. Tip; exchange must be made by barter 
as even common money would imply a social structure to which both parties belong. Thus, there 
is no `context' to a discrete transaction; all that is of relevance to the transaction will be 
contained within the act of exchange, implying that discrete transactions can be planned with 
complete accuracy. 
b) Neo-classical contracts govern relationships which face some limitations in their planning for 
different contingencies and therefore utilise a range of techniques and processes within the 
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contract to create flexibility over the longer term (e. g. third-party determination of performance 
or one party control of terms). 
c) Relational contracts describe a situation in which a contractual relation has moved beyond the 
bounds of either the classical or neo-classical system, and discreteness and presentiation2 are 
reduced to roles equal or often subordinate to the need to harmonise conflict and preserve the 
relation. The reference point has ceased to be the contract itself and becomes "the entire relation 
as it has developed throughout time" (MacNeil 1974). 
MacNeil concluded that increasingly the dominant mode of economic organisation was the relation 
and not the discrete transaction: 
"Advanced economies require greater specialisation of effort and more planning than can be 
efficiently achieved... through discrete transactions: they require the projection of exchange into the 
future through planning of various kinds, that is, planning permitting and fostering the necessary 
degree of specialisation of effort. " (MacNeil 1978 p. 857) 
Despite this prediction, many public sector management reforms appear to still be predicated on the 
idea of classical coniracting (Bennett and Ferlie 1996; Goddard and Mannion 1998). 
ECONOMIC APPROACHES TO THE STUDY OF CONTRACT 
Economics has an impressively extensive and formal theory of exchange but lacks a correspondingly 
extensive theory of contract (Deakin and Michie 1997). Whilst economic approaches to explaining 
the nature of contracts vary considerably, none appears able to offer a comprehensive framework for 
analysing the many aspects of contracts satisfactorily. The shortcomings of neo-classical theory in 
explaining how contracts operate are described below, followed by the contributions of market failure 
literature on asymmetries of information (principal agent theory, transaction costs). Last, `new' or 
`modern' institutional economics' willingness to incorporate both context and the role of individuals 
in determining a contractual transaction is described. This has given rise to new insights in the study 
of contracts and also suggests interesting new avenues for approaching the question of contracting for 
health in LMICs. 
a way of looking at things in which a person perceives the effect of the future on the present. It is a recognition that the 
course of the future is so unalterably bound by present conditions that the future has been brought effectively into the 
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It is a paradox that although many of the NPM policies described earlier have been inspired by a 
belief in the efficiency of market forces, neo-classical economic theory appears unable to offer much 
to the understanding of the new organisational forms to which its application has given rise. 
Contracting out is in essence an issue of changing organisational form and much of neo-classical 
theory is particularly ill-suited to analysis of the effects of this, given its reliance on the idea of 
multiple, homogenous firms. It lacks an approach to the recognition of what may influence 
individuals in different organisational settings - being in fact quite lacking in any recognition of what 
influences individuals, what Bates refers to as the 'fundamental embarrassment of neo-classical 
economics" (Bates 1997 p. 28). Hodgson (1988 p. 57) quotes Pareto's comment "the individual can 
disappear, provided he leaves its this photograph of his tastes ". The neo-classical approach is 
equally uninformative about the organisations or firms that are the actors within its analysis, with an 
apparently unbridgeable gap between the firm as an economic actor and the firm as an administrative 
and financial organisation as it operates in the `real world' (Toye 1997). Also frustrating to a study 
of contracting are the standard assumptions of neo-classical theory of costless transacting, perfect 
foresight and complete information, as these render almost any attempt to explain different 
organisational forms redundant. 
A description of how contracts would work according to neo-classical theory as summarised by 
Walsh et al (1997 p. 33) below, appears quite utopian: 
"Contract, in its traditional, neo-classical form is a relatively impersonal process in which the 
parties to an agreement state their formal commitments to each other. They may be held to these 
commitments and, should they fail to honour them, sanctions may be brought to bear. The law stands 
behind the agreement, as the means of resolving differences. The contract serves to allocate risks, 
responsibilities, and rewards precisely between the parties to the contract. The relationship between 
the client and contractor is limited to matters specifically concerned with the exchange. The time 
limit of the contract is strictly defined. Terms and conditions of contract are written, detailed, and 
cover the substantive issues. " 
This approach to contracting assumes that contractual promises are the legal expression of rational 
utility-maximising individuals making discrete exchanges in perfectly competitive markets (Campbell 
present so that it may be dealt with just as if it were in fact the present (MacNeil: 1978) 
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and Harris 1993) and corresponds to MacNeil's idea of `classical contracts. ' Empirical studies have 
found that this classical understanding of the nature of contract has a tendency to misrepresent what 
actually happens (for instance Macauley 1963 and Beale and Dugdale 1973 cited in Walsh et al 
1997). 
The literature on market failure such as asymmetries of information (Akerlof 1984; Arrow 1973) 
begins to highlight complicating factors relevant to the study of contracts, in particular the principal 
agent relationship, and transaction costs (Coase 1960). A `principal-agent' relationship is created 
where one individual or organisation depends on the actions of another, who is supposed to act in 
furtherance of their interests (Pratt and Zeckhauser 1985; Guesnarie 1990). The need for contracts 
arises to set out what each party will deliver in an exchange, and in some cases to spread risk and 
align incentives, such as in the case of share-cropping (Toye 1997). However, without perfect 
information at zero cost (in other words, with asymmetries of information and transaction costs), this 
relationship becomes problematic, in that the agent is given scope for opportuni.: tic behaviour which 
benefits himself or herself and usually also reduces the welfare of the principal. 
Asymmetries of information therefore explain both the need for contracts and also why they may not 
operate optimally. Principal-agent theory indicates that incentives are key to the appropriate design 
of contracts, but due to asymmetries of information their operation may be problematic. However, 
principal agent theory, whilst recognising asymmetries of information between principal and agent, 
usually assumes that fully comprehensive` contracts can be written. Little insight is draw: as to what 
types of contractual or hierarchical relationship may be appropriate in different settings although 
Arrow (1973) emphasised that the degree of trust between a principal and his agent may be a key 
determinant of how efficiently asymmetries of information can be dealt with. It is also interesting to 
note that many compensation mechanisms are not as complicated as those predicted by models of 
principal agent theory, implying that there are other factors at work determining the nature of the 
comprehensiveness here defined as the contract being able to specify all parties' obligations in all future states of the 
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relationship. The idea of `incomplete contracts', which are discussed in more detail below, begins to 
enter the picture (Hart 1995). 
Transactions costs are another result of asymmetries of information. They are the costs of seeking 
and processing information in any principal-agent relationship or exchange. All transactions involve 
costs, those of discovering what the relevant prices are, negotiation and enforcing the contract ex 
post. Contracts also have transaction costs in writing, monitoring and managing them. The costless 
transactions assumed by neo-classical theory are more of a logical construct than a reflection of 
reality (Cooter 1989; Coase 1960; Williamson 1985) and transaction costs have been recognised as 
an obstacle to the efficient operation of private exchange. This means that the firm, or some form of 
internal organisation, may be an alternative, cheaper means by which to organise some transactions 
(Coase 1960) and that the implications of transaction costs must be taken into account in considering 
the desirability and viability of different types of contract. Coase (1960 p. 16) observed: 
"the main reason why it is profitable to establis, i a firm would seen to be that there is a cost of using 
the price inechanism ". 
Whilst still maintaining the rational choice perspective of neo-classical economics, game theory 
offers some interesting insights into what influences the nature of contractual relationships, and 
recognition of the context of a transaction makes its first appearance - in particular what Axelrod 
(1984) terms the `shadow of the future'. He observes that a mutually cooperative approach to any 
exchange will be dependent upon whether there is a good chance of continuing future interaction. 
This is echoed in work by Oliver Williamson reviewed below (1975: 1985) which also emphasises 
the importance of the likely frequency of exchange in defining the nature of a transaction. Similarly, 
Toye (1997 p. 60) used game theory to model the relationship between the World Bank and a 
borrowing government as a contract and found that: 
"the key feature of the game turned out to be whether or not the borrowing country required a 
further round of borrowing from the Bank". 
world. 
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Finally, realisation that the neo-classical market paradigm is insufficient to accommodate a number of 
important economic phenomena (Hart 1990), has led some economists to increasingly focus on other 
approaches which may be able to offer more insight. Kelm (1996) observes that the price mechanism 
is not the only way to bring about co-ordination; there are also the other `conscious' mechanisms of 
institutional arrangements and organisational integration. Writers such as Hodgson (1988), referring 
to their work as `modern institutional economics', stress the role of both the individual in 
determining how economic activity is shaped, and the role of society and institutions in determining 
how an individual behaves. Neo-classical economics is criticised for its expectation of rational, 
maximising behaviour by all individuals and its failure to represent chronic information problems. 
Hodgson makes the link between the importance of individuals and the importance of institutions 
and context as follows: 
"JV/iilst it can be accepted that information and knowledge have important subjective and individual 
features, the concepts and theories that are used in their acquisition are not ... purely subjective as 
if 
they resulted froin an isolated individual.... Cognitive processes are essentially social as well.. We 
are all individuals and the totality of our knowledge and experience is unique, but the mechanism of 
our perception and acquisition of knowledge are unavoidably social and unavoidably reflect social 
culture and practices "(Hodgson 1988 p. 7). 
Recognition of information problems such as uncertainty and limits to human comprehension 
(bounded rationality) also give rise to greater insight into the constraints of using contracts to govern 
exchange and greater understanding of the complexities of contractual relationships. More allowance 
is made for the influence of context in determining how contracts will operate. Campbell and Harris 
(1993) characterise contracts as a mechanism to make the future more tractable via suggesting 
methods for dealing with unseen events and establishing patterns of social relationship and 
communication that will be robust. This alternate view argues that contracts act more as a bonding 
mechanism, not allocating risks in great detail but signifying willingness to co-operate (Gordon 
1985). In this view, the social process surrounding contracts is at least as important as the contract 
itself, about which parties may be relatively ignorant. Individuals partaking in contracts may behave 
more as if they are in a continuing organisational relationship, making the distinction between market 
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and hierarchy more blurred (Walsh et al 1997). Contracts may have more to do with the relationship 
which frames them than with what is to be exchanged. This echoes MacNeil's view that: 
"Planning how to do things and how to structure operating relations ... rather than simply 
defining 
what is to be exchanged, has come to dominate a great deal of nmodern contract " (MacNeil 1974 
p. 762). 
Highly formalistic approaches to contract may indeed hinder the development of flexible, robust 
contractual relations. Stewart (1993 p. 12) refers to the importance of acknowledging "what cannot 
be expressed in contracts ". 
It is increasingly argued that more relationally oriented contracts are more likely to be socially as 
well as technically sufficient, able to cope with unforeseen circumstances and able to deal with 
problems of observability, information asymmetry and the possibility of opportunism. Trust is basic 
to effective operation of contracts as indeed to all organisations, and vagueness and ambiguity may 
even contribute to its development. Longer term relationship contracts increase the value of the 
shadow of the future, making reputation important and both parties less likely to cheat. 
Roberts (1993) has applied some of these theories to the internal market of the NHS and found that 
the initial annual cycle of contracting in the NHS was inappropriate for the vast bulk of contracting 
(this cycle has subsequently been extended in the new White Paper (DOH 1997)). An annual cycle 
will not be conducive to optimal investment in specific assets as the potential threat of losing a 
contract may be too great to justify the investment. She observes that in the context of a service 
which entails large sunk costs or specific assets, markets are unlikely to provide the discipline 
necessary to ensure efficiency, both due to suboptimal investment and the likely departure from the 
market of those who do not win the contracts. In similar vein, a number of other writers have argued 
that the introduction of contracts in health care may not enhance efficiency due to the increase in 
transaction costs which they imply (Ashton 1998; Bartlett 1991) although Ashton has pointed out 
that this is dependent upon the nature of the service. Again, it is observed that: 
"as the market matures together with the relationships within it, the style of contracting is likely to 
shift away from the transactional end of MacNeil's contracting continuum further towards the 
relational pole" (Ashton 1998 p. 367). 
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Hart (1995) further emphasises the difficulties of writing comprehensive contracts, their subsequent 
incompleteness and therefore that the `ex post' allocation of power (or control) matters, in order to 
reduce what he terms "haggling" or "hold up behaviour" by one party to the transaction, suggesting 
that some form of integration or long term relationship is likely to lead to more efficient outcomes. 
Hart's emphasis on the incompleteness of contracts raises further questions about how the behaviour 
of contracting parties is determined. If incomplete contracts fail to specify each party's actions fully, 
additional factors are at play which determine how a partially defined contracting relationship is to 
operate. Recognition of the likely incompleteness of contracts then begs the question of what other 
forces are at play determining the behaviour of parties in an incompletely defined contractual 
transaction. Behaviour within some contracts may be determined as much by factors external as 
internal. The environment in which contracting takes place and other external factors become 
correspondingly more important as determinants of how contracts will operate. Determinants of the 
contractual relationship are no longer contained purely within the contract. Equally the way in which 
individuals react to the contract may not be best explained by ideas of instrumental rationality, but 
may be to at least some extent socially determined. The co-operation implied by increasingly 
complex and relational contracts relies upon the presence of an institutional and organisational 
framework within which to operate, and to some extent the nature of contracts will be determined by 
this framework. Walsh observes that the impact of contracts needs to be understood within the total 
institutional context within which they operate (Walsh et al 1997). Similarly Tyler and Kramer note 
that a: 
"chorus of writers has argued for greater attention by scholars to the social context within which 
individuals behave" (Tyler and Kramer 1996 p. 2). 
Institutional economics emphasises the importance of the role of both institutional and environmental 
factors and individual beliefs and motivations in shaping the way that contracts will operate. What 
the introduction of each of these two dimensions can bring to the study of contract is examined in 
turn below. 
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INSTITUTIONAL AND EXTERNAL FACTORS 
The contractual environment plays a key role in supporting incomplete contracts, the social, 
institutional and organisational context within which contracts operate should all be considered 
(Arighetti, Bachman and Deakin 1996). This includes its competitiveness and the nature of the 
service to be specified. MacNeil termed the broader contractual environment as `socio-economic' 
support, or the `social matrix', noting that it may be moral, legal, economic, social or otherwise 
(MacNeil 1974). Norms and conventions embedded in the social, institutional and organisational 
arrangements of the contracting environment allow the generation of trust, enhance the operation of 
the system and may determine how widespread and successful the use of contracts is (Burchell and 
Wilkinson 1996; Deakin and Wilkinson 1995). 
Sources of institutional norms include the legal system, mechanisms of economic management 
directly available to the state (taxation, public spending, industrial and macro-economic policy), other 
forms of regulation and non-state bodies of various kinds including trade associations. Organisations, 
including firms, network relations and also markets themselves are less stable and operate within the 
general framework set by institutional norms, while themselves also operating as structures for the 
governance of exchange (Deakin and Wilkinson 1995). Other institutional factors which influence 
the contracting environment include those related to labour legislation, norms of employment, income 
protection and the activities of trade associations and other professional bodies (ibid). The norms 
established by these means serve to minimise the risk to firms in trusting other firms and in entering 
into long term asset-specific relationships. Efficiency and effectiveness of the regulatory 
environment is another key influence upon the contractual environment. The role of the nature of the 
market, nature of the service being contracted, legal enforcement and regulatory capacity are each 
examined here in turn. Trust is dealt with in greater detail in the next section as a factor which is 
gaining increasing attention as playing a central role in the determination of how contracts operate. 
A key feature of the external context has been highlighted as the nature of the market, notably the 
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degree of competition and the rate of change and stability (Williamson 1975; Walsh et al 1997). The 
degree of market competition will influence what types of contractual relationships develop, how 
they will operate and the nature of co-operative behaviour within them. It may encourage co- 
operation within contractual relationships, due to a lack of alternative providers/purchasers. A higher 
degree of competition may encourage purchasers to move away from relational contracting to a more 
transactional approach. However, according to Williamson's concept of the `fundamental 
transformation' (Williamson 1985), a large number of bidders for a contract at the outset does not 
necessarily imply that such competitive conditions will continue to apply in cases where a transaction 
requires some form of specialised investment. Furthermore, LeGrand and Bartlett (1993) highlight 
the importance of competition on the purchaser as well as provider side of the market to avoid 
monopoly purchasing power, and observe that in a number of quasi-market settings studied in the 
UK, the district health authority was furthest from meeting this requirement. Mills (1997b) reflects 
on equal difficulties attached to achieving competition on the purchaser side in LMICs where 
individual's cash incomes are low and achieving choice of purchaser would require large state 
subsidies. 
The nature of the service will also have a key influence, through the impact on the degree to which 
the service can be specified, and the ease with which performance can be monitored (Walsh et al 
1997). In the case of a service such as primary care in the setting of a district health system in South 
Africa, the difficulties inherent in both specifying contracts and monitoring delivery have been 
highlighted (McCoy, Buch and Palmer 2000) 
It has been argued that a key role of the contractual environment is to assist in fostering and 
maintaining trust between contracting parties (Burchell and Wilkinson 1996). The importance of 
institutions in trust formation has also been demonstrated and the more effective the contractual 
environment is in increasing information and reducing conflict, monitoring and risk from the 
individual relationship, the greater will be the potential for trust building (ibid). 
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Rather than trust, the classical theory of contract places legal enforcement at centre stage. however, 
both Williamson (1985) and MacNeil (1974) comment on the assumption in classical contracting 
theory that every contract is accompanied by effective laws which will be resorted to where 
necessary. Whilst some studies argue that the role of the legal system in underpinning relational 
contracting is arguably greater than has been previously allowed for (Arighetti, Bachmann and 
Deakin 1996), many theoretical and empirical studies question any emphasis on the role of the law in 
underpinning contractual relations. This is both on account of the difficulty for the courts in being 
able to assess the values of parties' ex ante contractual expectations, and more importantly because 
resort to court-ordering is very harmful to long term relational contracts (Deakin and Wilkinson 1995; 
Arighetti, Bachmann and Deakin 1996; Williamson 1985). A study of inter-firm contracting in 
Wisconsin found that managers were highly sceptical about the value and relevance of breach of 
contract damages. Extra legal sanctions and pressures, in particular the need to maintain the firm's 
reputation, were more important than the threat of legal action in inducing performance (Arighetti, 
Bachmann and Deakin 1996). In the case of the NHS internal market, resolution of contractual 
disputes is specifically kept out of the courts (Allen 1995). Last, efficiency and effectiveness of the 
regulatory environment must be considered. Several studies have found this typically to be quite low 
in LMIC settings (see Kumaranayake 1997), in particular the lack of enforcement of existing 
regulations. This is largely due to weak capacity and too few resources expended on regulatory 
activity (ibid). 
INDIVIDUAL FACTORS 
In contrast to the anonymous actors of neo-classical theory, Williamson (1975) acknowledges the 
importance played by human factors in attempting to grapple with problems of economic 
organisation, such as what defines the nature of contracts. He observes that these are often 
suppressed in many of the conventional models of economic man: 
"more self conscious attention to rudimentary human attributes is essential if we are to adequately 
36 
characterise and more accurately understand many of the problems of markets and hierarchies" 
(Williamson 1975 p. 2) 
In particular, Williamson highlights the two "elementary attributes" of human decision makers as 
bounded rationality' and opportunism' and a key environmental factor as whether there is a 
competitive market, which in later work (Williamson 1985) he develops further as the idea of asset 
specificity'. He observes that the costs of writing contracts will vary according to the characteristics 
(bounded rationality, opportunism) of the human decision-makers that are involved in the transaction 
on the one hand and the objective properties of the market on the other (small-number conditions). 
Firm and market are characterised as alternative ways of governing transactions, between the 
boundaries of firm and hierarchy lie various degrees of contract specification and contractual 
difficulty (Williamson 1975; 1985). 
A summary of the way that opportunism and bounded rationality may interact and the types of 
contract most appropriate in different settings is shown in table 2.2. Where both bounded rationality 
and opportunism are absent Williamson characterises the operation of the market as "bliss" e. g. there 
are no contractual difficulties. With opportunism but no bounded rationality, it is possible to write 
`comprehensive contracts' which specify all contingent supply relations comprehensively, but the 
introduction of bounded rationality would make such comprehensive specification impossible. 
Where bounded rationality is admitted but there is no opportunism, a `general clause contract' 
contains clauses designed to guide the parties to the contract by joint profit maximisation 
considerations and an appropriate sharing rule, designed to make them act co-operatively when 
unforeseen circumstances arise. Finally, the presence of both bounded rationality and opportunism 
are likely to lead to `serious contractual difficulties'. In such a context internal organisation (a 
hierarchy) may be preferable, as contracts will be unable to be comprehensively specified and " 
Bounded rationality arises because "the capacity of the human mind forformulating and solving complex problems is very 
small compared with the size of the problems whose solution is required for objectively rational behaviour In the real world 
(Simon 1961). This definition of bounded rationality involves both neurophysiological and language limits (Williamson 
1975 p. 21) 
S.. a lack of candour or honesty in transactions, to include self interest seeking with guile"(Williamson 1975 p. 21) 
6 Parties engaged in a trade that is supported by nontrivial investments in transaction-specif ic assets are effectively operating 
in a bilateral trading relation with one another ( Williamson 1985) 
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opportunism suggests that parties to the contract are likely to exploit such a situation. Internal control 
is argued to offer access to a further set of incentive and control techniques (via the organisation of a 
firm) which may be more effective than reliance on any market foram of contracting (Williamson 
1975). 
Table 2.2 Williamson's four-way classification of contract 
BOUNDED RATIONALITY 
OPPORTUNISM Absent Admitted 
Absent Bliss "General clause contracting" 
Admitted Comprehensive 
contracting 
Serious contractual difficulties 
Source: Williamson (1985 p. 67) 
Williamson therefore highlights the importance of the interaction between three key variables in any 
contracting relationship: the nature of the service being contracted, the motivation of the individuals 
involved in the contractual relationship, and the nature of the market in which the contract is let. 
A second important role of the individual in any discussion of contracts is to consider how different 
contract types interact with their motivation. Contracts aim to create an incentive structure to which 
individuals respond; contract design is about incentives (or sanctions) that will operate efficiently in a 
given contractual environment. However, recent work emphasises that not all individuals respond in 
the same way to the same set of incentives. Other motivational influences upon individuals delivering 
services under contract need to be considered. Effective design therefore requires an understanding 
of the motivations of the contracting parties (both the firm and the individuals within it), their 
capacity and the existing institutional and organisational capacity to support the contract. 
Motivations include the attitudes of contracting parties to risk, to the service provided and to the 
people to whom the service is provided. Profit making firms or individuals will be largely influenced 
by financial incentives and a perception of the organisational and institutional environment 
(effectiveness of regulation and monitoring). It is less easy to speculate as to the incentives most 
important for a non profit making firm or each individual operating alone or within an organisation. 
38 
Robinson (1997) goes some way by characterising NGOs as either voluntary organisations or public 
service contractors, with the latter being more market-driven and less value-driven. However, very 
little is known about the motivation of any of these types of providers and the interplay of that with 
other factors in the contractual environment, especially in developing countries. 
Handy (1993) notes the complexity of elements involved in motivating individuals and the failure of 
theories of organisational behaviour to come up with one generally applicable theory of how 
incentives operate. This is echoed by Le Grand (1997 p. 153) who observes that whilst "assumptions 
concerning human motivation and behaviour are the key to the design of social policy" we may find 
that we are ignorant about what he terms the "mainsprings of human motivation". He identifies two 
possible forms of motivation, each calling for quite different policy, and therefore in this case, 
contract design. The first type would principally respond to financial incentives and is self interested 
("the knave") whilst the second ("the knight") assumes that people are predominantly public-spirited 
or altruistic. Policies or contracts constructed on one set of assumptions would clearly be markedly 
different from those constructed on the other. 
The literature on response to incentives by health care providers observes this broad distinction 
between financial and non-financial motivation or incentive response. In the case of financial 
incentives for GPs in the NHS, these can range from simple target payments for certain services, as 
was introduced into the GP contract in the NITS in 1990, to the more complex approach of GP 
fundl, alding. Much research into the impact of both of these policies emphasises the `non-linear' 
relationship between financial incentives and the desired effect on the behaviour of providers (see 
Lynch 1994; Hughes and Yule 1992 on the GP contract and Whynes, Heron and Avery 1997; Gosden 
and Torgerson 1997 and Stewart Brown, Gillam and Jewell 1995 on fundholding), although other 
work on the NHS has found that doctors do respond to financial incentives by managing demand 
(Giuffrida and Gravelle 1999). Overall, studies highlight the many attenuating influences on the 
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effectiveness of a pure financial incentive, including the level of the incentive, the identity of the 
provider, and socio-economic factors relating to the community in question. 
Other motivating factors which can attenuate the influence of financial incentives can be divided into 
environmental and personal. On the environmental side, Preker and Harding (1999) suggest issues of 
governance (such as how residual claims and decision rights are distributed) and market environment 
are both important alongside the payment mechanism in determining an environment of incentives. 
In the case of contracts with individuals such as GPs, individual motivation must also be given 
considerable weight. To examine Le Grand's "mainsprings of human motivation", there is a wealth 
of literature in organisational and management theory attempting to answer one fundamental 
question, here phrased by Simon (1991 p 34 quoted in McMaster 1998 p51): 
"... not why free riders exist, much less employees who exert something less than their maximum - but 
why there is anything besides free riding? Why do many workers exert more than minimally 
enforceable effort? " 
Many aspects of New Public Management recognise that in any production process: 
"the key resource is human, hence the emphasis is placed on techniques for rewarding and 
motivating staff' (Walsh et al 1997). 
Frequently studies of health provider behaviour have to acknowledge the importance of this factor. 
For instance evaluations of GP fundholding in the NHS reforms (Le Grand, Mays and Mulligan 
1998) make reference to the "professional ethic" and that: 
"those working in the service continued to see themselves as engaged in the provision of public 
services based on relations of mutual trust" (Le Grand, Mays and Dixon 1998 p. 132) 
Seeking to explain a lack of evidence for cream-skimming, when all theory would point to ti. e GP 
fundholder contract encouraging it, the same authors suggest: 
"both purchasers and providers were not perhaps as single-minded in the pursuit of a narrowly 
defined self - interest as the internal market required; e. g. they continued to operate more like 
knights than knaves " (LeGrand, Mays and Dixon 1998 p. 133). 
Feelings of altruism or social responsibility may be just as important in determining how a health 
care provider delivers care to a patient as what is written in their contract. Equally, altruism has been 
argued by authors such as Titmuss (1970) and Axelrod (1984) to benefit the giver, although they 
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hypothesise how this happens in different ways. According to Axelrod, individuals co-operate to 
reap strategic benefits whilst Titmuss emphasises the satisfaction which the giver receives from 
knowing that they have been of benefit to society. 
TRUST 
Trust is frequently posited as a key factor in the operation of different types of contract and one that 
encompasses both individual and institutional/social factors. A shift towards the use of contracts in 
public services, and a concern with the subsequent identification of the problems of developing, 
specifying and monitoring complex services, has been one of the driving forces for a new interest in 
trust in public management (Newman 1998), and is a key concept in the analysis of the way in which 
individuals work, individual organisations work and how they relate to one another (Walsh et al 
1997). The concept of trust has become indispensable to any discussion of the role of motivation, 
incentives and monitoring in the operation of contractual relationships. It is increasingly seen as 
playing an essential role in underpinning efficient contractual relationships, reducing the need for 
complex and expensive information and monitoring inherent in principal-agent relationships (Arrow 
1973; Deakin and Wilkinson 1995; Gambetta 1988; Goddard and Mannion 1998). On the other hand, 
its role as the great panacea in public sector contracting is also beginning to be questioned (Newman 
1998; Watt 1998; Puffit 1998; Davis and Walker 1998). The degree of trust will influence the 
approach that different individuals and organisations take to contracting (Walsh et al 1997). In 
addition, some approaches to public sector contracting are argued to undermine the development of 
trust or erode existing hierarchical and trust-based relationship;:. (Walsh et al 1997; Davis and Walker 
1998). 
Defining Trust 
Perhaps part of the appeal of trust is the difficulty of defining it or its role in the operation of any 
agreement. It seems in danger of assuming the role of "that-which-is-to-be-relied-upon-when-all- 
else-fails" in contracting relationships - whereas in practice its role appears both more complex and 
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more elusive. 
Several authors have tried to categorise and formalise the concept of trust, Sako (in Goddard and 
Mannion 1998) identified three kinds of trust which address different aspects of the principal agent 
relationship: contractual trust (based on the parties adhering to specific written or oral agreements); 
competence trust (the likelihood of the agent performing in a competent way); and goodwill trust (the 
willingness to go beyond mere fulfilment of explicit promises to taking initiatives to assist the other 
party, and to resist taking advantage of incomplete contracts). Similarly, Coulson (1998) observes 
that many disciplines offer an attempt to define trust. He draws on offerings from psychology, 
sociology, anthropology and economics. Psychologists have categorised trust relationships into three 
groups which are fairly comparable to Sako: calculation based trust (based on a calculation that 
suggests that the course best serving an individual's interests is to trust) experience based trust 
(where one has related to a person or organisation repeatedly and is able to build up an impression of 
their likely behaviour) and instinctive trust (where the decision to trust is instinctive and without any 
calculation). These latter two categories would be close to Burchell and Wilkinson's (1996) personal 
or social trust which forms from long term relationships and shared values or goals. A further, 
sociological or anthropological approach to trust emphasises its culturally determined aspects 
(Coulson 1998; Fukuyama 1995) implying that trust is "socially embedded" and that one society is 
more likely to trust than another. Related social conceptions of trust hold that it has social meaning 
beyond rational calculations, that it can have a strong orientation to society and that people help 
others and/or their groups because they feel it is the morally appropriate action (Tyler and Kramer 
1996). Last, some economists approach a definition of trust in terms of risk. Actors calculate the 
odds and chose to trust if the benefits from collaborating appear good enough. Coulson (1998) 
queries whether something so calculated can really be trust; this approach tends towards game theory 
and relates to the work of Axelrod (1984) discussed earlier, which shows that it is possible for a 
decision to co-operate to be made strategically and purely out of self-interest. 
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Common to all these definitions is the recognition that trust is a changeable concept and exists in 
several forms, each of which is as likely to transform or disappear as to remain static. Mishra (1996) 
observes that previous research on trust has often been both definitionally and conceptually vague. 
Other authors have also become frustrated with its apparent slipperiness. Newman (1998) terms trust 
a "promiscuous concept" and points out that its many guises mean that it is at the same time 
promoted as a route to efficiency (Arrow 1973) and as a kind of idealised counterweight to the 
encroaching role of economic rationality. She concludes that "this polyvalence leads to the problem 
of talking about trust in a coherent and consistent way" (Newman 1998 p. 51). 
Following a literature review, Mishra (1996) identifies four distinct dimensions or components of 
trust: 
"one party's willingness to be vulnerable to another party based on the belief that the latter party is 
a) competent b) open c) concerned and d) reliable" (Mishra 1996 p. 265) 
This therefore allows for trust based on calculations or experience and trust based on instinct, but all 
involve an element of risk and the recognition that someone who trusts is vulnerable and may be 
exploited or let down. It also includes an element of belief, which could be based on research, 
calculation or instinct. Last, trust is voluntary, involving willingness not compulsion and it also 
includes a view of the other party, that they are ultimately trustworthy, that they will not let you 
down. 
Broadening the concept, Puffit (1998) constructs the idea of a continuum between "trust" and 
"distrust" as concepts which might underlie any principal-agent relationship. The continuum moves 
from distrust at one extreme, through "indifference", to "hope" and finally to "trust". This idea is 
particularly relevant to the discussion of contracts in an LMIC setting as one of the principal 
determinants of which of these choices is to prevail is seen as the degree of resources available to the 
regulator, and this is likely to be low in many LMICs (Kumaranayake 1997). For instance, "hope" 
may prevail in a situation where: 
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"a zealous regulator, recognising the impossibility of constant surveillance due to the shortage of 
resources nevertheless believes that compliance is likely or at least possible" (Puffit 1998 p. 220). 
Unfortunately likely to be more relevant in the case of health care, distrust is considered the 
appropriate action where, amongst other factors, the link between cause and effect is uncertain, 
standards are non-specific, adverse results of non-compliance are significant and the risk of 
concealment, corruption and cooption is high. Many of these factors will particularly apply to health 
care contracting in a resource poor environment (Puffitt 1998). 
The relationship between trust and contract 
Trust has attracted so much attention in relation to contracting because it is argued to be a highly 
efficient substitute for many of the most difficult aspects of contracting already discussed, such as 
specification of a complex service and monitoring its delivery. By enabling these to be minimised, 
transaction costs are also reduced. Trust is therefore seen as an all round winner, by making 
contracting easier and cheaper. This is a seductive argument, not least by its simplicity. However, it 
does not remain simple for long, once the relationship between trust and contract is examined. How 
do they inter-relate? Do trust and contracts act as substitutes or complements? Do you make a 
contract with someone because you don't trust them or because you do? What types of contract are 
appropriate for different degrees of trust between contracting parties? 
Arrow (1973 p. 24) observed an element of trust in every transaction: 
"typically, one object of value changes hands before the other one does, and there is confidence that 
the countervalue will in fact be given up" (in Davis and Walker 1998 p162). 
Coulson (1998) expands this point, arguing that the world of contract and the world of trust are very 
closely related: 
"specifying the details of a relationship in a form that can be enforced is often presented as an 
alternative to trust. Those who have trusted and been disappointed may turn to their contracts and 
the law to recover their position. But contract and trust are not alternatives.... A contract actually 
assumes an underlying relationship of trust; because if you expected to have to take your contractor 
to court you would not have chosen that contractor in the first place " (Coulson 1998 p. 16) 
Equally, Newman (1998) argues that the perception that public management is moving along a 
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clearly defined arc from hierarchy, via contract, to trust based relationships is an oversimplification. 
There has always been some type of trust holding any organisation together. The current question is 
which type of trust is replacing which when contracts are introduced, and whether this is necessarily 
a step forward. 
This voice of caution in the embrace of trust-based contracting for the public sector is echoed by 
other authors who question the appropriateness of the public sector relying on a notion as vague as 
trust to oversee the use of its resources. Davis and Walker (1998) look at the environment in which 
Compulsory Competitive Tendering is taking place in one region of the UK. By analysing what they 
would expect a "high trust" contracting environment to look like they conclude that this type of 
enforced public sector contracting has not been characterised by a high degree of trust. They query 
the appropriateness of contracting out being decreed by government and question whether a private 
sector firm would not stick to the "make" rather than "buy" decision when faced with this type of 
service to provide. This leads to the furthcx question of whether trust based contracting can take 
place in local government - the authors argue that contracting may actually undermine the longer 
term relationships that were in existence before. Their conclusion stresses the problems with 
accountability inherent in relational contracting: 
"There is little likelihood that the looser more informal contracting that characterises some parts of 
the private sector would prove acceptable when set against accepted and expected standards for the 
conduct of public life" (Davis and Walker 1998 p. 178). 
Watt (1998) observes that in the case of contracting for white collar services in local government a 
reliance on trust may provide conditions in which corruption can grow. The efficiency benefits of 
trust in reducing transaction costs must therefore be weighed against the potential costs of the 
development of corruption. Puffitt concludes: 
"The citizen might prefer that those who regulate on their behalf be skilled and practised in the art of 
distrust rather than trust, for imprudent kinship with the latter may well result in no more than a 
dance with the devil at the citizen's expense" (Puffit 1998 p. 223) 
It is therefore clear from this literature on trust and public sector contracting that trust is probably 
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desirable (although the extent to which it should be relied upon is questionable), but that it comes in a 
myriad of forms, is elusive and probably difficult to create. Mackintosh (1997) highlights how 
subjective trust is, emphasising the learning process in the development of trust and the important 
link between the expectations of another's behaviour and the determination of one's own. 
Nevertheless, it is arguable that beliefs relating to the motivation of the other contractual party may 
influence the type of contract adopted, and if not, perhaps should do. 
CONTRACT DESIGN 
The formal expression of the terms of a contract both arises from and influences the three sets of 
factors described above - institutional factors, individual factors and trust. Checkland (1997) 
describes contract form as "shorthand for a complex social process". A contract's design is likely to 
reflect all the social, institutional and organisational factors described above, as well as assumptions 
about how they will interact in the future. In turn, contracts influence the way in which contracting 
parties behave, providing a bridge between purchasers and providers which reveals many different 
aspects of how demands and other intentions are expressed, clarifying the information needs of 
markets and showing how risk is to be shared (Appleby et al 1994). The form that a contract takes 
creates incentives which aim to influence the behaviour of the provider in a certain way desired by 
the purchaser. Thus, specification of contracts and their management is a key determinant of their 
impact. 
Like the transactions which they govern, the shape, form and content of contracts vary hugely. At 
one end of the spectrum is the pure transaction (e. g. purchase of petrol) governed by contracts which 
are unwritten because there is no time and no need, and at the other end is the relational transaction 
(e. g. marriage) governed by contracts which are unwritten or highly incomplete due to the difficulty 
of writing them. Also on this spectrum lie the types of contracts which govern health service 
delivery, some of which are legally binding and quite detailed, others may merely be a letter or one 
side of A4 paper which sets out an `agreement to agree' (Flynn and Williams 1997; Checkland 1997; 
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Spurgeon 1997). In the case of developing countries, very little attention has been paid to the nature 
of contracts required for health services, features of their design and implementation including 
pricing methods, and what capacities governments require in order to put contracting mechanisms in 
place (Mills 1998). 
Nevertheless, the type of contract used is important and will have an effect on the capacity of any 
market to operate efficiently. Contracts can act as a powerful tool by which value for money is 
delivered (Allen 1995). The contract can be used to specify accurately what quantity and quality of 
services are required, their price, the methods of monitoring whether they have been delivered and 
the sanctions to be applied if they have not. However, such specifications each take time and 
expertise and any discussion of contract design/specification must include consideration of the 
transaction costs of designing and running a contract and issues of capacity'. Mills (1998) observes 
that in a series of developing country studies of contracting, many problems with contracting had 
their origins in poor contract design and weak management of the contracting process. There was an 
absence of specification of both service nature and quality and a lack of penalties for non- 
performance. Mackintosh (1997 p. 5) emphasises the prevalence of contracts for health care which 
contain perverse incentives: 
"If you pay for cheapness in health care you eventually get cheapness - at the expense of quality. If 
you demand achievement of measurable targets based on data which can be manipulated at agency 
level, eventually the agency staff will manipulate them. " 
Appleby et al (1994) examined the form of contracts and negotiating process during the first two 
years of the internal market and identified the following as important factors in the contracting 
process: expertise, timetable, level of information available, existing purchaser/provider relationships 
and the quality of care specified/delivered. All these factors relate to a broad definition of capacity. 
In accordance with the tenets of commercial contract drafting, Allen (1995) observes that there are 
7 Ex ante transaction costs are the costs of drafting, negotiating and. safeguarding an agreement; whilst ex post are all those 
incurred after the contract is in place e. g. maladaption costs, haggling costs and the costs of setting up and running 
governing and monitoring structures (Williamson 1985). 
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certain key provisions which should be contained in a contract to deal with the most 
likely and 
important eventualities which may occur during the life of an agreement. These are: i) specification 
of performance; ii) monitoring of performance; iii) method of pricing; iv) method of enforcement of 
performance; and v) method of dispute resolution. The manner in which each aspect of these 
provisions is dealt with will influence the overall incentive structure of the contract. Each is 
examined below. 
Specification of performance requires a description of the actual tasks to be performed, the standard 
to which they should be performed and when services must be provided. The concepts of inputs, 
outputs, throughputs and outcomes need to be differentiated, and Allen observes that volume of 
services alone is an incomplete specification, despite its enthusiastic use in many NHS fundholders' 
contracts. Standard, or quality, of performance should also be specified as much as is possible, 
including quality of the process (e. g. maximum waiting time) and the quality of the outcome (e. g. 
health gain). Monitoring is closely tied to the adequate specificaticn of performance and if this has 
been inadequately done, the ability of the purchaser to monitor adequately will also suffer. Allen 
(1995) found NHS fundholders' contracts to be seriously deficient in this respect. Specifying quality 
runs into problems of information asymmetry and observability; with some services even a definition 
of quality may be difficult because of their intangibility. Inputs and outputs may also be difficult to 
observe where, for instance, the input may be as intangible as effort. In many cases in contracting for 
health services, it is likely that both inputs and outputs will be difficult to measure. Walsh et at 
(1997) observe that where monitoring is very costly, and effort and state of the world are 
"effectively" unobservable, contracts will depend upon the outcome alone. The problem is the 
outcome may also not be observable. Neither client nor contractor may know what outcomes are. A 
product such as health in many cases may have to be treated as a credence good. 
Method of pricing should be clearly stated, as well as an indication of where the risk will fall if 
anticipated volumes are not met. Methods of enforcement of performance can take the form of 
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financial incentives (or penalties), termination or other legal or financial sanctions. These need to be 
sufficiently detailed to act effectively. Finally, some allowance for dispute resolution should 
normally be included, be it arbitration or informal conciliation. Evidence from both NHS and 
developing country contracts indicates that these elements of contract design are usually inadequately 
specified or lacking in most health service contracts (Allen 1995; Mills 1998). Sanctions could be 1) 
deduction of money 2) requirement to repeat the work 3) delay in payment 4) termination of contract 
5) refusal to work with a contractor again. Sanctions may still have a role in relational contracts, 
even if just as a threat which should deter those who think they will not be able to deliver the services 
required. However, some sanctions are unlikely to be implementable in the context of health care 
delivery; for instance, there may be no choice of provider, preventing a contract from being 
terminated, or it may not be possible to repeat work. Therefore incentives may be more appropriate 
than penalties, particularly in cases where output is dependent on the commitment of the contractor. 
The importance of common norms and values and an understanding of the motivation of providers in 
such a situation begins to be clear. . 
Walsh et al (1997) highlight the impact on the relationship between client and contractor of factors 
such as the distribution of risk, the level of trust, the observability of inputs and outputs, the extent to 
which quality can be defined and measured, and the timespan of the relationship. Elements of 
contract design likely to determine distribution of risk and hence the cost and quality of service 
provision in health services are pricing methods, price changing rules, service and quality 
specifications, contract duration and sanctions for poor contractor performance (Mills 1998; 
Broomberg 1997). Even in sectors other than health, it is noted that many issues concerning the 
optimal contract form and duration as well as the optimal level of contract formality and 
enforceability remain far from clear (Deakin and Michie 1997). 
Last, by influencing the distribution of risk and reward between purchaser and contractor, the design 
of the payment mechanism is likely to be a powerful influence on the way providers deliver services, 
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even if the role of non-financial incentives as laid out in the previous section is also acknowledged. 
Contracts would commonly make provision for providers to be paid by salary (or some form of block 
grant), fee for service or capitation. Mills and Ranson (2001) evaluate the incentives presented by 
these options as follows (Table 2.3): 
Table 2.3: Key payment methods and their incentives to providers 
Payment method Unit of paid services Key financial incentives for 
providers 
Salary Per month, week etc. of work Restrict number of patients seen or 
services provided 
Fee-for-service Individual acts or visits Expand number of cases seen and 
service intensity: 
Provide more and expensive 
services and drugs 
Capitation/block contract All relevant services for a patient Attract and keep more registered 
in a given time period patients (especially the healthier): 
Minimise contacts per patient and 
service intensity 
source: mills and Kanson (2001) 
Clearly, choice of payment mechanism can create dramatically different incentives even for the 
delivery of essentially similar services. Often the choice of payment method may be limited due to 
circumstance; for instance in many LMICs the feasibility of running a capitated system is low due to 
the high level of administrative capacity required and to high levels of migration between 
communities. 
EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE 
Evidence on the nature and results of the introduction of marketisation reforms in the UK and 
developing countries highlight first the prevalence of relational contracts in the UK and second, 
issues of poor capacity in developing countries. 
From the UK 
Whilst much has been written about the NHS reforms, comprehensive summaries of their impact are 
still rare, with some exceptions (Le Grand, Mays and Mulligan 1998; Robinson and Le Grand 1994). 
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A review of the literature surrounding them serves to highlight several key questions which are of 
relevance to the evaluation of any managed market reform, and also echoes many of the points 
highlighted by the preceding review of economic approaches to contracting: 
1. The nature of competition created by the internal market is unclear. Despite the theory of 
competitive or contestable markets improving technical and allocative efficiency being central to 
the arguments in favour of marketisation, it is recognised that internal markets such as the NHS 
are far from competitive. Evidence suggests that whilst there may be some choice of provider `at 
the margin', in general purchasers continue to use the same provider which they have done 
traditionally (Propper and Bartlett 1997). There is also limited evidence for any increased choice 
for patients (Mahon, Wilkin and Whitehouse 1994; Jones, Lester and West 1994). In addition 
there is a clear trend toward `relational' contracting which tends toward long term arrangements 
and reduces the likelihood of purchasers actively `shopping' in the marketplace at all (Flynn and 
Williams 1997). 
2. The manner in which actors in the health care market respond to financial incentives is not 
straightforward. Studies examining the behaviour of GP fundholders in this regard suggest that 
responses can be highly varied and are influenced by many other issues besides money, such as 
geography or personal motivation (Lynch 1994; Hughes and Yule 1992). Again, textbook theory 
bears little relation to the behaviour of the health care `market'. Furthermore, Paton (1995) 
concludes that the internal market system actually provides `perverse incentives' for inefficient 
behaviour. 
3. The transactions costs of marketisation are high. Administrative staff in the NHS increased from 
4,600 to 13,000 when the internal market was introduced, creating an additional £400m of 
expenditure (Glennerster and Le Grand 1995). The new NHS White Paper refers frequently to 
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the high transactions costs of establishing the internal market and the need to transfer resources 
back into treating patients. (DOH 1997). 
4. Marketisation may have had implications for equity. In the case of the NHS, cream-skimming by 
providers and the growth of a "two-tier" service in which patients of more effective purchasers 
receive better service have both been issues much discussed (Whitehead 1994; Glennerster and 
Matsaganis 1994). 
5. Contracts can act only as a tool and not a substitute for policy. Checkland (1997) summarises the 
nature of contracts within the NHS as "shorthand for a complex social process which has been 
evolving steadily since reforms were introduced". He also notes that contracts per se have come 
to be perceived as having a more limited role than at first envisaged. The importance of clear 
planning and service specification is highlighted but not necessarily assisted by the use of 
contracts. Within the NHS the importance of an adequate definition of which services are the 
responsibility of which organisation is increasingly recognised. Indeed, the suitability of 
contracts and medical audit to `drive' a clinical process is questioned (Hopkins and Soloman 
1996). 
Therefore, limited existing evidence relating to the nature of contractual relationships in primary 
health care from the NHS shows that, as MacNeil (1974) predicted, these contracts rarely conform to 
the classical or neo-classical model but are much more likely to be re: ational. Whilst many reforms, 
at their introduction, were phrased in the language of competition and classical contracting, it is 
common for contracts themselves to be vague about risks and responsibilities, to ignore sanctions that 
are available for failure to perform and to be imprecise about time (Bennett and Ferlie 1996; 
Goddard, Mannion and Ferguson 1997). In many cases, contracts are shown to be left deliberately 
incomplete, and parties often behave in ways that contradict what the contract stipulates (Walsh et al 
1997). Most contracts are found to be imperfect in the sense that they leave many elements of 
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intended performance unspecified (Klein 1992) or need adaptation as circumstances develop (Watt 
1998). Indeed, coping with an uncertain future may best be done by deliberately leaving contracts 
incomplete (Walsh et al 1997). Especially in cases where the investment is low it may not be worth 
the expense of tightly specifying contracts. Mackintosh (2000) finds a great emphasis placed on 
"flexibility" in a case study of local authority contracting for social care, and quotes one manager on 
the subject of incomplete contracts: 
"you have a great long list of things, and you specify it really tightly, and what you end up with..... is 
a series of loopholes. You can specify things too tightly I think and you end tip causing more 
problems ... 1 think with a social specification you create um, not a regime, you create 
a sort of an 
atmosphere "(Mackintosh 2000 p4). 
Even where contracts are well specified, many empirical studies now stress the importance of the 
distinction between the formal provisions of a contract and its day to day operation (Deakin and 
Michie 1997; Vincent-Jones and Harries 1998; Davis and Walker 1998). 
Walsh et al (1997) in a comparative study in the UK analysed the design of a series of contracts for 
health, social care and other local government services according to the dimensions of form, focus 
and content. Contract focus relates to contract specification above, and examines whether the 
contract is specified in terms of inputs, methods or performance: what is required to do the work, how 
the work is to be done, or what are the results to be achieved. Contract form refers to the level of 
formality, whether the contract is based on a fixed or variable price and how it deals with the 
relationship between contract and price. Contract content deals with issues of how the services are to 
be provided, how they are defined, and the nature of contract conditions covering such issues as 
arbitration, variation and default. 
In the case of contracts for health care, 176 contracts were studied, the focus of which were highly 
varied between emphasising input measures or attempting to define results. The contracts fell into 
three different categories of form: block (contractor pays fixed fee for defined range of services); 
cost-per-case (price of each treatment is specified); and cost and volume (baseline level funded on a 
block basis and all funding after that is on a cost-per-case basis). Contracts tended to be block 
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originally and become more sophisticated over time. In terms of content, contracts for health tended 
to be much less detailed than in the other services, and were sometimes no more than statements of 
procedures and prices. A tendency to use rather unsophisticated output measures, e. g. number of 
interventions, was noted. Language was also noted as being less legalistic and less detailed than in 
some other sectors studied. If contracts for health err on the side of `vagueness', this may be a 
reflection of the difficulty of accurately specifying and monitoring the delivery of quality health 
services, or inadequate capacity to do so. In either case, the question remains of whether a more 
detailed contract design would effectively improve the standard of service delivered. 
Key mechanisms within contracts, and therefore determinants of the cost and quality of services 
delivered, are identified as how they deal with risk, how they ensure quality and the use of default to 
cope with problems of unsatisfactory performance (Walsh et al 1997). Within each of these, 
variables of interest are the degree of detail, degree of adaptability, completeness and reliance on 
trust (ibid). 
Health was noted as the most problematic of the three sectors studied with regard to dealing with 
issues of risk, and this influences the behaviour of contracting parties in health. In terms of ensuring 
quality, Walsh found that health contracts had sections on quality tending to emphasise the need for a 
co-operative, incremental approach involving both client and contractor. These statements varied 
from simple to more detailed declarations. Default measures were specifically addressed in only just 
ove: 50% of the health contracts analysed. Failure to deliver was seen as incurring financial 
deduction in only 15 % of contracts analysed. Only 19% of contracts made specific provision for 
contract termination for failure of performance (Walsh et al 1997). Purchasers may attempt to 
reinforce the commitment of a contractor by aligning values or choosing those who are believed to 
share the same values. In a separate work, Walsh observed: 
"in the case of contracts for community care, a great deal of attention is typically given to ensuring 
that the contractor's philosophy is in line with that of the purchaser. .... it 
is easier to ensure 
commonality of values in long term contracts and if the contracting organisation is not primarily 
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oriented to profit"(Walsh 1995 p128) 
Heavy regulation is shown to further fundamentally compromise the nature of the contracting process 
(Bennett and Ferlie 1996; Hughes and McGuire 1992; Propper 1995; Allen 1995; Maynard 1993). 
Hughes and McGuire (1992) refer to the "conceptual gymnastics" needed to sustain the metaphor of 
the market within the NHS, given the nature and extent of government regulation. 
MacNeil's (1974) prediction that relational contracting will be a dominant form is further confirmed 
by recent surveys of contracting in the NHS (NAHAT 1994 cited in Flynn and Williams 1997; 
Spurgeon 1997). These have noted that the majority of contracts were very broadly focused, 
informally worded and adopted a pragmatic approach to monitoring. They were less likely to have 
provisions on how to deal with failure than on how to vary the clauses of the contract, and tended to 
rely on informal mechanisms for dealing with disputes. All of these points indicate a tendency 
towards relational contracting. 
From LMICS 
Evidence from LMICs is scarce and in particular there is virtually no evidence on the nature of the 
contractual relationship between purchaser and provider. Research has been more focussed on the 
desirability of more limited forms of contracting, particularly for non-clinical services. This is a 
reflection of the type of contracting most common in LMICs with the exception of several Latin 
American countries, Zambia and Cambodia'. 
The principal evidence relating to contracting in LMICs comes from a project in six countries where 
researchers documented the extent and nature of clinical and non-clinical contracting in their country 
8 Health sector reforms in Colombia involve distinguishing a purchaser provider split and Mexico is planning a similar 
reform (Gonzalez-Sedano 1995 and Frenk et al 1994 in Bennett, Russell and Mills 1996). Guatamale, Peru, the Dominican 
Republic and Costa Rica all have some form of contracting with NGOs (Abramson 1999). In Zambia, decentralization 
involves individual district health teams being contracted by the Central Board of Health to provide services (Bennett, 
Russell and Mills 1996) and in Cambodia a pilot project is experimenting with different models of `contracting in' and 
`contracting out' the provision of district level health services to private sector organisations. 
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and attempted to identify factors which contribute to the success or failure of contracting 
arrangements (Alvarez et al 1995; McPake and Hongoro 1995; Broomberg, Masobe and Mills 1997; 
Tangcharoensathien et al 1997; Bhatia and Mills 1997; Beracochea 1997; Gilson et at 1997). A 
common research framework (McPake and Hongoro 1995) evaluated the following: 
0 cost of direct provision versus costs of contracting versus costs to the contractor 
" implications for workers 
0 differences in quality 
0 level of satisfaction of different groups 
. the contracting process and associated problems 
0 capacity of the public sector to manage contracting 
" factors which affect feasibility and success of contracting. 
In all cases, the extent of contracting with the commercial sector and for clinical services was found 
to be limited. The rationale for contracting tended to be price in the case of non-clinical services, and 
a pragmatic response to non availability of the service (with no option to expand) in the case of 
clinical services. Design and specification of contracts varied considerably. 
Clinical services were usually paid on a fee-for-service basis and non-clinical services with a lump 
sum payment or at a unit price set in advance by the purchaser. Non clinical contracts were 
consistently agreed through a competitive process although a change in supplier was very rare. 
Number of bidders was often low and clinical contracts were rarely awarded competitively. 
With respect to capacity of the managing agency to handle the contract, the case studies provided 
both good and bad examples. Bad examples included contracts being allowed to persist that were 
highly favourable to the contractor (South Africa) and health departments becoming `locked in' to 
contracts which they could not afford (in Zimbabwe, one province was paying 70% of its provincial 
health budget to one mine hospital). Weak capacity also implied poor monitoring and late payment 
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of contractors, which were likely to act as a disincentive to potential contractors being willing to 
work with governments. On the supply side, capacity issues were whether there were private sector 
firms willing and able to contract for the price the government would pay. Their ability to recruit a 
suitable workforce was a related issue. 
Mills (1997) concluded that contracting out was not a substitute for good public sector management. 
Contracts are tools which still have to be managed and in certain respects this may be more 
demanding on managers than direct provision, requiring new skills. Contracting out was also not 
seen to be a solution to very limited budgets: if governments cannot afford to fund direct provision 
adequately, it was also highly unlikely that they would be able to fund contracts adequately. In fact, 
contracts may have the effect of protecting an arbitrary selection of services from cuts. Lastly she 
stressed that some circumstances making public sector provision inferior to contracted out services 
were amenable to change, and that this was a clear alternative for LMICs rather than further pursuing 
a policy of contracting out. 
Circumstances where contracting out of non clinical services may offer advantages (of cost, quality, 
management convenience) were suggested to include those where: 
0 enough interested and capable private sector suppliers exist in sufficient number to ensure 
competition 
0 public sector funds are sufficient to fund a service of adequate quality 
" public sector rates of pay are higher than private sector rates, and public sector rules make it hard 
to use labour flexibly. 
Nevertheless Mills (1997) emphasises that when contracting is introduced, new skills need to be 
learned by public sector managers, the authority to monitor the contract needs to be clearly allocated, 
and contract specification should be sufficiently detailed that performance can be checked. 
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CONCLUSION AND UNANS\VERED QUESTIONS 
This review of economic theory relating to contracts reveals an interesting breadth of potentially 
relevant approaches for understanding their nature, although also some gaps, mainly in the traditional 
arguments in favour of contracting out as a tool to improve efficiency. Proponents of the New Public 
Management argue that efficiency is improved via any of three routes: increased competition, the 
beneficial effects of managerial decentralisation, or as a response to increased transparency and 
accountability by the use of a contract. Limited evidence, principally from hospital contracting in 
developed countries, indicates that the latter two routes may be more common. Instances of genuine 
competition amongst health service providers who require any significant level of capital investment 
has been found to be rare. 
Equally, contracts for health tend to be incomplete and poorly monitored, with sanctions rarely 
specified and even more rarely invoked. Overall the limited empirical evidence available suggests 
that the operation of contracts is complex and determined by a range of factors better captured by an 
appreciation of the vital role of the broader institutional, organisational and social environment in 
which they exist. Such factors are stressed in the `new' or `modern' institutional economics 
literature. 
Nevertheless, contracts are often still held up very much as a `one size fits all' prescription. This 
review has highlighted some confusion between the policy prescriptions underlying many LMIC 
reforms, based on an idea of classical contracting, and empirical evidence of the nature of the 
contractual relationships emerging in countries such as the UK, which often appear to be more 
relational than transactional. Whilst policy prescriptions are filled with discussions of competition 
and choice, empirical findings on contractual relationships tell a different story, reflecting the 
existence of a variety of contract forms in a myriad of settings. Overall the need for a better 
understanding of the nature of contractual relationships and the factors which determine these is 
clearly required. In particular, this incomplete picture of the dynamics of contracting highlights the 
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need for more detailed information about specific contract design and management processes and 
how these operate in different contractual environments, especially those likely to characterise many 
LMICs. The channels or processes through which a contract does or does not influence the behaviour 
of different types of providers can only be understood by examining a range of different contracts and 
their operation in detail, and by giving consideration to the attitudes and perceptions of those 
involved in purchasing or providing the services in question. 
In the case of contracts in developing countries, this review has stressed that very little is known 
about their nature or performance, or to what any differences in performance should be attributed. 
Factors concerning the role of institutions, market structure, social and environmental factors and 
individual motivations have been identified as influences upon the operation of contracting in recent 
literature from developed countries, but as yet not explored in the context of contracting for health in 
LMICs. The role of such factors in different LMIC settings, how they inter- relate and what their 
relative importance is in different settings are all subjects in need of more enquiry. For instance, a 
greater understanding of the interaction between reliance on trust, detailed monitoring and detailed 
contract specification as alternatives to ensure performance would shed light on the most appropriate 
manner to approach contracting for health in different settings. Alternatively, contracts may rely on 
entirely different operating mechanisms in LMICs from those identified in developed country 
literature. Either way, the types of conditions that must be present for different contractual 
arrangements to function effectively need to be understood to establish a coherent public private mix 
in LMICs. Unanswered questions of particular relevance in an LMIC context include a consideration 
of what constitutes appropriate contract design and management in a situation of weak institutional 
capacity and perhaps non-existent competition (highly relevant to the "export" of NPM ideas to 
developing countries); the implications of differing provider motivations (profit or non-profit) on the 
most efficient methods of managing contracts; and lastly the issue of how poor monitoring and 
regulatory capacity could be compensated for. For instance, can weak monitoring capacity be 
overcome by selecting providers with whom the level of trust is high or which are seen to have 
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motivations more in line with those of the government (for example NGOs)?. The complex 
phenomenon of how an individual contract operates needs to be examined from a range of angles, 
utilising the concepts suggested by developed country literature. A broad approach which takes in all 
facets of the contract's design and operation will allow a comprehensive exploration of the 
mechanisms that appear important in determining its overall nature. 
FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYSIS 
Several key concepts arise from the literature review presented. These have been grouped into a 
number of categories which form a flexible framework for considering the determinants/attributes of 
a contractual relationship, and are shown in figure 2.1. First, environmental factors such as the 
nature of the market in which contracts are to be let, the type of service that is to be specified in the 
contract and the capacity that exists within both purchaser and provider, are all influential. Second, 
at the root of any discussion of contracts are problems arising from asymmetries of information, 
although these will vary in their intensity and effect from transaction to transaction according to 
factors also discussed such as the nature of the service, the degree of opportunism amongst providers 
and the capacity of the purchaser to monitor service delivery. How any purchaser chooses to manage 
these problems is key to the nature of the contractual relationship. Third is the human/organisational 
contcxt of the transaction. Some contracting literature attempts to address the question of the role of 
human factors in the operation of contracts, for instance the implications of a combination of 
bounded rationality and opportunism with asymmetries of information such as discussed by 
Williamson (1975). If opportunism or bounded rationality are assumed to be absent, asymmetries of 
information carry less sinister implications. The potential role of trust and historical context in 
determining many of the above factors must also be considered. 
The literature review in this chapter suggests that such attributes of each specific transaction will also 
determine to a great extent the second set of key concepts, relating to the formal mechanisms of 
contractual control - contract design (and award and negotiation) and monitoring. In its turn, contract 
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design will directly influence the behaviour of those working under a contract via the package of 
incentives that is created. Incentives are determined by the manner in which provision is made for 
1) specification of performance, 2) monitoring of performance, 3) method of pricing, 4) method of 
enforcement of performance and 5) method of dispute resolution. A key influence here is the extent 
to which inputs and outputs of the contract can be specified and provision made for monitoring them; 
again this is directly related to the nature of the service discussed above. 
The third set of concepts centres on the nature of the contractual relationship and what drives it. This 
is clearly influenced by both the previous categories discussed. Relevant factors in considering the 
nature of the contractual relationship may be very broad but include the extent to which monitoring is 
possible and carried out, the types of sanctions resorted to, the role of trust, perceived dependence by 
either or both contractual parties, frequency of legal enforcement, and general perceptions and 
attitudes of each of the contracting parties to each other and to the contract. The literature from 
developel countries may underplay the importance of lack of choice in a contractual relationship in 
LMICs. It is conceivable that there exists a stage where neither trust nor monitoring are functioning 
sufficiently, but the contract remains due to a lack of any alternative to get the service provided. In 
this study the possibility of such a situation, as a form of a dependent, relational contract, is also 
recognised. 
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Figure 2.1: Factors likely to influence the nature of a contractual relationship 
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CHAPTER 3: RESEARCH DESIGN AND RESEARCH METHODS 
The purpose of this chapter is to describe and justify the choice of research design and methodology 
for the research question outlined in chapter 1, and to describe the individual methods in detail. In the 
first section, the research design is described and an explanation for the choice of a mainly qualitative 
case study approach presented. The rationale for the examination of three examples of contracts for 
primary care services in LMICs is that they may highlight themes relevant to the operation of 
contracts in similar settings. The nature of the generalisability that such a case study design may 
offer is therefore important, and this is discussed and the data collection process outlined. Finally the 
status of the data generated by this study is reflected on, as well as criteria for assuring its quality. 
RESEARCH DESIGN 
The study was designed to address the following aims and objectives: 
Aim: "To evaluate the nature of three examples of contracts for primary care services in an LMIC 
and the context in which they operate, in order to inform policy-makers on the desirability of the use 
of different types of contract in different settings and how to improve contract design and 
management" 
Objectives: 
" To describe and analyse contracts in terms of their award process, design and specification 
0 To describe the nature of the contractual relationship between purchaser and provider 
0 To identify and describe external factors and how they impact on the nature of the contractual 
relationship e. g. nature of provider, nature of service, degree of dependence, degree of trust 
" To relate these factors to those which would be predicted to be important by theory supporting 
the use of contracts for health care 
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0 To explore both formal and informal controls potentially determining the nature of the 
contractual relationship and the behaviour of the contracted provider 
" To make recommendations on how policy-makers in South Africa and elsewhere could best 
approach a policy of contracting with the private sector, and what is likely to be appropriate for 
different types of service and different types of provider. 
Research design provides the path from research questions to the research findings. In evaluating the 
nature of three examples of contracts for primary care services, the research aimed to address both 
the question of "what is the nature of the contractual relationship? " and seek answers to "why is this 
so? ". By seeking to answer both "what" and "why" questions, the research described here was both 
exploratory and explanatory. To achieve the above aims and objectives, and following from the 
concepts highlighted by the initial literature review, a series of research questions were posed for 
each contract. Examples of these are given in Table 3.1 overleaf. A research design was chosen 
which was appropriate to answer these research questions. 
The nature of the information sought was a mixture of facts and more subjective beliefs and 
perceptions and needed to take account of the context of each contract. The focus of the research was 
a naturally occurring social phenomenon, the contractual relationship. This, in addition to the small 
sample size of functional contracts available for evaluation, suggested the need for an emphasis on 
open-ended, qualitative enquiry. 
Whilst the previous chapter reviewed theories and concepts which formed the basis for the collection 
of the data in this study, the final interpretation of the data arose from its analysis rather than any 
predetermined theoretical framework. Coast (1999) notes the usefulness of qualitative methods for 
this type of health economics research, in particular their ability to explore complex issues, their 
ability to allow for the role of context, and their applicability for developing theory grounded in real 
experience. This latter feature may be particularly applicable to `alternative' approaches to 
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economics, such as institutional economics, where, in contrast to the neo-classical framework, the 
more piecemeal nature of explanation arising is less likely to be considered problematic. 
Table 3.1: Key theoretical issues highlighted by literature review and related study questions 
Influences on nature of the contractual relationship Research questions posed 
1. Contextual factors What is the nature of the environmental factors 
" environmental (nature of market, capacity, type of' potentially impacting on contract design and the 
service) contractual relationship, including the prior history pit 
" human/individual (nature of provider and the contractual relationship? 
purchaser, motivations of' provider) 
2. Degree of asymmetries of inftrnmation (information What are the incentives and motivations of health 
systems, capacity to monitor, degree of opportunism of service providers under each contract'' 
providers) 
3. Contract design and award process What farm does the contract take, what incentives 
does it create and what factors can explain this'? 
--> Nature of the contractual relationship Research questions posed 
1. Formal and infonnal controls upon the behaviour What appear to he the mechanisms (either within a 
of contracting parties written contract or external to it) which hold the 
2. Factors on which the contract's operation relies relationship together and influence the performance of 
the provider'? How does the contract operate'? 
Under what conditions are different types of 
contractual form appropriate and desirable? 
Choice of a case stud), approach 
The research drew on Yin's work (1994) on case study design by paying attention to the need for a 
theoretical framework to underlie the research design, and to the categorisation of case studies which 
it employs. A case study is a study of an event which also includes its real-life context. Features of a 
case study are the attempt to measure multiple variables using a variety of methods, and seeking to 
triangulate findings from these different methods. Yin (1994) sees the case study as "all- 
encompassing" and a "comprehensive research strategy". In some ways a case study is similar to a 
history, except that it has access to methods such as direct observation and systematic interviewing. 
Case studies have traditionally been looked down upon as a "weak sibling of social science methods" 
(ibid), accused of being a rather weak approach offering somewhat tentative conclusions and limited 
degrees of general isabiIity (Walsh et al 1997; Black 1994). Ilowever, Walsh observes that this 
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perspective derives from a highly positivistic conception of the nature of science, a stance made 
increasingly untenable by exploration of the philosophy of science, admitting that truth may not 
always be an objective set of facts waiting to be "revealed". Case studies are becoming increasingly 
commonplace and gaining recognition as valuable "where policy change is occurring in messy real 
world settings, and it is important to understand why such policies succeed or fail" (Keen and 
Packwood 1999). They are particularly appropriate in circumstances such as the following: 
0 where researchers have no control over events and so an experimental approach is not feasible 
(ibid). 
0 when it is desired to study policy implementation empirically 
" where there are complex causal links between many variables to attempt to understand (when 
"how" or "why" questions are being posed (Yin 1994)) 
" where contextual conditions are a relevant issue for the study 
9 when the focus is on a contemporary phenomenon within some real-life setting- it allows an 
investigation to retain the holistic and meaningful characteristics of real-life event; - such as 
individual life cycles, organisational and managerial processes, neighbourhood change, 
international relations and the maturation of industries (ibid). 
In summary, case studies are good for analysing complex relationships and allowing for the 
importance of context. This is particularly relevant for the empirical study of the implementation of 
real-life policy. Given the importance of context, history and environmental factors in the key 
concepts summarised at the end of the previous chapter, a case study was clearly the most appropriate 
choice for being able to study the nature of contracting in the "real world" of an LMIC setting. This, 
combined with the small size of the sample of contracts available for study made the choice of a case- 
study method both suitable and inevitable. 
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Design of the case study 
Yin (1994) provides a useful categorisation of case study design which is drawn upon here. In this 
research a multiple case, embedded case study was used. The unit of analysis was a contractual 
relationship and a total of three contracts were studied. One contract is presented in great detail and 
two others as summary cases. Within each case study, where more than one contractual relationship 
was reviewed, these individual contractual relationships were classified as a `subunit' embedded in 
each case study. In the case of the Part Time District Surgeons there were 11 subunits examined and 
in the case of the Lesotho contract there were two. The private capitated scheme contract did not 
lend itself to the examination of specific contractual relationships, so this was examined as one 
generic contract. 
The justification for using three case studies was that they would complement each other by 
demonstrating a range of contractual relationships over ,i cross-section of settings. This would shed 
light on the influence of different factors on the overall nature of the contractual relationship. The 
table below summarises the differences between the case studies with regard to some of these factors, 
such as the nature of purchaser and provider, and the setting of the contracts. 
Table 3.2 Features of different contracts included as case studies 
Contract Purchaser Provider Setting 
PDS Public sector - provincial Private sector -Individual GPs Rural towns 
authority who are also engaged in 
private ractice 
Lesotho Public sector -parastatal via Private sector - commercial Remote rural 
contract with construction company whose key activities 
consortium are not this contract 
Private Private sector companies - via Private sector - commercial Urban 
capitated medical scheme company running a chain of 
scheme clinics which are its main 
business 
Site selection 
For the PDS case study, eleven district surgeon practices were selected using purposive sampling. 
Practices were selected in two adjacent provinces, five in the Western Cape province and six in the 
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Eastern Cape°. Two provinces were used to allow for differences in provincial purchasing behaviour 
and capacity. These provinces were chosen because they had a strong history of using the PDS 
system and were using the same written contract, as they had originally both been part of the former 
Cape Provincial Administration. Sites were selected in consultation with Department of Health 
officials to give a cross section of regions and different types of town and contractual history. This 
was done in recognition of the need to minimise results that misrepresent the nature of the contractual 
relationship because they are consistently influenced by one external factor. Some of the district 
surgeons visited had been in the post for over 20 years whilst others were recently appointed; it was 
felt that this would allow for differences in the age and attitude of doctors as well as the effect of the 
history of the relationship on their current attitude to the contract. Care was also taken that towns 
differed in the number of other private doctors practising and the other public health sector services 
available and hence the degree of dependence on the services of the PDS. 
For the Lesotho case vudy, two of the three clinics operating under contract were chosen. Again 
purposive sampling was used, choosing the contract which was most recent and that which was the 
longest established. The purchaser had attempted to lay more emphasis on public health issues 
during the award and design of the most recent contract and so it was felt that it would be useful to 
evaluate how this had influenced the nature of service delivery or awareness amongst the sub- 
contractor staff. 
In the case of the private capitated scheme case study, two clinics (in Guateng and North West 
Province) were evaluated and these were chosen as typical examples of the most up to date service 
provision by the company. No specific purchaser was chosen as each clinic saw patients who fell 
under a range of contracts with different industrial companies. 
9 In the Eastern Cape one practice was included at short notice to accommodate the concerns of the Department of Health 
that the sample would give a view only of the traditional contractual relationship and missed one practice that they saw as 
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As part of the performance evaluation in the larger project a number of public sector sites in rural and 
urban areas were also visited to gather comparative data. Data from some of these rural sites are 
drawn upon as comparisons to the PDS performance data presented in chapter 7. More details about 
the features of these comparison sites are given in Appendix 1. 
Choice of principally qualitative methods 
Qualitative methods are being increasingly used in health services research (Pope and Mays 1999) 
and some types of study naturally lend themselves more to qualitative methods, including those about 
which little is yet known. Qualitative data can give intricate details that may be difficult to convey 
with quantitative methods; they are concerned with the meanings that people attach to their 
experiences of the social world. They try to interpret social phenomena by studying people in their 
natural setting, rather than via means of artificially created experimental surroundings (ibid). 
Qualitative research can be about person's lives, stories, behaviour but also about organisational 
functioning, social movements, or interactional relationships (Strauss and Corbin 1990). Contractual 
relationships fall into this latter set of possible research subjects. In this setting, and similarly to case 
study research, qualitative research usually adopts multiple methods, based around watching people, 
talking to them and reading documents. With any qualitative approach however, these apparently 
simple tasks must be carried out in a systematic, planned and logical manner and then are subject to 
careful rigorous analysis (Pope and Mays 1999). 
The value of qualitative methods in health economics research is also increasingly recognised (Black 
1994, Coast 1999). Coast notes that health economics is in a unique position to learn from other 
disciplines in health services research and consider researching particular questions in what are 
generally considered to be unconventional ways, by using qualitative methods. She also stresses the 
importance of context in considering `multiple realities' and summarises the basic aim of qualitative 
research as to try to: 
particularly innovative and interesting. As site selection was purposive, inclusion of this practice was not seen as 
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` grasp phenomena in some holistic way or to understand a phenomenon within its own context or to 
emphasise the immersion in and comprehension of human meaning ascribed to some set of 
circumstances or phenomena' (Lincoln 1992 p. 376 quoted in Coast 1999 p. 347). 
Case studies are not synonymous with qualitative research and can use any combination of qualitative 
or quantitative methods, but the term case study is often taken to carry implications for the kind of 
data that are collected. Frequently, but not always, it implies the collection of unstructured data and 
qualitative analysis of those data (Gomm, Hammersley and Foster 2000). Methods used in these case 
studies were principally qualitative, that is, findings were not arrived at by means of statistical 
procedures or other means of quantification (Strauss and Corbin 1990). Strengths of qualitative 
research in a case study setting are suggested by Lincoln and Guba (1985) as: 
a) validate and build upon the tacit knowledge that the investigator brings to the inquiry 
b) allow for purposive sampling whereby informed choices of site or location enhance 
understanding of the process being investigated 
c) incorporate the notion that the focus of the design can be adjusted as the process unfolds and 
issues of particular interest are identified. 
Recent research using similar approach 
Several recent studies have used qualitative methods, often in combination with a case study, to look 
at the operation of contracts: 
"A study of the enforcement of commercial contracts in Ghana (Fafchamps, 1996) used interviews 
and highly qualitative approaches such as looking at respondents body-language whilst quizzing 
them on their motivations and beliefs regarding suppliers and clients - "body language was an 
important part of respondents' answers - several laughed or shrugged " (p. 434). 
9 Mackintosh (2000) studied social care contracting in two health authorities to examine the 
discursive construction of social care contracting. Semi structured interviews were conducted 
problematic. 
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with staff, from departmental directors in a "slice" down to field level staff, and also with 
managers of contracting organisations. Analysis of the interviews was interpretative and 
identified shared and contested meanings of key words such as price/ purchase and contract. 
0 Allen (2000) used a case study approach for her doctoral dissertation, employing a combination 
of observation, document review and interviews to investigate and analyse the nature of contracts 
for district nursing in the NHS internal market. 
40 Walsh et al (1997) used case studies to provide an insight into the role of contracting in the 
British public services (health, social care and local government services), observing that "the 
openness, unevenness and relative novelty of the research canvas confronting its suggested that a 
case study approach was likely to be most appropriate and most fruitful "(p. 51). These case 
studies were very similar to those reported here in their approach, using a combination of 
structured interviews, analysis of supporting documents and analysis of contracts themselves. 
" Flynn, Williams and Pickard (1996) used a combination of interviews with patients and GPs, 
observation of meetings and document review in their study of purchaser provider contracting for 
community health services. 
GENERALISING FROM CASE STUDIES AND QUALITATIVE RESEARCH 
The degree to which case studies and qualitative research are able to provide a basis for drawing 
conclusions about some general type of phenomenon or about wider populations of cases is debated. 
Arguments outlined below include Yin's (1994) "replication logic", Mitchell's (1983) "theoretical 
generalisation" and the refutation of this type of reasoning by those who argue that case studies need 
not make any claims about generalisability of their findings and that it is their role in "naturalistic 
generalisation" that is crucial (summarised in Seale 1999; Hammersley and Gomm 2000; Donmayer 
2000; Schofield 2000; Lincoln and Guba 2000). 
The question of the generalisability of findings from a research design such as this goes to the very 
heart of the distinction between qualitative / case study type research and experimental or social 
survey methodology. Generalising from quantitative research is based on choosing representative 
71 
samples and using estimates of probability and chance to estimate the likelihood of events occurring 
in similar cases outside the sample. This is difficult in qualitative research, as generalising from a 
small number of cases on the basis of statistical probability is not feasible (Seale 1999). Mitchell 
(1983) paraphrases the most common criticism of the case study method as follows: 
"The basic problem in the use of case material in theoretical analysis is that of the extent to which 
the analyst is justified in generalising from a single instance of an event which may be - and 
probably is- unique "(p. 189). 
Again, he comments that this criticism arises out of the common assumption that the only valid basis 
of inference is that which has been developed in relation to statistical analysis, whereas the process of 
inference from case studies is only logical or causal, and cannot be statistical. Ile responds to this 
criticism by introducing the idea of theoretical generalisation and warns against falling into the trap 
of criticising the validity of case studies because they are only based on one or two cases. Case 
studies need to be selected for their explanatory power rather than for their typicality as there is no 
attempt to seek statistical generalisability from a case study method. The basis of theoretical 
generalisation lies in logic rather than probability (Seale 1999) and typicality must be looked for in 
the "social morphology" rather than in the case (Mitchell 1983). Case studies do not seek to find 
events that are representative; the line of enquiry is from the event, back to a theoretical framework, 
which expands as a consequence of the case study. It is the theoretical framework that gains from 
each case study. Case studies do not stand alone as powerful analytical tools but only in conjunction 
with a body of theory generated by a series of case studies and other research. Extrapolation from 
each case study to theory is therefore based on the validity of the analysis rather than the 
representativeness of the events (Mitchell 1983). 
Mitchell (ibid) makes the following points about the characteristics of the case study method: 
1. No case study can be presented in isolation from the corpus of empirical information and 
theoretical postulates against which it has significance. Case studies can be used 
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ethnographically and analytically, but to be used analytically they must be embedded in an 
appropriate theoretical framework. 
2. Predictions from an analysis based on case study techniques tend to be theoretical rather than 
empirical. 
3. The validity of the extrapolation depends upon the cogency of the theoretical reasoning rather 
than anything else. 
4. Impact of context features on the events being considered must also be incorporated rigorously in 
the analysis. 
Seale (1999) rejects this notion of theoretical generalisability, commenting that it involves making 
"unwarranted assumptions about the characteristics of populations not yet to be studied ".... "the 
attempt to generalise is, at least potentially, an act of violation "(p. 112). In order to generalise the 
researcher must attempt to ascertain the essential characteristics of a case and in social research these 
will always be "somewhat speculative and refutable by further examples" (ibid). Whilst he 
maintains that generalisation is a worthwhile goal for social research, Seale (1999) concludes more 
modestly that: 
"thick and detailed description of individual `sending' cases, chosen on the basis of evidence about 
the similarities with proposed 'receiving' cases, preferably bolstered by a study of several cases 
rather than just one, is a more secure basis for good work.... Theories generated by single cases 
should always be seen as fallible propositions that might be modified in the light of further 
experience "(ibid). 
Lincoln and Guba (2000) whilst admitting that generalisation is an appealing concept, also advocate 
an intermediate position which does not involve deciding between "nomic generalisations on the one 
hand and unique, particularised knowledge on the other"(p. 27). In a modified form of Mitchell's 
theoretical generalisation, Yin stresses that the theory provided as part of a case study design plays a 
key role in generalising case study results (Yin 1994). 
The rationale for having more than one case study in a design such as that used here is what Yin 
terms "replication logic" rather than a "sampling logic". Replication logic includes both literal and 
theoretical replication. In this sense the basic objective of use of the case study method is again to 
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expand and generalise theories, and not to enumerate frequencies. A "replication logic" seeks to find 
similar results between case studies (literal replication) or different results but for predictable reasons 
(theoretical replication). In replication logic, theoretical replication takes place when different results 
are observed for predictable reasons, by relating the case study to a theoretical framework which 
analyses it differently and therefore would predict different results from the different cases chosen. 
Replication of results across sites helps to ensure that findings are not due to characteristics of 
particular sites, hence it increases external validity (Keen and Packwood 1999) or analytical 
generalisability if not statistical generalisability (Walsh et al 1997). 
In the case of this study, three cases were chosen where contracts for primary care were operating in 
different contexts but within the same overall setting of an LMIC. The use of several cases 
acknowledges the difficulties of generalising from case studies and is not argued to strengthen the 
research design in terms of a bigger sample, but purely to reflect upon the same issues in a range of 
settings. Above all, this research was conceptualised pragmatically --o "add meat to the bones" of 
theory about what types of contracts might operate in LMICs for primary care. At the minimum, 
substantive theory about each contractual relationship examined by the research reported here is 
generated. In addition, tentative generalisation can be made at the theoretical level, such as a 
typology of issues that are important to consider in LMIC contracting and how they might interact. 
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TILE RESEARCH PROCESS 
The Theoretical framework 
A flexible theoretical framework of factors likely to impact on the process of contract design, letting 
and management were identified during the initial literature review prior to the development of study 
tools. At this stage the interview schedules were prepared (Appendix II) to reflect these. They 
covered a range of issues relating to the factors shown in figure 2.1 at the end of the previous chapter. 
These different categories of factors that were considered initially should also highlight two 
characteristics of the phenomena being investigated. First is the complex and interrelated nature of 
the variables that the study seeks to investigate. Second is the importance of background, context and 
history in understanding the dynamic of a contractual relationship. A multitude of categories and 
possible influences and interrelationships needs to be understood in relation to one another. Whilst 
several concepts presented themselves as potentially important, part of the role of the research was to 
find which actually were. 
Data Collection 
Yin (1994) identifies six possible sources of data for case studies: interviews, direct observation, 
participant observation, archives, physical artefacts and documents. Specific methods used for the 
case studies reported here were semi-structured interviews, direct observation and document review. 
Results from the broader research project were also drawn upon to give further quantitative data such 
as cost and quality of care provided under each contract. 
Fieldwork was carried out in four distinct stages between August 1998 and November 1999, covering 
the Western Cape PDS, Eastern Cape PDS, Lesotho contract and private capitated scheme contract 
consecutively. Each facility delivering services under a contract of interest was visited during this 
time. Over a period of two to three days data were collected for a comprehensive costing and quality 
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of care evaluation for each site, as part of the larger research project. During this time fieldwork for 
the case study was also carried out. In addition, further case study fieldwork consisted of 
interviewing purchasers and head office managers at their offices. This was done at regional, 
provincial and national level and any relevant documents were also collected from these sources. 
To gain permission for the research, each PDS was contacted individually and asked whether he 
would be willing to participate in the study; all were keen to agree. The study was described as a 
joint undertaking between the London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine and two South 
African universities10, funded by the UK Department for International Development. For the Lesotho 
and private capitated scheme case studies, the head offices of the service providers were contacted 
and both gave permission willingly. The clinics themselves were only contacted at a later date to 
make logistical arrangements, once they had been informed that the study would take place. 
Data collected for the larger research project is also drawn upon for these case studies - in particular, 
transcripts of focus group discussions, cost data, utilisation data, timeflow data and data on the 
structural quality of care at each facility. Table 3.3 shows the methods used in the case studies, 
which aspect of the contractual relationship they addressed and what role the author played in the 
data collection and analysis of those parts drawn from the broader study. 
10 Centre for Health Policy, University of Witwatersrand and Health Economics Unit, University of Cape Town 
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Table 3.3 Methods used in case studies 
Method Aspect of contractual relationship method is Role of author in data 
assessing collection and analysis 
NI' = author 
Semi-structured interviews with All aspects NP 
providers, purchasers, key 
informants 
Document Review Policy context. Nature of communication NP 
between purchaser and provider. Contract 
design. 
Direct Observation Performance of contract : nature of service NP 
delivery / effect of incentives on service 
provision 
Structural quality assessment Performance of contract : nature of service NP 
delivery / effect of incentives on service 
provision 
Costing Performance of contract : nature of service NP supervised data 
delivery / effect of incentives on service collection and analysis 
provision 
Timeflow study Performance of contract : nature of service NP supervised and took 
delivery / effect of incentives on service part in data collection and 
provision analysis 
Focus Group Discussions Performance of contract : nature of service NP was involved in 
delivery / effect of incentives on service drawing up guidelines for 
provision running groups and 
responsible for analysis 
of transcripts 
METHODS 
Each method is described in more detail below. Whilst a great variety of methods were employed to 
assess the performance of the contract, the bulk of the data used in this study are drawn from the 
semi-structured interviews and document review. 
1. Semi-structured interviews 
Semi-structured interviews were used with both purchasers and providers to explore issues around the 
contract design, award process, attitudes to the contract, the process of negotiation and the current 
contractual relationship, its history and the influences upon it. The interview usually lasted between 
one hour and one and a half hours. All interviews were taped and transcribed fully by the author. 
Forty six people were interviewed in total for all the case studies. Details of how these interviews 
were divided between the different case studies, as well as the race and gender of the interviewees, 
are given in table 3.5. 
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For each case study, the same themes were explored with purchasers and with providers but the 
nature of the interview and the way and order in which issues were addressed were not closely 
standardised (Silverman 1993). For instance, during the interview process for each case study it 
became clear that some questions were more relevant than others and attracted a more detailed or 
enthusiastic response from interviewees, whilst other questions met with uncertain responses. These 
areas were then pursued more closely as appeared appropriate. For instance, in the PDS case study, 
questions about what analysis had been done before the award of the contract to estimate payment 
levels or costs elicited a blank response from both purchasers and providers, suggesting that, whilst 
relevant, this was not a question that would be able to illuminate that particular contracting process. 
In contrast, in the Lesotho case study, both purchasers and providers were more able to engage with 
the question, even if they were still unsure as to the type of analysis that had been carried out. Key 
areas always explored with interviewees related to their motivations for being involved in the 
contract, the competitiveness of the contract award process, ! heir perceptions of the contract design 
and their views on both the existence of the contract and the nature of the other party to the contract 
and the contractual relationship. The nature of the information sought was therefore a mixture of 
facts and perceptions, as summarised in Table 3.4 below. Some types of information are entered in 
both columns of this table, demonstrating the mix of fact and perception which makes up much of the 
interview data gathered. 
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Table 3.4 Factual and perceptual information sought (luring semi-struct tired interviews 
Factual information solicited during the interview Information based more on perceptions 
Providers: 
" the history of their involvement in the contract 
" what proportion of total income the contract 
provided for their practice/company 
" the administrative burden that the contract 
represented and the types of skills required to 
manage it 
" number of potential competitors for the contract in 
the area 
" whether they knew of any competition for the 
contract at the time that it was awarded 
" the design of the contract and the incentives that 
they felt that it created 
" quality and level of monitoring by the purchaser 
" quality assurance systems 
" mechanisms for resolving disputes or agreeing 
revisions to the contract 
Providers: 
" the history of their involvement in the contract 
" their motivation for taking on the contract 
" the nature of their relationship with the purchaser 
whether they felt that the purchaser had many 
alternatives to get the service provided 
" the design of the contract and the incentives that 
they felt that it created 
" the distribution of risk in the contract 
" quality and level of monitoring by the purchaser 
" willingness to engage in legal disputes with the 
purchaser and their attitude to this 
Purchasers: Interviews with purchasers covered 
similar topics but also explored: 
" capacity within their department to adequately 
manage and supervise the contract 
Purchasers: Interviews with purchasers covered 
similar topics but also explored: 
" their attitude to the idea of contracting with the 
private sector in general 
" their beliefs about the motivations of the providers 
" how they felt these contracts fitted in with policy 
on primary care provision in general 
" their opinion of the quality of services offered 
under contract 
" capacity within their department to adequately 
manage and supervise the contract 
Interviews with key informants covered more general aspects of the government's attitudes to 
contracting and their willingness to undertake new contracts, their capacity to manage contracts and 
to control the private sector, and specific detailed issues of the legal status of the PDS contract. 
Some key informants interviewed were private sector providers who potentially might contract with 
the government and in such cases they were asked about their perceptions of the government as a 
potential purchaser. 
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Table 3.5 Interviews carried out for each case study 
General 
background for 
Interviews with 
providers 
No. providers 
interviewed/ 
gender/race 
Interviews with 
purchasers 
PDS case study 
PDS were interviewed 
at their practices during 
the data collection visit. 
In practices where there 
was more than one 
doctor, the interview 
was conducted with the 
individual who was 
specified on the 
contract. In addition in 
each province the PDS 
who was head of the 
PDS' representative 
body was interviewed 
11 PDS 
Gender: all men 
Race: all white 
The regional manager 
responsible for each 
IDS contract was 
interviewed as well as 
managers responsible at 
provincial level. 
Lesotho case study 
In Lesotho, the 
manager and chief 
medical person at each 
clinic were interviewed 
in addition to the chief 
executive of the 
company which held 
the contract. 
5 staff at two clinics 
Gender: 4 men, one 
woman 
Race: 4 white, one 
black (male) 
Personnel from both the 
government level 
purchaser and the 
intermediate purchaser 
(engineering company) 
were interviewed. 
5 (3 Lesotho 
government officials 
and two from the 
consulting engineer) 
Private capitated 
scheme case study 
liitcrv'icws wcrc held at 
head office and clinic 
level within the service 
provider company. 
5 staff at two clinics 
Gender: all men 
Race: all white 
None, due to the 
different nature of 
relationship. There was 
not one single 
purchasing institution - 
decisions whether to 
subscribe to the scheme 
were made by 
individuals. 
0 No. purchasers 
interviewed/ 
gender/race 
8 (4 in each province) 
In Western Cape: 
Gender: all men 
Race: 2 coloured, one 
Indian and one white 
In Eastern Cape: 
Gender: one woman 
(black) and three men 
Race: two black and 
two white 
Gender: all men 
Race: 2 white, 3 black 
Interviews with In Lesotho and South Africa, interviews were held with Department of Health officials, the South 
key informants African Medical Association and other key informants in the private /NGO sector about the 
policy environment for contracting and specific areas relevant to some or all of these contracts. 
Many of these interviews were relevant to more than one of the case studies as they dealt with the 
environment in which contracting was taking place and also may have specifically discussed 
several different types of contract. These interviews are therefore presented as one block rather 
than divided between the case studies as has been done above. 
No. interviewed/ 12 key informants : 
gender and race Gender: three women (all white), nine men 
Race: one Indian, two black and nine white 
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2. Document Review 
a) Contracts: 
Where possible, examples of each contract were collected from either the provider or purchaser. 
b) Policy documentation: 
Documents relating to policy on the public-private mix, contracting or the nature of the contractual 
relationship were sought. In Lesotho very little directly relevant policy documentation about 
contracting could be located. Documents relating to the contracts being studied were limited to 
statements of the desirability of providing health centres for all members of the population in sites of 
dam construction. In South Africa a range of policy documents ranging from 1994 to 1999 relating to 
policies on the public-private mix were accessed as well as some reports by academic institutions and 
special committees on the PDS system and suggestions for its reform. Finally, some PDS gave 
documentary examples of the type of communication that they received from the provincial 
Departments of Health. 
3. Direct observation 
Total fieldwork for the larger project entailed spending two to three days in each research site. The 
nature of data collection required most of this time to be spent in the clinic, around the areas where 
patients were waiting and the consulting areas. The author therefore was able to form a picture of 
how each facility operated and the characteristics of the service that it provided, as well as the 
atmosphere between patients and staff. 
4. Structural quality assessment 
In each facility a structural checklist was completed by the researcher. This included grading of 
factors such as the availability of drugs for standard treatment protocols, presence of a basic 
minimum standard of equipment and the cleanliness and state of repair of the buildings (such as the 
size of the waiting room, number of toilets for the patient load etc. ). 
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5. Costing (including utilisation data) 
Cost data were collected in each facility and a cost per visit and average cost per type of service 
calculated. Both recurrent and capital costs were included in the costing. 
6. Timeflow 
The time spent in the clinic and consultation time of 30 patients were recorded at each site. 
7. Focus Group Discussions 
Focus Group Discussions (FGDs) were used in the broader study to assess the perceptions of users of 
each facility as well as non-users, and reasons for their non-use. The objectives of the FGDs were to 
assess community opinions near to a study facility on access, equity and quality of alternative 
primary care services available. An external social research agency was contracted to run the FGDs 
according to guidelines drawn up by a number of r. -. searchers working on the project. For the PDS 
case study fourteen groups were run, two in each of seven of the towns where contracts were 
evaluated. For the Lesotho and private capitated scheme case studies, in each case two FGDs were 
run in the community near to one of the clinics. FGD participants were women aged between 20-30 
or over 35 who had used a primary care facility in the last six months and did not have medical 
insurance. 
Standard guidelines for moderators were developed and used in all FGDs. The guidelines covered 
discussion of all types of primary care facility available in the area where the FGD was being held, 
user perceptions of each type of facility, whether they had a choice of facility to use and if so, their 
reasons for using the one that they did. Issues around access, perceived competence of particular 
types of service provider, likelihood of referral, complaint mechanisms, quality of care, cost, drugs 
and cleanliness of alternative facilities were prompted for where appropriate. 
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Problems in data collection 
In three cases the PDS was pressed for time. These three interviews were done either at several 
sittings, disturbed by telephone consultations or in a shorter space of time than was ideal. In these 
cases, an attempt was made to cover all the key issues in the interview even if it was not possible to 
explore them fully. 
Accessing documents was often difficult. Some PDS were unable to supply a copy of the contract 
that they were working under because they had either lost it, it had expired or they had not been given 
a copy of the contract under which they were delivering services. This should also be seen as an 
important finding regarding the value placed on written contracts. Accessing policy documents was 
also problematic and there were fewer than had been envisaged at the research design stage. 
ANALYSIS OF DATA 
Analysis of intern. ew data 
Gahan and Hannibal (1998) observe that qualitative research always has three components: 
" Data, which are messy, unstructured, usually textual and always rich 
" Concepts, ideas or hunches about the data 
" The researcher, who is the creator of the concepts, ideas or hunches about the data. 
Transcripts were analysed using NudIST software, which should not be considered to detract from or 
remove any of the above elements, as the two quotes below emphasise: 
"whilst NudIST provides the tools for a researcher to manipulate and interrogate qualitative data, 
these tasks remain researcher directed and implemented " (Gahan and Hannibal 1998). 
"No computer can stand in for the ethnographer's discovery of emergent themes as fieldwork 
progresses, nor the final thinking and analysis " (Okely 1994) 
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NudIST facilitated the process of analysing qualitative data, but it did not enable anything to be done 
that could not have been done by hand, albeit more painstakingly. The decision to use NudIST was 
made because it was felt that it would lend order and rigour to the process and minimise dependence 
on analysis via the arrangement of pieces of paper, which could easily become muddled or lost. 
Informal analysis of the interview data started early in the research process and well before the 
coding procedures described below, with constant thinking through and reaction to the interview data 
already collected. Even as the interviews were progressing, they became more focused on some 
themes which were emerging as important. Conversations with colleagues and my supervisor about 
what was coming out of the interviews also refined the process during the fieldwork stage. 
Opportunity for further reflection took place during time spent transcribing each interview, which 
usually took the best part of a day. By the time the interviews were formally coded their content was 
already known and reflected upon in considerable detail. Many codes had already emerged clearly as 
themes during these earlier stages of reflection. 
A further process of interview data analysis then began by coding the transcripts using NudIST. The 
idea behind such detailed coding of the interview data was to ensure that the concepts discussed 
were: 
"grounded in data on the page as well as on the conjunctive experiential data, including the 
knowledge of technical literature which the analyst brings into the inquiry " (Strauss 1987 p. 29). 
Interviews for the different categories shown in the previous section were loaded onto NudIST, 
creating different analysis programmes for each type of interviewee, e. g. PDS, regional managers, 
national policy-makers, Lesotho purchasers. 
For each set of interviews, a process of `open coding' (Strauss 1987) was followed. Data were 
treated as empirical indicators from which analytical concepts could be derived. Preliminary sets of 
codes were applied to categorise indicators into different themes or under different concepts. At this 
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stage, links between these preliminary categories were not sought and, as Strauss (1987) observes, a 
number of categories were created which later were dropped as not very useful. 
Text was coded to as many themes or categories as appeared appropriate. After this initial open 
coding, each set of codes/theme was examined in greater detail and re-coding, new coding and the 
introduction of new sub-codes took place again. Finally codes were grouped into key themes, in a 
process similar to what Strauss termed `selective' coding. The grouping of categories and themes 
has influenced the way in which results have finally been written up and presented in this thesis. 
Quotes included in the results chapters were chosen as those which most articulately represented 
prevalent themes. 
Document Review 
Documents were summarised to reflect what they revealed about the nature of the existing 
contractual relationship or the government's policy towards contracting. Contracts analysis was 
based on the framework of form, focus and content used by Walsh et al (1997). 
Direct observation 
Observations of the way in which the practices visited were run or delivered services have not been 
formally analysed or separately written up. They have however informed the interpretation of much 
of the other data by providing a strong sense of the context in which the contracts being examined 
were operating and the nature of the service that they governed. 
Structural quality 
Structural quality at each site was awarded standardised scores divided into the following categories 
1) general state of repair of facilities, 2) adequate toilets, 3) functioning refrigerator, 4) adequate 
emergency kit, 5) items of essential equipment, 6) lockable drug storage facility, 7) quality of waiting 
area facilities, 8) adequacy of patient records. A version of the score sheet is shown in appendix III. 
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Costing 
Facilities were costed using a standardised methodology which is described in Appendix IV . 
Analysis of FGD transcripts 
Tapes were translated and transcribed. For use in this thesis, each transcript was analysed by the 
author. 
COMMENTARY ON STATUS OF DATA AND CRITERIA FOR ASSESSING QUALITY OF RESEARCH 
In the fallibilistic approach to qualitative methods offered by Seale (1999) there is still a need to 
critically evaluate findings, as the aim remains to reflect some truth lying beyond the text of the 
research report. This is complicated by the concepts of validity and reliability being to different 
degrees discredited as "markers of an earlier now largely discredited (or at least no longer 
fashionable) 'moment' in the short histomy of qualitative research" (Seale 1999 p. 2 paraphrasing 
Denzin and Lincoln 1994). While some still argue that concern with validity and reliability is 
something that should be shared by all social researchers, the search for validity and reliability in 
research that allows for a belief in multiple constructed realities will always be compromised, and 
contradictory with the idea of judging the trustworthiness of an account (ibid). The idea of relativism 
and a single truth do not sit comfortably together and hence the idea of "quality" rather than validity 
in qualitative research becomes a more relevant, if still equally elusive, concept. 
Since this research relies heavily on the interpretation of interview data, the status of that data is key 
in discussing the relevance of the research design. Due to the nature of the subjects being explored 
and the emphasis on interviewee's perceptions as a key variable driving the nature of the contractual 
relationship, the important role of the individual and how individuals interact with their situation was 
central to the conception of the research. This fits with a more interactionist view of interview data 
that: "accounts are not simply representations of the world, they are part of the world they describe" 
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(Hammersley and Atkinson 1983 p. 107 quoted in Silverman 1993 p. 95) and that interview accounts 
are both situated in context and "compelling narratives" rather than reports of any objective truth. In 
this case, interviews have given a snapshot of how people account for the contractual relationship 
being studied and in which they are active members. They are presenting their own interpretation, in 
interaction with the interviewer, not a report of an objective reality. The interactionist viewpoint 
furthermore stresses an interview as a social event -- which must be interpreted in light of the people 
taking part, how they chose to interact and the context in which they were doing so: 
" when we talk about the world that we live in, we engage in the activity of giving it a particular 
character... assign features and phenomena to it and make it out to work in a particular way... when 
we talk with someone else about the world, we take into account who the other is, what that other 
person could be presumed to know, "where" that other is in relation to ourself' (Baker 1982 quoted 
in Silverman 1993 p. 86). 
A recognition of the situated character of these interview data includes allowance for what would be 
considered a number of potential biases in a more positivist approach. These include `response' and 
`deference' effects where informants may tailor their responses to suit the interviewer or the identity 
of the interviewer influences the outcome of the interview. In this case, the interviewer's identity, as 
foreign, female, younger than most interviewees and non-medically trained, are potential factors to 
allow for in situating the interview data. 
A number of techniques have been proposed to achieve `quality' of research and analysis within a 
fallibilistic framework. Each of these and its limitations is described in turn. First is an attempt at 
methodological triangulation, or combining several methods to assess the phenomenon of interest. In 
this study, document review, interviews and observation all assessed different elements of the 
contractual relationship. Whilst document review revealed the "public face" of the system, 
interviews revealed the perceptions of those who took part in the contract and direct observation was 
able to show what the nature of service delivery and the attitude of the contracting parties was. There 
are weaknesses in triangulation however. First, the nature of triangulation available in this study 
design was not ideal precisely because these were different facets of the relationship accessed via 
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different methods. For instance, it was not possible to observe day to day interaction between 
purchaser and provider to triangulate findings on its nature from the interview data. Similarly, Seale 
(1999) and Silverman (1993) raise reservations about the use of triangulation in qualitative research, 
given that different methods and sources of data will tend to provide different sorts of insights rather 
than contribute to a single, accumulating picture. Second, this raises the question of how these 
different findings can be adjudicated between, once a recognition is made that none of them provides 
any guarantee to validity or representation of a single "truth". 
The second technique proposed as useful for those working with a fallibilistic framework is member 
validation but this was not deemed appropriate in these case studies due to the sensitive nature of 
the information which was given in confidential interviews, and the low chance of overstretched 
medical professionals and government officials being able to read and comment on the analysis. 
The third technique is deviant case analysis or the search for negative instances in the data that he! p 
to guard against culpable error, arising from too great an attachment to the personal perspective or 
values of the individual researcher. Seale (1999) comments that: 
"research is a process whereby the investigator should expect to change his or her mind about things 
which may currently be cherished, an event that is facilitated greatly if methods of data collection 
and analysis incorporate an active search for negative instances "(p. 75). 
The complexity of the data presented in this thesis provides a multitude of negative instances or 
deviant cases and these are an integral part of the overall analysis of the case studies. 
Last some use of quantitative data is suggested by both Silverman (1993) and Seale (1999) to back 
up and give further form and shape to the picture arising from the interviews. This is done in all of 
the case studies by drawing on data from the broader research project, and also by using numerical 
frequencies to present some aspects of the interview data. 
11 The validation of the researcher's taxonomies and analysis with respondents 
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CHAPTER 4: BACKGROUND AND CONTEXT 
Both the literature review and description of methods have noted the potentially important role 
played by context in the operation of health care contracts. The choice of a case study approach 
aimed to allow for this to be taken into account. This chapter gives some history and details of the 
context in which the contracts examined in this study were operating. It also highlights some of the 
historical factors which affect the current functioning and therefore capacity to contract of the South 
African government. Certainly for the PDS contract, which had been operating for several decades in 
an extremely complex and problematic political environment, it was likely that history and context 
would play a major role in explaining its current operation. For the other two contracts, which were 
newer and therefore less rich in the history and `baggage' of their past, there was less of relevance. 
None of what follows is intended to be a comprehensive review, but this chapter aims to provide 
some vital background and context to understanding the material presented from the case studies in 
chapters 5-8. The impact of apartheid on health service organisation and the huge task faced by 
South Africa's new government in overcoming the inequalities of the past, whilst faced with severe 
budgetary and human resource constraints, are discussed. South Africa's powerful private health 
sector and its predominance even at primary care level is described, as well as the government's 
ambivalent policy towards it, and some reasons for this. Last, some specific details about the history 
and context of each contract are given. 
THE SOUTH AFRICAN CONTEXT 
`for far too long this health system has been allowed to evolve along a path dictated by a 
combination of commercial interests and narrow, racial prejudice, and with every attempt to change 
it, we meet face to face with people who profited from this country's unsavoury past" 
Chair of Portfolio Committee on Health (Gilson et al 1999 p. 103) 
This section briefly reviews the current context of health care delivery and health policy in South 
Africa, highlighting the organisational, financial and human legacy of the apartheid era, which has 
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left an under-resourced public sector struggling to meet the needs of the majority of the population, 
whilst the vast majority of resources for health care are engaged it a private sector which only serves 
a small portion of the population. The core context of this study is a public sector which cannot 
achieve adequate medical cover in many rural and per-urban areas without drawing on the private 
sector. 
Separation and fragmentation dominate South Africa's history. The health sector is no exception. It 
is greatly affected by the country's past, from the way that services are organised to the way that 
people working in the health sector interact with each other. The PDS system in particular must be 
recognised in this context as a legacy of the "old" health system, but one which is still having to serve 
a role in the transforming health system. Some points are therefore particularly important for the 
context of the PDS contract. First is the continuing functional fragmentation of South African health 
services; second is the massive transformation that South African governance structures have had to 
undergo to redress the legacy of apartheid and the capacity problems associated with this; and third is 
the likely dynamics of a contractual relationship between an almost exclusively white group of 
doctors, many of whom rendered medico-legal services on behalf of the apartheid state, and the 
mainly black South African government, many of whom were detained by the same apartheid 
government. 
LEGACY OF THE APARTHEID ERA 
Between 1948 and 1994 South Africa was governed according to a policy of explicit racial 
discrimination. At the heart of the apartheid system lay four ideas (Thompson 1990), which 
determine many of the dynamics of post-apartheid South Africa. First, the population of South 
Africa was divided into four "racial groups" - White, Coloured, Indian and African. Second, whites 
were entitled to absolute control over the state. Third, white interests automatically gained 
precedence; the state was not obliged to provide equal facilities for all races. Fourth, the white racial 
group formed a single nation, with Afrikaans- and English- speaking components, while blacks were 
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forced to belong to several (eventually ten) distinct nations or so-called independent states -a formula 
which made the white nation the largest in the country in terms of geography and resources, but not 
population, of which they only represented approximately 12%. The legacy of apartheid is clear in 
all aspects of South African society. While its consequences have been most profound upon the 
welfare of individuals (including their health and education) there are also geographical and 
administrative factors which to this day shape the functioning of the new South African government 
and even a small feature of its administration such as the PDS system. 
The organisational legacy of apartheid 
During apartheid, state institutions were `Afrikanerized', appointing Afrikaners to senior as well as 
junior positions in the civil service, army, police and state corporations. Medical and legal 
professional associations also came increasingly under Afrikaner control. Education policy was used 
to systematically disadvantage black South Africans. With the institution of the Bantu Education Act 
in 1953, government control of the quality of education for all racial groups was strengthened, 
resulting in expenditure ten times higher on the education of a white child than a black child 
(Thompson 1990). Segregation was imposed at all levels of education up to university. In 1980,657 
White, 52 African, 62 Indian and 18 Coloured medical students qualified as doctors (ibid). 
At the same time, `Grand Apartheid' in the form of "independent" or "self governing" homelands for 
black South Africans was established. The map of South Africa became increasingly confused, 
consisting of four provinces and eventually ten nominally or semi-independent "homelands". Often 
these "homelands" were not one consistent piece of land, but several poorer quality, scattered pieces 
of land amalgamated in name to make one territory. For instance, the homeland of Bophutatswana 
had nineteen fragments, some hundreds of miles apart (Thompson 1990). The establishment of 
"homelands" resulted in ten additional departments of health and a bewildering fragmentation of 
health services and authority structures (Van Rensburg and Harrison 1995). 
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The negotiated solution to the end of apartheid created nine new provincial governments out of the 
combination of the former Republic of South Africa and all of the "homelands". Provinces were 
faced with the task of amalgamating separate civil services from the old white provincial 
bureaucracies, whatever administrations may have existed for Indian and coloured people and the 
former "homelands", each of which had developed their own managerial styles and all of which 
lacked technical skills and professional integrity (Lodge 1999). The 18 health departments which 
existed in 1993 were streamlined into one national Department of Health and nine provincial health 
departments (Klugman and McIntyre 2000). Provincial health departments were also required to 
integrate staff from the former provincial administrations, the regional offices of the former 
Department of National Health and Population Development the former "homelands" (ibid). This 
meant that the health sector's problems all had to be addressed simultaneously with the challenges of 
creating, organising and staffing these nine new provincial structures. The example of the creation of 
the Northern Province demonstrates the sheer enormity of the administrative challenge, even before 
policy issues were tackled: 
"the Northern Province.... is working to create a single health department out of five previous 
administrations. These include the former Department of National Health and Population 
Development, the previous Transvaal Provincial administration and the homeland health 
departments of Lebowa and Gazankuht and the once "independent" homeland of Venda" (Tollman 
and Rispel 1995) 
The Eastern Cape province, one of the sites for this research, was formed by amalgamating the 
Eastern portion of the old Cape Province and its old administrative centre, Port Elizabeth, with the 
former "homelands" of the Ciskei (former capital Bisho) and the Transkei (former capital Umtata). 
The challenge of rapidly amalgamating these particularly disadvantaged former homelands' 
bureaucracies, each with its own managerial style and most of which were lacking in technical skills, 
management systems and professional integrity, was enormous (Gilson et al 1999). The Eastern 
Cape has struggled to overcome this challenge of amalgamation. Examples of problems that had to 
be tackled included the former Transkei's government accounts not having been audited since 1988 
and a shortage of skills so extreme that it was estimated would require the recruitment of over 22,000 
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qualified personnel to make up the province's skills deficit (Lodge 1999). Capacity problems 
included poor information systems which even now have difficulty identifying the number of 
employees within the bureaucracy, and poor systems of financial control. For some provincial 
managers, getting even basic expenditure data is still problematic (Klugman and McIntyre 2000), and 
the lack of financial management capacity within health regions and districts has been noted in a 
number of reports in the past few years (Gilson et at 1997; Brijlal et at 1997, Makan et at 1997; 
Collins et al 1999; Engelbrecht 1999 all cited in Gilson et al 1999). 
Transformation at provincial level impacted on the capacity and morale of South Africa's civil 
service, which in the health sector in turn influenced capacity to manage contractual relationships 
with the private sector, such as the PDS contract. In 1994 the public service employed 1.2 million 
people and accounted for 54% of the total government budget, excluding interest on government debt 
(Gilson et al 1999). At its inception, the new government faced the reform of a bloated public service 
which was sapping national resources and not delivering even the existing, racially biased services 
with anything approaching efficiency. This reform of the public service has itself run into numerous 
problems and has been acknowledged as not always effective. In 1999 a study found that "the system 
of governance in the new Republic of South Africa is in a number of crucial respects not working 
well at this stage of the transition process" (Gilson et al 1999). Lodge (1999) notes the huge and 
widespread shortages of technical and professional skills and the weaknesses of some administrative 
systems that new provinces had to inherit. 
The new provincial structures also brought together competing political elites that still experience 
difficulties working with one another (Gilson et al 1999; Klugman and McIntyre 2000). In some 
cases, completely new people have been brought into senior positions, whilst in others many of the 
new positions were occupied by those who previously held positions in the old departments. The so- 
called `Sunset Clauses' which protected the jobs of many old civil servants after the elections have 
further slowed down the pace of change within provincial bureaucracies. There is inevitable 
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suspicion on both sides, new and old, of the ability and motivations of the others. A review of health 
service organisation in 1995 muses of old civil servants re-appointed to new positions: 
"They were responsible for implementing the fragmented centralised and discriminatory policies of 
the past...... only time will tell whether they will be able to rise above themselves and their history and 
boldly implement badly needed reforms" (Tollman and Rispel 1995) 
whilst another study observes that: 
"to some extent the barriers to collaboration in the restructuring process come from the difficulties 
of crossing the divides of the past. While few interviewees are willing to be explicit, it is clear that in 
many areas there is distrust across race lines" (Klugman and McIntyre 2000) 
So called "old guard bureaucrats" were accused of being either apathetic towards change, or actively 
placing obstacles in the path of reform (Presidential Review Commission 1998 cited in Gilson et al 
1999). 
The financial legacy of apartheid 
South Africa's new government also inherited a perilous financial situation in 1994. In response, the 
Department of Finance's current macro economic strategy, known as the Growth Employment and 
Redistribution strategy (GEAR), has the explicit objective of deficit reduction in order to improve 
business confidence and encourage foreign investment. Overall government spending limits are 
determined in a medium-term fiscal framework, which uses budget deficit and tax to GDP ratio 
targets set by GEAR (McIntyre et al 1999). In order to remain within these limits, the South African 
budget in real terms increased only marginally from R158 billion in 1995/6 to R160.9 billion in the 
2000/01 budget (McIntyre, Baba and Makan 1998). 
This means that the Department of Health was faced with the task of building up the capacity of 
public sector health services in the context of a budget that was shrinking in real per capita terms. 
Trends in real per capita provincial budgets for the two provinces focused on in this study are shown 
against the average for all provinces in the table below. In both the provinces focused on in the PDS 
case study, the decline has been considerable. 
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Table 4.1 Trends in real per capita provincial budgets 1995/6- 2000/01 (1995 Rand) 
1995/6 1996/7 1997/8 1998/9 1999/00 2000/01 
Eastern Cape 2 141) 2 5(0) 2 183 1871) 1 734 I 051 
Western Cape 2 257 2 415 2 281 1 958 1 744 1 642 
Average for 
provincial budgets 
1 875 2092 1974 1 711 1 581 1 520 
Source: McIntyre, Baha and Makan 1999 
Such a budget constraint has serious implications for the health budget. Whilst it is estimated that 
health will be consuming a slightly greater share of the total government budget (11%) in 2000/01 
than in 1995/6 (10%), increases in the health budget have barely kept pace with population growth 
rates. There is evidence that within provincial health budgets a greater share of spending is being 
allocated to primary level services, although in both the Western and Eastern Cape provinces these 
relative shifts were insufficient to translate into real per capita increases in district health service 
budgets (McIntyre, Baba and Makan 1998). 
Efforts to accommodate new policies while ensuring the continued provision of integrated primary 
care services (and other health services) of acceptable quality was particularly difficult in a context of 
static real health budgets. A study of the effect of transformation on the budgeting process quotes 
one regional manager: 
"... 80% Of our money is tied in salaries. Another 10% is pharmaceutical services and sundries.... at 
provincial level they ask what are your objectives for the year and to put money to your objectives 
but its hard to allocate money to these. Why are they bothering about the 6% of the hudgct we have 
manouvrahility about and not asking about the 94%? " (Klugman and McIntyre 2000) 
In the same study, some interviewees complained that their budgets were sometimes arbitrarily cut 
mid-way through the financial year. Such budgetary constraints are likely to have an impact on 
willingness to enter into contracts and the degree of flexibility there is to alter existing contracts. 
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The health sector legacy of apartheid 
Apartheid health policy closely mirrored the ideology and social engineering of the white minority 
government. The health sector under apartheid was fragmented racially, geographically, and 
functionally; and a large, poorly controlled private sector was encouraged to develop in parallel. 
Services were concentrated in urban areas, and focused on curative, hospital-based, specialised care 
(Gilson et al 1999). For instance, in 1992/3 only 11% of public funds were spent on primary care 
delivered outside of the hospital setting (McIntyre et al 1995). Legislated racial discrimination and 
segregation affected not only the way in which health services were organised but also people's basic 
health, and the broader package of apartheid policies also contributed to inequity in health care use. 
McIntyre and Gilson (2000) show that health care utilisation patterns in South Africa were sensitive 
to race, household income level, employment status, education status, household environmental 
status, geographical area, and insurance status, rather than to health status. The only groups who 
achieved the target utilisation rate for primary care in South Africa of 3.74 visits per capita per year 
were the higher socio-economic groups and those with medical aid support (Gilson et al 1999). 
A review of the management and organisation of the health sector in 1995 (Tollman and Rispel 1995) 
identified the following as particular legacies of apartheid health services: 
1. The fragmentation of health services, with the former Department of National Health and 
Population Development having no authority over the ten "homeland" health services, which 
were in turn responsible for some 45% of the population. (In addition, there were approximately 
400 local authorities involved in health service delivery (Klugnian and McIntyre 2000)). 
2. Highly centralised planning systems, both nationally and in the "homelands". Decision-making 
had been concentrated in a highly select group favoured by the prevailing political system. 
3. Deliberate and long standing inequity in health investments. These favoured rural over urban 
areas, suburbs over townships, whites over blacks and the wealthy over the poor. 
4. A large private sector, accounting for almost three fifths of total health care expenditure but used 
by only 23% of the population on a regular basis (McIntyre et al 1995). This sector employed 
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highly skilled medical and nursing personnel, trained in the public sector, while employers 
enjoyed tax rebates on their medical scheme contributions. The private sector was therefore 
benefiting from a major state subsidy. 
TUE HEALTH SECTOR AND PRIMARY CARE SERVICES 
"South Africa has two parallel health systems -a system providing care for the poor majority, and a 
private system taking care of an affluent and /or employed mninority" (Tollman and Rispel 1995) 
The public sector 
A key challenge faced by the public sector at all levels is the shortage of doctors, especially South 
African doctors, and the maldistribution of the existing limited number, who tend to cluster around 
large wealthy urban areas such as Cape Town or Johannesburg where the bulk of the medically 
insured population lives. The inequity between better off and worse off provinces is demonstrated by 
the difference between the two provinces examined in this research: the Eastern Cape had one doctor 
for every 3296 people and the `Nestern Cape one for every 654, and the proportion of these doctors in 
private practice is estimated to be 58% and 81% respectively (Van Rensburg and Van Rensburg 
2000). The government has adopted various strategies to overcome this shortage of doctors in key 
areas; first is the encouragement of a substantial influx of foreign doctors, in particular Cuban doctors 
on a country to country contract (20% of foreign doctors in South Africa are Cuban). Second is the 
introduction of compulsory community service for qualifying doctors who must now spend one year 
working in a public sector hospital before qualifying. In 1998/9,45% of community service doctors 
were placed in either community health centres or district hospitals and visited outlying clinics 
regularly. Nevertheless the motivation to contract with the private sector remains strong, driven by 
the need to access the substantial human resources within it for the service of the public sector. This 
is particularly true in rural and perl-urban areas where it is most difficult to attract doctors into full 
time public sector employment. 
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Methods of primary care delivery vary from place to place, in particular between rural and urban 
areas and between former Republic of South Africa (RSA) and former homeland areas in South 
Africa. It is only in the former homelands that anything approaching a comprehensive model of 
primary health care (PIIC) is well established. This is due to the existence of a split in service 
delivery in the former RSA between provincial administrations delivering curative services and local 
authorities delivering environmental and preventive health services established since 1910 (Naidoo 
1997). This is still in place in many areas despite moves to establish a district health system 
delivering comprehensive primary care services under one roof. In areas where PDS traditionally 
operate, curative primary care would be their responsibility whilst local authority clinics delivered 
preventive care. 
In President Mandela's first speech to parliament as President in May 1994 he made health care free 
for all pregnant woman and children under six. In April 1996 free primary care was extended for all 
South Africans without medical insurance. '- Both these policies were implemented with little warning 
for the health system. In both cases utilisation at public sector facilities rose rapidly, usually by 
between 20 and 60 percent, although it is unclear if these rapid increases were sustained across the 
country (Gilson et al 1999; McCoy 1996; Schneider et al 1997). The free care policies are also 
argued to have had unintended and negative effects on the quality of service provision. Concerns 
soon emerged that the system was unable to cope with the volume of demand. Overcrowded 
facilities, lengthy waiting periods, shortages of staff and drugs were all to some extent blamed on the 
new policy. Free health care also meant that the volume of patients attending PDS services rose 
dramatically - previously patients had been required to access the PDS via the magistrate and either 
pay R8 or get a certificate of indigence. This requirement was effectively removed by the 
introduction of free primary care services. 
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The private sector 
Most health care professionals still work in the private sector, including the majority of general 
practitioners (GPs) (Tollman and Rispel 1995; McIntyre et al 1995) and the private sector cannot be 
ignored in any description of primary health care delivery in South Africa. In line with general 
apartheid policies to promote privatisation and service the interests of the elite, the private sector had 
been allowed to grow to substantial proportions by the mid-1990s (McIntyre et al 1995) and it is 
estimated to control over 60% of the health sector's resources. Its dynamism and sophistication 
allowed it to adapt to the changes in the market for private health care in South Africa in the last few 
years and are in startling contrast to South Africa's bureaucratic and somewhat archaic public sector. 
The private sector offers the whole spectrum of primary care services. 1995 figures for expenditure 
on health care estimate that the private sector absorbed 61.1% of total health sector spending, and 
much of this is out of pocket expenditure at primary care level (McIntyre, Gilson, Valentine and 
Soderlund 1998). In the case of a key public health problem such as sexually transmitted infections 
(STIs), it has been estimated that private GPs in South Africa may treat more cases than are seen in 
the public sector (Schneider, Blaauw, Magongo and Khumalo 2000). 
In urban areas there is typically a range of private GPs which are utilised as substitutes for or 
complements to public sector care by most income groups. The usual model for those without health 
insurance is to pay a flat fee for both a consultation and basic drugs. A new trend in urban areas are 
private clinics, such as those examined in the capitated private scheme case study, where patienii pay 
a flat fee to be seen by a nurse clinician and where necessary a doctor, and to receive drugs. These 
clinics are strongly branded and are favoured by patients for their cleanliness, politeness and prompt 
service. In rural areas there are fewer doctors but they are more likely to practise in the private 
sector. They also provide care both to those with medical insurance and those paying a flat fee per 
consultation. 
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Private health insurance in South Africa has seen an explosion in costs since the mid 1980s. This has 
led to greater enthusiasm by employers for lower cost alternatives to provide cover for their 
workforce, encouraging the arrival of low cost insurance models based on managed care principles. 
For all levels of care, medical aid administrators have moved increasingly towards the use of 
contracts with provider groups which contain an element of risk-sharing as well greater reliance on 
the use of formularies and capitation payments to control costs. New chains of private clinics such as 
those described above (and used for the private capitated scheme case study) are moving into this 
market by offering, via medical aid schemes, low-cost capitated cover for primary care services. 
Medical aid administrators then purchase hospital cover in a similar manner from a different group of 
providers and create a comprehensive package of low cost cover to market to industrial companies for 
their workforce. Contracts often involve an element of risk-sharing by the primary care provider, 
who faces a penalty if too many patients are referred for hospital care. 
Policy towards the private sector 
One of the main points of contention in the discussions underlying the evolution of the African 
National Congress' (ANC) health policy in the 1980s and the early I 990s was the role of the private 
sector (Gilson et al 1999). At primary care level, the key issue was how to draw its plentiful human 
resources into the service of the public sector. Many commentators saw the central requirement of 
future financing policy as bridging the resource gap between the public and private sectors, for 
instance by using public funds to contract private providers. One commentator observed in 1994: 
"The debates around the public/private mix in health care tuen on whether one can counter the trend 
of decreasing equity and access to health care by draining on financial resources currently being 
spent by the private sector through a national health insurance scheme, and by integrating private 
providers into the publicly financed health system" (Price 1994 p. 50) 
whilst others were more outspoken: 
"It is imperative that private sector resources are made more available and accessible to the 
population as a whole. 62% of GPs are in private practice, and therefore accessible only to those 
with the ability to pay, they offer a prime resource to extend primary level care to the community at 
large" (Tollman and Rispel 1995) 
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The new Government was quick to acknowledge the importance of the primary health care approach 
and a district health system. At first this was combined explicitly with ideas of contracting with 
private providers, but both a lack of progress in developing this approach and an increasing 
reluctance to contract out clinical services to the private sector is noticeable. 
Shortly after South Africa's first democratic elections, enthusiasm for contracts at primary care level 
was strong. In the draft policy for the establishment of a district health system (South Africa 1995b) 
it was suggested that district health authorities contract with individual or group private practices or 
NGOs. Several other policy documents in the mid 1990s, notably the report of the Committee of 
Inquiry into a National Health Insurance System, suggested using contracts to draw private 
practitioners into public sector PHC delivery (South Africa 1995). The Committee of Inquiry's 
report envisaged that ultimately there would be a complete purchaser-provider split, with accredited 
private providers competing with the public sector for contracts from public sector health authorities. 
These recommendations were incorporated into the White Paper on Health (South Africa, 1997). It 
stated that "private health practitioners should be integrated with the public sector with regard to the 
provision and management of services". However, very little progress has been made in this 
direction and more recent policy documents (South Africa 2000) suggest a more cautious approach. 
The most recent explicit statement on government policy towards public private partnerships 
appeared in late 1999, with a final draft released in March 2000. This report is the result of a task 
team established in the National Department of Health but also incorporating consultation with 
provincial officials. It shows that a quite clear shift has taken place in attitudes to public private 
partnerships (PPPs), placing a strong emphasis that they should: 
"not limit the government's ability to guarantee public access to health care. The government must 
be able to provide, or guarantee provision of services to public patients and must be able to act as 
the insurer of last resort to private patients. At this stage, this means that the government would not 
wish to lose control of clinical services for public patients, since these are the core services. In 
future, however, it may be useful to review whether it may be able to control and guarantee such core 
services without necessarily being the provider "(ibid). 
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A dichotomy is apparent between the direction of earlier policy, and its slow implementation and 
growing scepticism of public private partnerships in more recent policy documents. At Provincial 
level, some frustration with mixed policy messages from the National department was expressed in 
the interviews with key informants: 
(there are) "great jumps from one policy to the other without having clarity or frameworks or 
anything" Regional Manager 
"... On the one hand we are told to strengthen the public sector, get the referral system correct, but 
on the other hand if these people [Accredited Private Providers] can come in - how does that fit in? 
There were no examples of how it could work and we were extremely cautious of going that route. " 
Provincial manager 
Several factors at both provincial and national level help to explain this lack of progress with tackling 
the issue of the private sector. These include an ambivalent attitude and occasional general hostility 
towards the private sector from some policy-makers, lack of capacity to write and manage contracts 
sufficient to control a highly sophisticated private sector, and budgetary constraints. 
A general suspicion of the private sector has confused the formulation of policy towards it. One 
provincial manager tasked with a pilot of the accredited private provider system which did not 
materialise12 explained: 
... within the group of my 
directors, my colleagues were ideologically against the private 
sector... they were outspoken against the private sector" Provincial Director 
whilst other managers expressed the view that private doctors were: 
"more interested in their incomes than the quality of care that they were providing" 
Regional Director 
Post 1994 saw an influx of non-medically trained personnel into managerial positions and some 
policy-makers observed that there is a greater suspicion and hostility amongst non-medics to the idea 
of contracting with private providers. In the case of the PDS the following observation was also 
made: 
"The district surgeons were the people who treated people in prisons - of which a lot were people of 
the struggle, people now in high positions so I think there is a stigma also to District Surgeons. I 
think that politically the whole environment was against them.... The relationship was very poor to 
12 Following the report of the Committee of Inquity (1995) two provinces undertook to establish pilot schemes of Accredited Private Providers but no such schemes were ever established. 
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start qff u ith. Because the PDS are chiefly male, white Afrikaaners who service the communities in 
the rural areas. They practice a back door front door" policy. There are allegations I have heard 
that they treated patients very poorly". Provincial Director 
A further hindrance recognised at both national and provincial level is the issue of capacity to write 
and manage contracts. At the National Department of Health level one official was quite dismissive 
of some provinces' enthusiasm for the idea of trying to increase private sector participation, saying 
"it's kind of like apple pie and motherhood... its just a good thing to do ..... I don't think that they 
have 
thought it through logically ". NDOH manager 
and this lack of capacity for contracting is also acknowledged by some at provincial level: 
"I don't think even in the province we have a person who would be able to really compile a contract " 
Provincial manager 
Many provincial senior people commented that they thought that people were keen on the idea of 
contracting, its just that "the nuts and bolts are more demanding than they realised". Finally, one 
provincial director referred to `corporate exhaustion' preventing them from making progress with 
accredited private providers whilst another observed: 
"I think that generally people are quite open to the possibility of contracting. It's just that when you 
get into it it's a lot more, and sometimes it's easier to just run the service yourself'. 
The third hindrance to the development of contracts was budgetary. Many policy-makers interviewed 
expressed uncertainty regarding scope for contracting currently, given the budget constraints faced by 
the Department of Health. In particular, an intensive programme of clinic building has meant that the 
primary care budget has diminishing money for contracts and that the role for private providers 
within the system is increasingly unclear, although presently some clinics have neither staff nor 
drugs. 
Other elements which would feed into the development of contracts, such as the definition of a 
standard package of primary care services have also been slow to be finalised", due mainly to a 
shortage of capacity. In addition, local government has been made constitutionally responsible for 
13 A system where state patients enter the practice through the back door into a considerably inferior, separate waiting room 
and are seen in different consultation rooms, which are also usually much poorer quality than the private sector rooms. 
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delivering `municipal health services' and this may include all primary care services. This would 
make local authorities the purchaser in any new contractual relationships but the policy is still mired 
in a lack of clarity over their specific role relative to other spheres of government, and uncertainty 
over what health services they are mandated to provide (Naidoo 1997; McCoy Buch and Palmer 
2000). The operational status quo has therefore remained largely unchanged. 
TILE PART TIME DISTRICT SURGEONS (PDS) SYSTEM 
In the case of towns where a PDS is working, the division of responsibility between clinic, hospital 
and PDS differs from town to town but is based along the following lines. The local authority or 
regional services council clinic in a town is responsible for delivering services such as ante-natal 
care, Family Planning, TB treatment and childhood preventive services. The PDS provides curative 
services and emergency care. His/her exact tasks will also reflect the capacity of the public sector 
services in a town. The PDS acts as a back up for sisters in local government clinics, usually doing 
sessions at some clinics as well as seeing referred patients at his practice. Referrals are also from 
PDS to clinic, with the PDS practice often referring TB and STIs to the local government clinic. 
Policy on PDS since 1994 
a) The De Villiers Report (1995) 
Following the arrival of the new government, it was clear that the PDS system needed to be rc- 
evaluated and brought into line with new policy initiatives such as the establishment of the district 
health system delivering comprehensive PHC. In 1995 the National Department of Health 
commissioned a report to prepare draft policy guidelines for reformed PDS services (De Villiers 
1995). This report identified the following weaknesses with the current PDS system from the point 
of view of users, the Department of Health and the PDS themselves: 
" Patients complained that the fragmentation of services caused them to be "shunted around" and 
that PDS did not have sufficient time to see to all their needs due to their huge workload. 
14 Although an outline package was agreed in 1999. 
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" The Department of Health complained that the service was currently rendered outside of a 
comprehensive public sector health system, that there was inadequate monitoring and evaluation 
of service and that the PDS system used discriminatory practices (a type of back-door/front-door 
system with state patients often being seen in considerably less salubrious conditions than private 
patients in the adjoining room). 
" PDS complained of having to be on duty 24 hours a day with no support from the primary care 
clinic, that there was a stigma attached to being the PDS which harmed their private practice, that 
they were required to provide all physical facilities at their own expense, that there was still major 
fragmentation in health services and that the remuneration system forced them to see patients 
very quickly and render a poorer quality service than would be possible if they were properly 
remunerated. 
The report made a series of recommendations on how the PDS system should be transformed and 
brought in, o line with other ongoing policy reforms such as the establishment of a district health 
system and the recommendations of the Committee of Inquiry. Recommendations also included a 
name change, as the term district surgeon "has some negative associations" and the division of work 
into medico-legal and clinical functions. The newly titled `Community or District Medical 
Officer/Practitioner' would have extended duties including: 
9 the rendering of comprehensive primary health care services including preventive, promotive, 
curative and rehabilitative services as envisaged in the district health plan 
" training and support of primary health care practitioners 
" certain public health functions where required (ibid) 
It was also recommended that these posts must be advertised to all medical practitioners in a town, 
and that the duration of the PDS contract should be shortened. While it was recognised that PDS 
were reluctant to stop rendering services in their own rooms, the report recommended that: 
" no discrimination must be allowed 
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" the service should form part of a comprehensive primary health care service rendered at district 
level 
" the most feasible place for the service to be rendered, especially in the larger towns where 
practitioners from different practices will share the clinical functions, is the state health facility 
(ibid). 
The report also observed that: 
`continuing uncertainties amongst PDS regarding a new system are causing increasing discontent 
and a decline in morale and motivation..... The current fragmentation of health services continues to 
complicate the possible implementation of any new PDS system. ' 
However, it stopped short of making specific recommendations other than for discussion, or setting a 
time frame to the implementation of the type of new system that it recommended. It was concluded 
that `a specific plan of action must be worked out and phased in' and that ideally this should be done 
at the National Department of Health level. 
A pre-cursor to this report was a more detailed evaluation of the PDS system in the Western Cape 
(Western Cape District Surgeon Committee 1995). This report made more specific recommendations 
for the province regarding implementation of recommendations and time frames, and again stressed 
the importance of co-ordination with other policy implementation such as that of the Committee of 
Inquiry and the establishment of a District Health System. It was suggested that a phased approach to 
the new PDS system should be taken in the Western Cape, implementing it where a PDS resigned or 
was willing to change onto the new system. Those PDS who wished to continue functioning on the 
present system were to be allowed to continue for a two-year period. As with many of the others 
discussed above, the actual implementation of this policy has been slow and patchy. Over four years 
after the report was finalised, the majority of PDS in the Western Cape are still functioning on the 
"old" system, although they had been given a two-year notice period from December 1997. A 
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process of re-negotiation of contracts underway has been extremely slow and no PDS who wishes to 
remain in his post has had his contract removed. 
b) Legal challenges to the contract: the Free State case 
Provinces elsewhere in South Africa took a more abrupt approach to redefining the role of their PDS. 
At the end of 1996, as part of its restructuring towards a district health system, the Free State 
province gave three months notice to all its district surgeons. After consultation with the Medical 
Association of South Africa (MASA), some of these PDS decided to mount a legal challenge to this 
dismissal. The main question around which the cases revolved was whether PDS were independent 
contractors or employees of the province. The province claimed that the PDS were independent 
contract workers and that they were therefore not bound by the procedures laid out in the Labour 
Relations Act 1995 for a dismissal. MASA claimed on behalf of the PDS that they were employees 
of the State and as such their services could not be terminated summarily without following a fair 
procedure. The State, MASA claimed, was obliged to consult and negotiate with the doctors prior to 
terminating their services (Basson et al 1998). 
The case was decided in favour of the Free State PDS, who were ruled by the court to be employees 
of the state. Arguments why the case went in their favour hinged around the following points (ibid): 
" even though the doctors were professionals, the provincial administration did have some control 
over the way in which services were rendered 
9 the court viewed as `neutral factors' the fact that the contracts could be terminated on three 
months' notice or on reaching the age of 65 years or summarily in certain circumstances; the 
provision for suspension or the holding of a disciplinary enquiry; and the non-membership of 
pension and medical aid schemes 
" the dominant impression was therefore that the part-time district surgeons were more likely to be 
`employees' as defined in the Labour Relations Act, 1995 as they had "placed their labour at the 
15 Medical Association of South Africa & Others v Minister of Health & Another (1997)18 1 US28 
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disposal of the Provincial Department of Health and the object of their relationship was the 
rendering of services rather than the end result of such services". 
The fact that contracts were old, outdated and made provision for the payment of an annual 
honorarium were all elements which contributed to this judgement. The requirement on PDS to place 
their whole productive capacity at the disposal of the state ("the district surgeon shall give preference 
to his official duties, except where serious emergencies occur in his private practice") was also seen 
as suggesting the position of employees. This ruling in their favour meant that PDS were protected 
by the Labour Relations Act, which prevented them from being dismissed merely on notice and 
without reason. The Labour Relations Act specifies that the only reasons that employees can be 
dismissed are for misconduct, incapacity or because they are beyond operational requirements. 
Despite the fact that the Free State province has subsequently terminated the contracts of all its 
remaining PDS (31 December 1998) in line with the Labour Relations Act's requirements (that the 
PDS were beyond operational requirements), this court case has affected the way that the PDS 
contract is viewed by other provinces, including the Western and Eastern Cape. It has contributed to 
the partial implementation of the recommendations of the De Villiers commission and the Western 
Cape District Surgeon Committee, due to concerns about the litigious inclinations of the PDS. 
Elements of confusion remain about the status of the PDS and the contract that they work under. 
c) Policy to curb expenditure on PDS services 
Before the introduction of free primary care services in 1996, PDS patients had been required to go 
via the magistrate in each town, where they either paid a fee of R8 or obtained a certificate of 
indigence. This acted as a barrier and a form of means testing, and reduced the risk to the province of 
too many patients attending PDS services. When primary care services were made free in 1996, the 
removal of this requirement meant that provinces faced an open-ended financial commitment to PDS, 
determined by how many patients chose to access their services. 
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In response, both the Eastern and Western Cape provinces brought in new ways to again limit access 
to PDS. From 1997, the Western Cape introduced a policy of "capping" expenditure on certain PDS 
practices. In a negotiated agreement with them, high volume practices were given a monthly payment 
limit beyond which they may not claim. This translated into an average number of patients per day 
and once a practice had gone beyond this they must either see patients without claiming payment 
from the province or tell them to come back the next day. In the practices reviewed in this study, this 
"capping" was in effect in two. In 1998, the Eastern Cape introduced a requirement that patients 
must attend the public sector clinic first to obtain a referral to the PDS and could not access PDS 
services directly. 
THE LESOTHO CONTRACT 
The Lesotho Highlands Water Project (LHWP) is a large civil engineering project based on an 
agreement between Lesotho and South Africa to construct a series of dams and tunnels for the 
transfer and sale of Lesotho's water to South Africa. The LHWP began in the 1980s and is now in its 
second phase. The historical context of the Lesotho contract is quite different from the South African 
cases, in that there is very little history relevant to what is a new, entirely commercial relationship, 
with a fixed time horizon. It has not been characterised by any contractual disputes or attempts to 
terminate the contract on the part of either party. However, geographic context is more relevant. 
Lesotho is a very mountainous and remote country, encircled by South Africa. Construction work for 
the LHWP takes place in the remote mountainous interior of Lesotho, which is bleak, cold and 
sparsely populated. 
The project is governed by an international treaty signed between Lesotho and South Africa in 1986. 
In Lesotho the project's implementing authority is the Lesotho Highlands Development Authority 
(LHDA). The LHDA's mission is: 
"to efficiently and effectively implement and manage on a sustainable basis the Lesotho Highlands 
Water Project in accordance with the Treaty... to the benefit of the people, the environment and the 
economy of Lesotho" (LHDA 1992) 
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Construction of the various parts of the project has been packaged up and put out to tender as 
different self-contained projects. A stipulation of all construction contracts has been that medical 
services must be supplied by the contractor to both the construction community and members of the 
local community who are resident in areas adjoining the construction site. LHDA adopted this policy 
for three reasons: 
1. members of the local community are considered to be adversely affected by upheaval caused by 
the construction work of the LHWP and should be compensated 
2. traditionally these communities have been remote, with poor access to health care facilities. The 
Government of Lesotho wished to used the opportunity of the LHWP to improve access to 
services for all its population. 
3. the Environmental and Public Health Impact Assessment prior to the first phase of the project 
highlighted the adverse impact on health that the project would have; particularly it emphasised 
the effects of overcrowding, informal settlements and STIs on public health. 
Public sector primary health care delivery in Lesotho is fairly typical of a poor rural African setting. 
Service provision is via a series of clinics which are not always open and characterised by frequent 
drug stock outs and low or non-existent staffing. The remote rural areas of Lesotho have no private 
sector allopathic medicine, although interestingly in urban Maseru the same trend is noticeable as in 
South Africa, with the opening of flat fee, branded private clinics such as those examined in the 
private capitated scheme contract. 
In the case of LHDA's contract 129b, which is examined in this study, the engineering contractor 
sub-contracted the provision of medical services to a specialist for-profit health care company. 
Services required by the contract could be quite sophisticated, most importantly the running of 24 
hour emergency medical cover and evacuation facilities was required. Sophisticated services have 
therefore been transposed onto a setting which is normally very poor in resources. 
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Whilst the Government of Lesotho suffers from more acute capacity problems than those described in 
South Africa, capacity within the bodies tasked to deal with contracting health for the LIIWP is 
strong. The LHHDA is a well resourced body supported by a combination of European Union, World 
Bank and bilateral donor funding and technical assistance, specifically focusing on areas such as 
contract writing. It employs a series of contracting experts, lawyers and engineers. 
THE PRIVATE CAPITATED CONTRACT 
The private capitated contract for primary care services, which is the third case study, is entirely 
within the private sector. A comprehensive package of primary care cover is offered by a single 
commercial company, via a medical scheme, to a range of industrial companies. Each company may 
have arrangements with several medical schemes to offer a variety of packages of health cover to 
their workers. The medical schemes' role is to package together alternative sources of cover for 
primary and hospital care to create comprehensive pack ges of cover. One of the options that they 
will offer is health cover at primary care level provided by this chain of clinics, in conjunction with 
hospital cover provided by different arrangements. When an industrial company elects to use this 
package, one of the contracts signed is a tripartite agreement between the industrial company, the 
commercial primary care provider and the medical scheme. 
The commercial company offers a comprehensive set of primary care services in a number of clinics 
situated in low income, industrial settings throughout South Attica. All clinics offering services 
under this contract are part of the same company. The company was established in the mid 1990s to 
meet a perceived gap in the market for low cost, good quality private primary care services. Clinics 
are usually placed in busy parts of an urban area or near to industrial centres and factories. As with 
the Lesotho contract, there is very little relevant historical context to this contract, and government 
policy is of reduced importance because the contract lies entirely within the private sector. There is 
no history of legal disputes with any of the contracting parties. Also because the contract is within 
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the private sector, issues of weakness in public sector capacity are not relevant. How much capacity 
to devote to writing and supervising contracts is a commercial decision taken by both the purchaser 
and the provider, presumably according to the cost effectiveness of devoting resources to these 
activities. 
The clinics all operate in a highly standardised manner, typically employing one doctor, two nurse 
clinicians and a number of "primary health care workers"" who are used to screen patients and take 
their vital signs before they are seen by a nurse or doctor. All staff in the clinics are paid on a 
salaried basis". The company is run on a very strict system with strong, hierarchical, internal control. 
Each clinic has a full time manager and regular supervisory visits from an area manager, who is based 
at head office where he reports to an overall operations manager. The area manager typically has 
responsibility for four clinics, allowing quite a close degree of supervision. In addition to direct 
management supervision, each clinic is fitted with an extensive, specially designed computer system 
which is linked directly to head office, and all drugs are purchased and supplied according to a 
formulary common to the whole company. 
As well as keeping control of finances, the computer system is used to control clinical practice. 
There is a computer terminal with a direct link to head office in each consulting booth and service 
providers are required to enter details of each patient as they see them. The computer then acts as an 
aid in diagnosis, and defines the prescription to be given for this diagnosis according to a set of over 
2,000 primary care protocols contained within its programme. In effect this means that patients are 
being treated in a manner highly standardised and controlled by head office and variance in clinical 
practice according to the judgement of the service provider is much reduced. By weekly financial 
and clinical reports from the computer system, head office closely monitors the activities of each of 
the clinics. 
16 employees without any formal medical training but who have undergone an in-house training programme in basic clinical 
skills such as taking blood pressure and testing urine 
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CONCLUSION 
The importance of context generally, and different aspects of context (e. g. geography, history, 
capacity, policy) is likely to vary between the case studies. The PDS contract is particularly rich in 
relevant history and its current operation needs to be understood against this backdrop. In particular, 
this chapter has highlighted that the context in which this contract operates includes tension between 
the "old" and "new" South Africa which influences the attitudes of both parties to the contract, as 
well as having implications for the capacity of government. Budgetary constraints have also 
impacted on the attitude towards contracts for primary care in South Africa more generally. The 
Department of Health is faced with a legacy of fragmented services, inequity and a weak public 
sector human resource base which leads them to have to depend on the stronger private sector to meet 
the demands of even basic service provision in some rural areas. All these factors contribute to an 
ambivalent and rather suspicious atmosphere between public and private sectors at primary care 
level. 
Both the Lesotho and private capitated contracts have less of a history, but in the case of Lesotho the 
geographical setting of service delivery is clearly an important and unique factor. In the case of the 
private capitated contract the recent growth of demand for private sector low cost primary care 
delivery and the context of strong internal control in which service delivery takes place in this 
company, as well as its setting in urban densely populated areas, must all be taken into account. 
17 with the exception of two clinics where the doctor is running his own private practice as a franchise for the commercial 
company 
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CHAPTER 5: ENVIRONMENTAL FACTORS ANI) TILL OPERATION OF '1111; I'I)S 
CONTRACT 
FORMAT OF THE CASE STUDIES : CONTENTS OF CHAPTERS 5-8 
Chapters 5-7 present aspects of the PDS case study and in chapter 8 evidence from the Lesotho and 
private capitated scheme contract is explored. In line with the research questions highlighted in 
chapter 3 and figure 3.1 (adapted below to figure 5.1), each of the chapters addresses the following 
issues: 
Chapter 5- Environmental factors and the operation of the PI)S contract 
Chapter 6- The PDS contract: award process and design 
Chapter 7- The contractual outcome : operation of an incomplete contract 
Chapter 8- Contracting experiences: the cases of Lesotho and a private capitated 
scheme 
In the adapted version of figure 3.1 shown below, the way in which each of the issues identified is 
addressed in the following chapters is indicated: 
Table 5.1: Map of results chapters 5-8 
Influences on nature of the contractual relationship PDS case study Other case studies 
1. Contextual factors Chapter 5 Chapter R 
" environmental (nature of market, capacity, type of 
service) 
" human/individual (nature of provider and purchaser, 
motivations of provider) 
2. Degree of asymmetries of information (information Chapters 5&7 Chapter 8 
systems, capacity to monitor, degree of opportunism of 
providers) 
3. Contract design and award process Chapter 6 Chapter 9 
-> Nature of the contractual relationship 
What appear to be the mechanisms (either within a Chapter 7 Chapter R 
written contract or external to it) which hold the 
relationship together and influence the performance of 
the provider? How does the contract operate? 
Under what conditions are different types of contractual Chapters 9 and 10 
form appropriate and desirable? 
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ENVIRONMENTAL FACTORS 
The impact of contracts needs to be understood within the total institutional context within which 
they operate. Walsh et al (1997) observed that: 
"a key feature of the external context will be the nature of the market, notably the 
degree of 
competition and the rate of change and stability .... the nature of the service will 
have a key influence, 
through the impact on the degree to which the service can he specified, and the ease with which 
performance can be monitored ". 
This chapter describes these and other types of external influences as they impact upon the PDS 
contract. The term "environmental" is used here in the sense that these factors are "givens", at least 
in the short term, they are not defined by the type of contract chosen or how it is operated, whilst they 
may be influential in both these things. 
The table below outlines the environmental factors which arose from the case study as potential 
influences on the way in which the contract was likely to operate. Each is then discussed in turn. At 
the end of the chapter, the role of asymmetries of information, which run through several of the 
factors described below, is discussed. The degree of existing trust within the contract, or more 
broadly in the contracting environment, should also be acknowledged as an important environmental 
factor which will underlie and influence the nature of the contract. It is however difficult to separate 
out different aspects of trust, for instance, what is of a historical or environmental nature and what is 
a manifestation of the condition of the current contractual relationship. All aspects of the role of trust 
in this case study are therefore dealt with in chapter 7. 
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Table 5.2 Environmental factors potentially influential on the nature of the PDS contract 
Environmental Factor Aspects potentially influential on Direction of likely influence 
nature of the contract 
Nature of the service to he 1) Ease with which the boundaries or More difficulties in specifying 
contracted requirements of the task to be contract likely to lead to more 
contracted can be defined incomplete, relational contract,. 
2) Asset specificity Greater asset specificity is likely toi 
lead to more relational contracts. 
Nature of the market in which 1) degree of current competition Low competition, high barriers toi 
service to be contracted 2) barriers to exit and entry entry to market, few substitutes 
3) existing substitutes for service (existing or potential) likely to 
4) potential substitutes for service make contracts more relational. 
Capacity of purchaser 1) financial and administrative Shortage of capacity may lead to 
systems poorly specified or monitored 
2) resources- human and other contracts. 
Human/ organisational context Motivation of providers Depending on importance of role 
of contracts of individual in defining nature of 
contract, their motivation will 
influence nature of service 
delivery. Hierarchical controls in 
companies may also influence this. 
Cross Cutting Factors: Combination of capacity, nature of As asymmetries of information 
Asvnn ietr"ies of information service and motivation of provider increase, the role of relational and 
trust based contracting becomes 
correspondingly more important. 
Degree of trust existing in Trust between purchaser and Existing trust or lack of trust 
contractual setting provider arising from history of influences environment in which 
contract and context of contract any type of contract will operate. 
NATURE OF THE SERVICE 
Key dimensions of the nature of the service to be contracted for are the degree of asset specificity, 
and the degree to which the services required can be clearly foreseen and specified in a contract. 
Asset specificity is important as a determinant of' the nature of the market (which is examined in 
greater detail in the next section) whilst the degree to which the boundaries of a service can be 
adequately defined and specified is important as a determinant of how easy contracts are to specify 
and whether they will tend to be complete or incomplete. 
For the PDS contract, the issue of how easily a service can be adequately defined in a contract is 
examined via dimensions such as 1) whether all the factors that will influence the type of service to 
be required can be either foreseen in the contract or controlled by it, 2) whether this service can be 
adequately defined and specified separately from other inputs that would be required to deliver the 
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service successfully, 3) whether given any level of time or expertise it is possible to draft a fully 
comprehensive contract for the service (e. g. there is no uncertainty). 
Asset specificity 
Asset specificity reduces the competitiveness of the market by increasing the reliance of purchaser 
and provider on one another. Williamson (1975) identified four types of asset specificity - site 
specificity, physical asset specificity, human asset specificity and dedicated assets. PDS services are 
extremely site specific. They also require some degree of human asset specificity as the holder of the 
contract must be medically trained. Other skills are required which are specific to the PDS work, 
although these can be learnt relatively easily by any medical practitioner as long as there is time 
available. Physical asset requirements to hold the PDS contract are not high, and they are 
complementary to the assets private GPs must anyway possess to run a private practice. 
Defining boundaries of the task 
The nature of the service to be contracted to PDS is not easy to define absolutely. Whilst the services 
contracted out are only a part of all primary care services being delivered by the government, the 
overall responsibility that accompanies the role of PDS is large. South Africa has not yet corrected 
the historical division between the delivery of curative and preventive primary care services, so PDS 
form part of a highly fragmented system of PHC delivery, rarely being responsible for the delivery of 
all primary care services in a town. Nevertheless, the nature of the service which they are contracted 
to provide is diverse, consisting of. 
" curative primary care services 
" 24 hour emergency medical cover 
" medico-legal duties 
" ex officio duties 
The requirement to be on call 24 hours a day led to a sense amongst the PDS interviewed of being 
ultimately responsible for all medical services: 
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"anything which is in the medical field has to be serviced by me, it has to be done, it doesn't matter 
what it is. Even if the ambulance isn't available, you have to make a plan. If there isn't a health care 
worker or the clinic sister has left, then its your responsibility " PDS, Western Cape 
There are several instances where roles are likely to overlap or be confused between the PDS and the 
public sector. Many PDS are also the medical superintendents of the hospital in their town, or one of 
the part time medical officers at the hospital. In such cases they provide a continuum of services, 
from primary to hospital care. It becomes difficult to distinguish between what services are being 
delivered under the PDS contract and under other contracts with the state: 
"a lot of the DS are also the medical superintendents of the hospitals where they are, and they are 
also the part time medical officers at the hospitals. So they run a continuum, from primary care they 
run the patient right through the system " 
Regional Manager, Western Cape 
Responsibilities are also likely to overlap and be confused between the doctor as PDS, Medical 
Officer or Medical Superintendent at the hospital. 
Defining the requirements of the task 
Three dimensions were suggested above as determining how easily a service can be adequately 
defined in a contract. Drawing on the context of this contract described in Chapter 4, each of these 
dimensions is examined with reference to the PDS contract. 
1) whether all factors that will influence the type of service to be required can be either foreseen in 
the contract or controlled by it - the type of service required can be broken down into WHAT 
services are to be delivered and TO WHOM they should be delivered. At a macro level both of 
these factors are determined by policy and are subject to change which the contract cannot control. 
For instance, the removal of user fees for primary care services in 1996 led to a massive increase 
in the demand for PDS services throughout the country. On a more micro level, the time, place 
and nature of some of the services to be demanded cannot be determined because they are in 
response to emergency events or forensic work. Even the nature of standard primary care 
services that will be demanded is difficult to predict or control. 
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2) whether that service can be adequately defined and specified separately from other inputs that 
would be required to deliver the service successfully - the PDS services form part of the broader 
health system and rely on the functioning of other facilities such as clinics and hospitals within 
their referral network as well as services such as drug supplies and ambulance services. The 
operation of the PDS service is integrally linked to what is happening in these other parts of the 
health system, which means that their service must always be defined in the context of what is 
happening in the broader health system. 
3) whether given appropriate Linie or expertise it is possible to draft a fully comprehensive contract 
for the service - as well as inputs, a comprehensive contract would describe what is to 
happen in 
each eventuality, methods of service delivery to be used and the outcomes desired. PDS services 
do not lend themselves to such specification for three reasons. First is the broad nature of the 
service to be delivered and the v-ncertainty of what will be required. Second is the inherent 
problem in comprehensively specifying how any form of medical service is to be delivered, but 
especially one as broad as primary care and in a situation where the circumstances of service 
delivery in each case are unknown. Third is the problem of uncertainty in linking services 
delivered to outcome in any health care setting. 
NATURE OF THE MARKET 
"one... big problem is whether you have only one doctor in the town, that's a big factor. ... the 
presence or absence of a hospital is another one. The presence or absence of more doctors (is 
another), because the big issue is that you have got no market competition and you have not got 
enough private work to keep the doctor. So the doctor in X (town]. would not be in X for private 
reasons. If he had to depend on private practice he would not be (there).... and of course it's also 
inconvenient to be in a small town. So we have got to compensate for that type of situation..... and if 
we press him too hard and he leaves, that is the end of medical care in that town... " 
Regional Manager, Western Cape 
The nature of the market in which contracting takes place is a second key influence on the likely 
nature of the contractual relationship. The nature of the market will influence the degree of 
competition, the frequency of interaction between purchaser and provider, the history of their 
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interaction and the likelihood of continued interaction in the future. These all combine to determine 
the degree of dependence or competition which characterises the relationship. In turn, the degree of' 
dependence between purchaser and provider is likely to influence the nature of their interaction under 
any contract, both in terns of their willingness to co-operate and their willingness to exit from the 
relationship. In situations where either or both parties to a contract are unwilling or unable to exit 
from a contractual relationship, it takes on a very different character from the shorter term, voluntary 
contracts likely to arise in a highly competitive market. 
Indicators of the nature of' the market examined below include the number of potential alternative 
providers, barriers to exit and entry of the market and the existence of real or potential substitutes for 
the services of a provider. Relevant factors for each town are summarised in table 5.3. 
Table 5.3 Nature of market in PDS towns included in the case study 
Practice Number Other Other doctors Total number Is there a hospital? How dependent 
of doctors practices visit from of doctors on PI)S doctors is It? 
in PDS in town? neighbouring based in the 
practice Number toww n? toss 11 
A-E Cape 3 No )'cs, part-time 3 )'e.. Iuti°(ILI)ei1 Icnt 
B-E Cape 5 No No 5 Yes. 100% dependent 
C-E Cape I No No I Yes. 100% dependent 
I) -E Cape I No No I Yes. 100% dependent 
F. -E Cape 3 No Yes, part-time 3 No. PDS doctors must pros e all 
after hours cover 
F- E Cape 2 Yes, (2) No 6 Yes. All doctors in town do 
sessions at the h,,. lital 
C-W Cape I No No I Yes. 100("(' 
H-W Cape 2 No No 2 No. PDS doctors must providcr all I 
after hours cover. 
J- W Cape 4 Yes, (2) No 12 Yes. All doctors in town do 
sessions at the hospital. 
K- W Cape 4 Yes, (1) No 6 Yes. All doctors in town do 
sessions at the hospital 
L-W Cape 2 Yes No not sure Yes. All doctors in town do 
Kesslolls at the hospital 
Current competition 
... you must remember that with a lot of these [NUS] iv e don't have o/)tiuns. It's not as it We have 
got 10 practices or 50 doctors where you say "you are not performing" and get somebody else. That 
is why most of the contracts in the rural areas just carry on. " Regional Manager, Western Cape 
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Of the 11 towns visited for the PDS case study, four had other doctors/practices resident who might 
potentially compete for the PDS contract, although it is not clear that they would want to. Two more 
towns had doctors who were resident elsewhere but visited the town regularly to sec private patients, 
but these were unlikely to be viable alternatives to a resident PDS. 
Contestability of the market - barriers to entry 
The second factor which influences the degree of competition in a market is its contestability or the 
threat of other providers moving into the market. For PDS services, each of the towns included in 
this study resembled a separate market due to the distance to access health care in another town. 
There is little movement of doctors in and out of towns, and especially not where they are likely to 
face competition. Barriers to entry appear to fall into three categories: 
" strategic behaviour by doctors already in the town to prevent a potential income for a second 
doctor/practice to enter their town 
" reluctance by doctors to incur costs and disruption of moving to a new market when they are 
unsure of the income that it will offer 
" reluctance of many doctors to become involved in PDS work, although there is some evidence that 
this situation is changing. 
The market in each town appears to be quite aggressively guarded by its resident doctors, who see it 
very much as "their patch", using phrases about other doctors such as "he came and squatted here". 
They talked quite strategically about how they saw the market for their services in their town, and 
ways in which they might prevent other doctors entering the market: 
"the reason that we kept it (the PDS work) in the practice was there was always just enough money in 
it to allow another practice to start up. So another doctor could move into town and if he gets the 
district surgeoncy, with his hospital job, other little jobs, then you could have two chaps working in 
opposition " PDS, Western Cape 
Such blocking of access to a newcomer GP is made particularly easy by the 24 hour nature of the care 
which must be offered by a GP in a rural town: 
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"there is Dr X from Y. He came and squatted here about two years ago. He doesn't live here,.... 
(but) he applied for permission to admit patients to hospital. We said no problem at all but the 
Medical Superintendent just insisted on a letter from this guy saying that he would give a 24 hours 
service, as he stays elsewhere. In other words that he doesn't admit patients and then we end tip 
dealing with the emergencies. He never answered that letter.... " PDS, Eastern Cape 
The second type of barrier is due to the specific location of PDS work and its 24 hour nature. To 
successfully break into any town's market, the doctor must become resident: 
"I have advertised for a partner... no one is interested to come because the contract is so temporary. 
You have to move house, buy a bakkie'" etc.... no one else wants to come here! Those who would want 
to conic want a fixed income" PDS, Eastern Cape 
In addition moving to a new town means building up a new private practice which is risky: 
" it takes you 3 years to really build up a practice. The people [patients] leave you and they still 
think of the old doctor so it still takes you about 3 years" PDS, Western Cape 
Such investment in re-establishing a practice suggests the need for a secure market to encourage 
doctors to take that risk; but by definition anywhere to which a doctor would move to increase 
competition will not be a secure market. 
Asked about alternatives to his services, one PDS commented: 
"you won't get a doctor in this practice again, because there is no private practice .... if 
Igo there is 
nothing that I can sell a guy... So I an sure that I will be the last private doctor in this toºt'n. There 
won't be another one. " PDS, Western Cape 
A further barrier to entry into the market is the need to be familiar with PDS work and to be willing 
to put up with its long hours and stressful nature, a point related to the human asset specificity 
discussed in the previous section: 
"you also learn from years of dealing with the state that there are certain things that you can expect 
and certain things that you can't and you grow used to that..., the state doesn't always supply the 
best.... So the one problem the state would have if they would for instance drop its and take on 
another private practice, is that that other practice's doctors are not used to working with the state, I 
mean you sort of learn to do that. " PDS, Western Cape 
18 Four wheel drive utility vehicle 
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Reluctance to get involved in PDS work is a related issue. Not all private doctors wish to compete 
for PDS work. In one town the PDS described how the other practice in town had previous 
experience with PDS work and had tried to take it on again: 
"After 3 months they decided that they didn't want to do it anymore; it wasn't worth the income and 
they were losing private patients from their surgery because of the state patients turning up there 
PDS, Eastern Cape 
This was echoed in another town in the Western Cape, which despite having 12 doctors, caused 
problems for the Province in replacing the recently retired PDS. The new practice which had taken 
on the contract commented that none of the other practices would do so. In a second town in the 
Western Cape the PDS described how before he took the contract the province had had to move a 
doctor up from Cape Town to cover the town: 
"because nobody was interested in the job. There were doctors here but not interested" 
PDS, Western Cape 
This is partly due to the nature of the work, described by one regional manager as: 
"blood and gore every Friday and Saturday night, people screaming through the window to come 
and help... it's extremely unpleasant" Regional Manager, Western Cape 
Private practitioners are also reluctant to take on PDS work because they see a stigma attached to 
being the "state doctor" and this undermines their private practice. If they have a thriving practice 
they can also probably match the income from a PDS by seeing private patients, likely to be a less 
stressful and more easily controlled way of making a living: 
".... in the towns where we have a reasonably high income group, the doctors are not really much 
interested in the PDS work.... because their private practices are so big that that is taking virtually 
all their time. " Regional Manager, Eastern Cape 
However, evidence from some towns, mainly in the Western Cape, suggest that this situation may be 
changing and that as private practice comes under greater pressure, PDS or any state work starts to 
look relatively more attractive. Several interviewees stressed the difficulties faced by private GPs in 
what is becoming an overly competitive market, leading them to become more interested in state 
work: 
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"things have changed lately .... 
look at a place like V., nobody was interested in doing it now 
everybody wants to do it" PDS, Western Cape 
This view was echoed by two of the three regional managers interviewed in the Western Cape: 
"Private sector has reached saturation point in terms of the doctors that it can accommodate, so 
sonne doctors today are actually looking for another career in the public service" 
Regional manager, Western Cape 
"If you take the income that a doctor like X generates .... it is 
higher than he would get if he had a 
private practice in the city..... the private sector is quite over supplied in the cities and so a lot of 
private doctors in the cities are not earning a lot of money...... they don't earn as well as if they were 
a PDS in the rural towns" Regional Manager, Western Cape 
To conclude, barriers to entry therefore exist both on the side of existing doctors blocking access to 
`their' market and the reluctance of potential market entrants to uproot themselves to move to a 
potentially insecure market. There is also a reluctance by doctors with more successful private 
practices to get involved in PDS work, although this situation may be changing. Recognising 
ny considerable differences in this set of factors from case to case is important as the situation differed 
from town to town and doctor to doctor. However, overall there appeared to be little fluidity in the 
market described here, with difficulties for the free flow of capital or human resources in and out of 
the market represented by each individual town. As a result in most cases there is neither a high 
degree of existing competition nor the likelihood of new service providers easily entering the market. 
Barriers to exit 
Many of the factors described as barriers to entry were also barriers to exit - doctors were reluctant to 
leave a town where they have been established for a long time and face the risky prospect of 
establishing a new practice elsewhere. Fierce competition amongst private GPs in urban areas makes 
leaving PDS work for the city an unattractive prospect, and there are likely to be relatively few 
untapped markets in rural areas on account of the intense competition between GPs elsewhere. 
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Substitutes for the services of the PDS 
Substitutes for PDS services would increase the competitiveness of the market by allowing the 
purchaser to replace a PDS with another service or combination of services. This section examines 
first the possibility of substitutes already in existence in each town and then possible alternatives to a 
PDS which could be introduced. 
a) Existing substitutes 
PDS contracts cover a range of services, so it is necessary to consider what services need to be 
substituted. Partly it is the services of a doctor (for which the only substitute is another doctor); but 
in many towns it is also 24 hour emergency cover (for which the substitute most obvious is a 
hospital) and delivery of standard primary care services (in which case the substitute could be a 
primary care clinic). It is likely that the availability of each of these substitutes will be influenced by 
different factors. 
. 
for the service of a doctor 
The degree of existing competition between private doctors to deliver PDS services has already been 
described. A final substitute for a doctor's services would be state employed medical officers but 
posts for full time state employment do not exist in all small towns and where they do they arc 
usually vacant, given the shortage of doctors working in the public sector and reluctance to move to 
rural towns. There are several potential policies to counteract this lack of public sector doctors in 
rural areas, these are examined in the section below on potential substitutes. 
.... 
for after hours/emergency care 
Replacing key parts of the PDS service by sending patients to a hospital is dependent upon two 
factors: 
1. that there is a hospital in the town, or that the Provincial Department of Health (PDOII) is willing 
to tell the community that they must travel to another town; 
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2. that the running of the hospital is not entirely or largely dependent on the same doctor as has the 
PDS contract as he/she cannot function as a substitute for themselves. 
Table 5.3 reported how many of the towns included in this study had hospitals, and how much these 
hospitals were dependent on the same doctors as held the PDS contract. Two towns did not have a 
hospital and here the PDS was the only possible provider of 24 hours emergency care, i. e. there 
existed no substitutes, other than the province telling patients to travel to another town, a policy 
which has its own attendant difficulties. In five more towns the PDS practice were the only doctors 
running the hospital and were therefore also the only potential providers of 24 hour/emergency care. 
In the remaining 4 towns, the hospital was run by all doctors in the town on a sessional basis, 
therefore suggesting some basic element of competition in the provision of doctor cover for 24 
emergency care. Here the province could at least in theory substitute part of the service offered by 
the PDS practice by referring patients to the hospital for after hours care, although the capacity of the 
hospital and other doctors to deal with this on top of existing work is an issue. 
..... 
for primary care services 
Primary care services delivered in a clinic by a nurse clinician is the most promising substitute for 
PDS services, as well as being the one most clearly preferred by government policy (South Africa 
1995; 1995b; 1997). In all towns there are a combination of district council and/or provincial clinics 
offering a range of PHC services, often more comprehensively than many PDS practices although in 
some of the towns visited there was still a problem with soi, ie clinics not having nurse clinicians and 
therefore having to refer all patients in need of prescriptions classified above a certain level to the 
PDS. 
However the clinic is less promising as a substitute for after hours emergency cover, due to restricted 
opening hours and the reluctance of staff: 
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".... the primary care nurse and the primary care clinic have got a tendency to start at 9.30am and 
knock of at 3.30pm and what then? They are not prepared to do the after hours" 
PDS, Western Cape 
and cannot be substitutes where the services of a doctor are needed. Many PDS interviewed 
expressed scepticism about the ability of clinics to deliver primary care services adequately: 
"the clinic system is simply not up to handling it... and the hospital isn't either because there aren't 
enough doctors there. So I see their alternative if we didn't want to do the job as having to put 2 or 3 
permanent medical officers in the hospital 
"and how easy would that bevy? " 
"not easy! " 
PDS, Western Cape 
Regardless of the ability of primary care clinics to deliver, this demonstrates that most PDS do not 
see clinics as a viable alternative to their services and as such do not perceive them as a threat. In this 
sense, clinics are unlikely to increase the competitive pressure on PDS. Many clinics are overloaded 
and understaffed and unable to take on more work deferred from the PDS practice unless they are 
given more resources. For instance in one town, the clinic was the principal opponent of the idea of 
devolving all chronic patients from the PDS to the clinic, on the grounds that they did not have the 
capacity to see the new patients. In another case, the PDS described how he resented being made to 
be what he termed the primary care "gate" and had asked the PDOH when he took on the contract to 
put in some process of patient screening: 
"the municipality and the Regional Services Council just simply stated 'we do not have the staff to 
sift 100-120 people a day. I do understand that" PDS, Western Cape 
In a town in the Western Cape with only one doctor and one clinic the PDS describes: 
"the clinic isn't open after hours, it's not open on Fridays or on Saturdays or Sundays. In the past, if 
they go on leave for the whole December holidays it was closed. They just come here and bring a 
box of stt ff and say 'will you look after the patients please? "' PDS, Western Cape 
In addition, despite it being clear government policy, most patients and even some policy-makers are 
reluctant to see primary care clinics as a replacement for the services of a PDS. Community opinions 
on this were clearly expressed in the focus groups and show how difficult it is for the Department of 
19 Questions by interviewer are shown in bold throughout the text 
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Health to manage the expectations of patients away from the immediate access to a doctor that the 
PDS system has traditionally represented. This would take a concerted effort which has so far been 
lacking due to confusion over policy towards PDS services. Comments about the clinic system by 
service users in focus groups included: 
"I am not even sure some nurses know how to read BP "/ "Since when is a nurse a doctor? "/ "the 
clinic is for babies, pregnant women and TB "/ "You can't really go if you are sick because there are 
no doctors "/ "1 don't think that the clinic is equipped to deal with chronic illness '7 "its just for 
children and TB and diabetics "/ "if you go there, they just refer you anyway "/ "its best to go to the 
doctor, then you know that you will get medicines and tablets 71 don't think the clinic is much help, 
because in an emergency you will probably die first ". 
h) Potential substitutes 
Regional managers and PDS doctors were all asked what they viewed as the most likely alternative 
for PDS services were these to come to an end. Their reactions were rooted in whether they believed 
that the regional or provincial DOH were willing to leave a town without cover by a doctor. 
PDS in a neighbouring town 
Many PDS knew of towns that have now been left without a doctor following the resignation of their 
PDS. Sometimes these were covered by PDS in neighbouring towns. This was not viewed as a 
politically desirable solution, but nevertheless one quite commonly resorted to, which demonstrated 
the scarcity of other practical substitutes for the services of PDS. When this system broke down, 
towns were left without cover. One PDS in the Eastern Cape described what they thought the 
response to their resignation from the DOH would be: 
"they would say that they have an emergency room in X (approx. S0km) and that people must go 
there" PDS, Eastern Cape 
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Another said that he felt if he said: 
" 'if you don't pay ºne more, I will leave' the DOH would respond 'OK, tough luck-'- another town 
without a doctor" 
.... 
Cuban doctors 
In the Eastern Cape, where there are many Cuban doctors already working, the possibility of using 
them to replace PDS was raised by both PDS and policy-makers but doubts were expressed as to how 
effective they would be working alone as community doctors as well as problems of communication, 
especially in areas that spoke mainly Afrikaans, where foreign doctors would struggle even with 
English: 
"you must also remember that the amount of English being spoken here is about equivalent to the 
amount of Russian. Even if you speak English here, people don't understand " PDS, Western Cape 
.... 
Community Service Doctors (CSDs) 
These newly qualified doctors doing a compulsory year's service in the public sector were also 
mentioned as potential substitutes for PDS. This is a relatively new scheme (legislation was passed 
in 1997 and the scheme commenced in 1998) and one regional manager clearly felt that it would 
change the dynamics of their relationship with PDS: 
"now they know that the days when we had to fall on our knees and look for doctors are gone. This 
province had 220 applications for community service and so we will be able to fill our posts. " 
Regional manager, Western Cape 
However, other regional managers and PDS expressed concern about the level of supervision that 
CSDs needed and how that could be delivered in rural towns without another doctor. The likelihood 
of CSDs to stay in rural areas beyond their one year of duty was also questioned, meaning that 
expertise would constantly have to be rebuilt. 
In the case of both Cubans and CSDs there were also concerns that there was a shortage of both types 
of resource and that there may not be enough to cover all the rural towns currently covered by the 
PDS system. 
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In conclusion, the market examined here has two key features. First, it is very segmented and highly 
varied. Each town represents a different flavour of the interplay between factors such as competition 
between doctors and the presence of a hospital. Second, most towns visited displayed an interesting 
combination of market power and dependence for both PDS and the DOll. For instance, many 
doctors enjoyed a strong degree of market power but also often a high degree of dependence on state 
work to provide income vital to their livelihood. Factors contributing to this situation of bilateral 
monopoly are that doctors tend not to move often between towns and when they do move they will 
tend to choose a new town with little competition. A further factor constraining competition is that 
the pool of doctors keen to become involved in providing primary care services for the state is only a 
proportion of all rural doctors. Last, whilst there do exist substitutes for all the services provided by 
PDS doctors, achieving the full combination of services which they offer by other means is not easy. 
Therefore many aspects of the market described do not resemble aspects of a competitive market. 
This is demonstrated by the attitude of one regional manager's description of their choice to take 
action against a doctor in breach of contract: 
" Well it depends entirely on what is left over in the town. If there was just one single doctor then 
obviously we would at first try and convince him to stop it. 
So the way that you exercise penalties against them depends on who they are and where they are? 
unfortunately yes " 
Regional Manager, Western Cape 
GOVERNMENT CAPACITY TO WRITE AND MANAGE CONTRACTS 
The capacity of the purchaser to write and manage contracts adequately is likely to influence the 
manner in which contracting can be approached. Poor capacity to write, monitor, manage and 
enforce contracts will lessen the ability of the purchaser to use specifications in a written contract as 
a tool to control the contractual relationship and this will make them more reliant on a relational form 
of contracting. Indicators of this type of capacity include the number of people available to manage 
contracts and their level of expertise as well as what financial and administrative systems are in place 
for managing contracts. Administrative capacity is needed in terms of expertise for policy 
formulation, contract letting and design and monitoring and enforcement of contracts as well as 
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adequate financial systems to process payments on time and financial capacity to pay for the services 
contracted out. Last, basic resources such as transport, telephones and computers are needed to 
facilitate the process of monitoring and communication with providers. Capacity problems faced by 
the South African government and their underlying causes have already been highlighted in the 
description of the organisational and financial legacy of apartheid in the previous chapter. 
Financial and administrative systems 
"we need an extra pair of hands before we can do the administration here" 
Regional Manager, Eastern Cape 
As was described in the previous chapter, South Africa's current provincial governments were 
formed following the 1994 elections and many government systems and policies are still in the 
process of being established. In this case study of two provinces there were marked differences in 
their respective levels of capacity. Whilst the Western Cape province was formed from a portion of 
the former well-resourced Cape Province and has maintained its administrative capital, Cape Town, 
the Eastern Cape was amalgamated from parts of the former Cape Province and the former 
homelands of the Transkei and Ciskei. The Eastern Cape therefore faced a harder task in establishing 
its administrative and financial systems, having to integrate the rump of the Western Cape 
bureaucracy and two additional more poorly resourced bureaucracies. In addition, the Eastern Cape 
did not inherit many of the core administrative units and skills necessary for it to function 
successfully in the new federal system. 
The difference in financial and administrative capacity between the two provinces is demonstrated by 
the Western Cape's reliance on a computer system to monitor and process the claims of their PDS 
whilst the Eastern Cape still relies on forms to be filled out by the PDS and then checked by hand. 
The Western Cape has been able to both afford and administer the design of a computer programme 
specific to the PDS system, as well as the purchase and installation of computers for each PDS 
practice. As will be shown in Chapter 7, this computer system plays a key role in the monitoring 
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function of the Western Cape and acts as an important support for trust within that contractual 
relationship. In contrast an Eastern Cape PDS commented of that province's financial systems: 
"Now at the moment the province isn't really aware of how much they are spending in each region. 
Because for instance in our practice we are getting a hospital cheque, getting a cheque from the 
regional council for the PDS, there might be others but I can't think... It's stacked, all of these are 
coming from the same Treasury, and their system won't allow them to know how much (in total) I am 
receiving" PDS, Eastern Cape 
Further disruption was experienced in the Eastern Cape when the financial administration of the 
province was resumed by the National Department of Finance in 1997 following allegations of gross 
mismanagement. This impacted down to the level of PDS payments: 
"one salary just disappeared, we never got paid. And we queried this, and the answer was that they 
were changing over from the DOH to the Department of Finance, and that those are the guys who in 
the future would be paying our salaries. And with the changeover, the October salary disappeared. 
It was never paid " PDS, Eastern Cape 
The upheaval of decentralisation to the new provincial structures means that some systems are not yet 
fully decentralised. Administrative weakness in the Eastern Cape meant that the province was still 
processing the claims of the PDS at head office whilst their payments had been decentralised down to 
regional level. The region was unable to take on the monitoring task due to a shortage of personnel 
and was making payments independently of the monitoring function carried out at head office. 
Poor capacity to formulate policy 
"we are very concerned if that (contracting to the private sector) happens on a large scale because 
then the con fusion between private and public becomes greater, in a situation which we haven't 
proper policies about where we are going to. What are the issues of private and public health in this 
country? and the issues of funding? I am scared of these patchy approaches to the public private 
mix. I think we need a much more global policy framework..... and until that is sorted out I think that 
a lot of PPM stuff becomes veryfuzzy and di cult to control" Regional Manager, Western Cape 
These basic administrative difficulties were taking place against a backdrop of confusion on basic 
policy towards the PDS, also partly due to a lack of capacity to formulate a coherent policy 
framework. At the time that the fieldwork was being carried out, the Eastern Cape was attempting to 
formulate a provincial policy towards contracting with the private sector. This was hindered by a 
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lack of basic data regarding issues such as an up to date census and information on the likely demand 
patterns for PHC services in different areas. 
These problems are highlighted by the frustrated comments of regional managers: 
"we don't have a problem with the contract just with the PDS we also have a problem with the 
contract with local government... we need to have a drastic review... How can you enter into 
contracts if you don't tell the people what it is that you want done? And that is our major problem at 
the moment, it's too loose " Regional Manager, Western Cape 
-wtwe have delayed in getting consensus on the kind of policy that %t'e want in our Province" 
Regional Manager, Eastern Cape 
Lack of resources to manage and monitor contracts 
`I am the only one left who knows anything or who is managing the district surgeons.... the Eastern 
Cape, forming a nerv province, didn't have any infrastructure to fall back onto to manage it, whereas 
in the Western Cape they could still use their expertise from the previous time" 
Regional Manager, Eastern Cape 
Problem of a lack of resources appeared particularly acute in the Eastern Cape: 
"titwe don't have the personnel to do the monitoring of the interventions" 
Regional Director, Eastern Cape 
One of the principal managers of all PDS in the Eastern Cape described how he is doing the job 
almost by default, despite his job designation and terms of reference being quite different than 
manager for the PDS services : 
"I spend less than 20% of my time managing the PDS, I have stacks and stacks of work on my desk. 
There is too much for one person. It is an impossibility for one person to handle it..... I am just 
fighting frres.......... there is no one specifically engaged for that task. No-one specifically tasked with 
looking at, controlling and regulating the PDS services as they are at the moment " 
Regional Manager, Eastern Cape 
When asked whether he has time to spend contacting and managing the PDS the regional director 
said: 
"no I don't have the time. I did before but I must say that in the past two or three years, no I don't 
have time" Regional Director, Eastern Cape 
In turn the PDS complain that the people that they deal with in the Province are ill-informed: 
"They don't even have an idea, when you speak to them they don't have any idea what we are doing 
here, what the situation is like. I mean the people that we refer to X and then we get letters back 
saying why don't we do certain things here, because they don't have an idea that we don't have a 
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hospital. 
.... There is a very great misconception of what is really going on in a rural area... they have got no inkling.... " PDS, Eastcrn Cape 
In the better resourced Western Cape the situation appeared less constrained and devolution of 
responsibility for management of the PDS to regional level had taken place smoothly. 
HUMAN FACTORS: MOTIVATION OF PROVIDERS 
Individual service providers may be an important determinant of the nature of service delivery under 
an incomplete contract, making the question relevant of what motivates individuals involved in the 
contracting process, and whether they are likely to behave in an opportunistic manner. This is likely 
to be determined to some extent by whether contractors are operating for-profit or not for profit, and 
whether they are self-employed individuals or part of a larger company structure, in which case both 
their own motivations and the way in which their behaviour is controlled by the company's internal 
controls and procedures must be taken into account. Whilst the overall motivation of providers will 
also reflect contract design, the role of the underlying attitudes of providers to their work and to state 
work in particular, can be important. During the interviews, these were explored along with the 
initial reason why the PDS became involved with the contract. 
PDS interviewed for this research gave remarkably similar answers to the question of why they had 
become involved in that type of work. They had usually been in the town where they hold a contract 
for over 10 years. Their background was in rural practice, usually private, although in one case a 
doctor had moved from a public sector hospital in a former homeland. Most doctors mentioned a 
combination of altruistic and financial motivations. Examples of how they described these are shown 
in table 5.4 overleaf. 
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Table 5.4: Motivations of PDS 
PDS altruistic/ feelings of obligation financial 
A-E Cape "call it a . sense nJ r/e ce nc. r.... iJ ºrr 
didn't do /I. 
nobody would Ito it - 
C-E Cape "sounds very altruistic I suppose but it's part of "it's an income that we are dependent on, that's 
the ºº'ork in a small torn to provide services to the one aspect to it 
indigent patients. In a u'av its saust 'ingfor inc 
to work with the clinic sisters, not just seeing 
patients hill also having a hit of a broader view 
as to the actual service and the quality qfsen -ice 
"personallt' / would find it very di/ficult to give 
u that part of the service 
i)-F Cape "/ always wanted to he a community doctor. I 
feel some sort (? /'debt towards the c"onrnrºrnitl'. 
They have looked after me at different stages and 
let 's face it, nobody else wants to conic! If 
somebody else ºº"anted to come, / might fi'rl 
diJ%rent ". 
- _- ---_----- - E-E Cape '. first of all we stau here, that's one of the main 'Ihr Jac"t that ºic art . w1// 
here In hresulc. s. s Shalt S 
things. But also primarily tie all of its did this that this is ºº'hat ºº'e ºcant to do and intend to tie 
for the love of the job and the lore of the people, hill there is a point at which if the province tr it s 
that's how we all start out " to cut v our inmate' he'lrnr (1 c4,11uirr Ic ic/.... 
'. vve have always accepted that ice have to do all 
this doctor work because there is no one else 
available 
J-W Cape "its part ofnrvjob... l have been involved with "/I's a sure Income ever' ºnuntlº thus luu don't 
the state since / started working as a docior... 1 see have many overheads on 
it as art ofmvli/c" 
1. W Cape "yore pay a price over the years to he a PDS (in firstly you raust have a job " 
terms of private practice'). / thought at the time ''of course money is important, but ºº"hen l fir %t 
that / would like to he a PDS. l ºº"ould like to started ºcorking here in /962 I got R600l)c', ' 
service the conununity in that nay. l have grown montlº to do tlri% tcih. ! trat slush 'r nrrn'h awns'! ' .. 
up here, / have been at school here, 1 know the 
community. I know' especial/v the poorer 
community because I have grown ºrp on a 
. 
/arm...... ft is more interesting ºcork. I also like 
medico-legal work. But / did,, 't know that it 
Ivoºrld influence nil' bleats work . co nltrch 
K-W Cape ''one cannot avoid self interest, if thisgels driven 
to the extreme, like in that , 
vour income drops hr 
so much that its going to end up you having to 
leave the town..... / must have the income " 
H-W Cape "you can 't do a service in a community like this "/ think that there is a certain cut of point where 
without doing the district surgeon ºº'ork as well a district surgeon will decide I can't work for tilt N 
Otherwise von are not giving the community a type of nºonc"y, so voo either get out of th(" 
service and the community is very much (orlfract of /e'(rn' di. ' toil it". 
dependent on its" 
"a(l1'ti, i(at; i'v 0/ tilc c'untref('t to 1/I(' l)rul'1N('. ' Ur(' 
"the province knots it, they know that i/you are both income ºr ist' anti he'll. ahh" tu , 1,,, "c" u . "oll 
not going to do your. state work you are not going . service to the c'onnrnNºity 
to hure a )rustier 
Most PDS expressed a reluctance to uproot and move from where they were currently practising, 
having been there for a long time, and having a sense of identifying with the community in which 
they lived. These factors influenced their position, given that most acknowledged that they had little 
choice but to do the work if they wished to remain in that town. They also recognised that in many 
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cases provincial managers were aware of that and may be exploiting it. Rather than seeing the work 
as lucrative, interviewees talked most often of a level of pay below which they were not prepared to 
go; using phrases such as a "cut off point" down to which they were willing to go on rendering 
services, even if very poorly paid, although the increase in income since PHC was made free was also 
acknowledged. The best financial aspect of the contract was seen as the reliable nature of the work 
and income that it represented, as the demand from patients was consistently high. 
In terms of altruistic motives, comments were very similar between all doctors. Only one did not 
mention a wish to serve the community or a feeling of obligation to the community in which he lived. 
The impossibility of living in a town and not doing state work was frequently mentioned. One doctor 
felt that he would probably have to do the work anyway, so he may as well receive some 
compensation from the state for it. 
ASYMMETRIES OF INFORMATION 
Asymmetries of information lie at the heart of any contractual (principal-agent relationship), both as a 
frequent cause for such a relationship and as a problem which bedevils its operation. They are 
particularly prevalent in almost any health care setting. It is not surprising therefore to acknowledge 
that several of the factors discussed above combine to create a situation of severe asymmetries of 
information in the PDS relationship. In particular the nature of the service, nature (or motivation) or 
providers and capacity to specify and monitor contracts all combine to create information problems. 
First, the nature of the service is varied and delivered in remote, scattered locations. The purchaser's 
exact service delivery requirements are unlikely to be easily specified in a contract or easily 
monitored. Second, the providers involved in this contract are profit-seeking and report one of their 
motivations as financial, which suggests that there may be a degree of opportunistic behaviour on 
their part. Third, capacity of the purchaser to tackle these information problems, either via 
monitoring or specifying the contract in any kind of detail, appears to be weak. 
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CONCLUSION 
A review of the nature of the service, market, capacity and motivation of providers involved in the 
PDS contract reveals much about the environment in which the PDS contract operates, and how much 
this is likely to influence the way in which it works. The type of service that the contract governs is 
difficult to define both in terms of its boundaries and its exact content. The degree of competition or 
contestability of the PDS market is low and few direct substitutes exist. This, in addition to the 
nature of the towns in which PDS services are contracted, creates a situation of bilateral dependence 
between purchaser and provider. Capacity to specify, design and manage contracts at most levels of 
the South African department of health is under strain. The Eastern Cape, a formerly disadvantaged 
province, suffers from particularly weak capacity which severely compromises its ability to engage 
with the private sector. Last, the nature of the providers involved in the PDS contract is remarkably 
homogeneous. They identify a complex cocktail of motivations in their decision to do PDS work, 
which tend to contain both financial and more altruistic incentives. 
The environment of the PDS contract suggests that it will be plagued by severe asymmetries of 
information. How the purchaser chooses to manage these information problems is key to the nature of 
the contractual relationship. Two options present themselves. One is to try and approach the 
problem through tight contract monitoring and delivery, despite the problems described above. The 
second is to accept that asymmetries of information will be too great to allow for such a classical 
approach to contracting and recognise the inevitable incompleteness and relational nature of the 
arising contract. The next two chapters examine how these problems are dealt with in the case of the 
PDS contract. 
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CHAPTER 6: TILE PDS CONTRACT: AWARD PROCESS AND DESIGN 
This chapter is the second on the PDS case study and gives information on the design of the contract, 
the award process and the perceptions of both purchaser and provider about the adequacy of the 
contract's specifications. 
CONTRACT DESIGN 
Both Eastern and Western Cape provinces still used the old Cape Provincial Administration's 
contract, the form of which was unchanged since the early 1970s. It was laid out as a memorandum 
of understanding regarding "Part-tine District Surgeons: the Conditions of Appointment and Duties 
to be performed. " Some of the PDS in the case study were not in possession of a written copy of 
their contract. 
Duties specified 
The PDS was appointed by the Deputy Director General: Health and Hospital services, and the 
contract stated that immediate control over his services was exercised by the magistrate of the town 
in which he was appointed. This referred to the system, out of date since the removal of fees for 
primary care services in 1996, by which patients had to visit the magistrate to either pay a user fee or 
gain a certificate of indigency before accessing the PDS. 
The services to be rendered by the PDS are extremely broad. Their specification is shown in table 
6.1 overleaf. 
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Table 6.1: Service specification in the PUS contract 
SERVICES SPF: ('IFIF: I) IN'I HF. I'M CONTRACT 
i) Clinical duties, including medical, obstetric and surgical'" services for state patients`' and 
tooth extractions for state patients where no dentist is available. Maternity services to other 
state patients and operations in hospital are excluded. 
ii)Ex-officio work, including the examination of a range cif candidates for public service and 
apprenticeships as well as applicants for disability grants 
iii) Medical forensic, defined as "required of district surgeons in terms of any ac/ or 
provincial ordinance 
I%, ) Emergency services, the district surgeon is required to "render nm' vervice that tilt 
Regional Medico! Superintendant nr any oilier nºc'(liral o//ieial ... It 
hu lrrº. c (lºº/t, cnºthoriscd.. 
ºncr1' require U/ Iiini 
00) Other duties arc broadly spcciIicd as ''cart nl/rc r /arc, /ý ý. ýinnýr/ " (r iý r-cc/uin"d of 
him /)i" 
the Deprrty Director General. - Hospital and lieu/th sen-ices 
In addition to the duties described in the table, the following parameters were also set on the way in 
which they will be delivered: 
i) Geographic location 
The PDS was obliged "to render any senvice required of him in lernis of this contract at tiny place in 
the above mentioned district surgeon area as ordered by the magistrate". In the case of emergencies, 
he may also be required to render any service in any other area as ordered by the magistrate. 
ii) Maintenence of records 
The PDS was mandated to "keep adequate records regarding his official services and render an 
annual report and returns on the prescribed. form as the Deputy Director General: Hospital and 
Health services may from time to time require. 
20 "... which may reasonably be expected of a GP in regard to normal extra- institutional treatment" 21 persons for whose medical care the Cape Provincial Administration has assumed responsibility 
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iii) Changes to the contract specification 
Allowance was made for changes in the duties to be performed by the PDS in the following way: 
"The district surgeon shall perform his duties strictly in accordance with the standing instructions of 
the Deputy Director General: Hospital and Health Services as he deems it necessary to issue fron 
time to time ". In addition the Province retained the right to amend the contract or any standing 
orders, "providing that the PDS is entitled to three months' notice in regard to - 
"a reduction of his annual salary or an allowance or supplementary money named in the Appendix 
" an amendment which brings about an extension of the PDS' area 
" any other changes in the regional borders of the PDS area which may be detrimental to the PDS 
legal interests ". 
iv) Availability 
The contract specified that "the district surgeon shall give preference to his official duties, except 
where serious emergencies occur in his private practice" and that he "shall be available at all times 
for the immediate and efficient performance of a service required of him in terms of this contract ". 
v)Equipmeut 
The contract specified that "the district surgeon shall himself supply the means of transport and all 
the medical equipment required for the immediate and efficient performance of his duties in terms of 
this contract ". No compensation for any capital expenditure on equipment or upgrading of facilities 
was offered by the contract. 
vi) Method of payment 
Payment rates for services to be rendered by a district surgeon were not directly specified within the 
contract but laid out in an appendix. PDS services were remunerated monthly at sessional rates. In 
addition they received an honorarium payment and transport allowance per km. To calculate the 
sessional payment, a range of service options was specified, alongside the amount of time that it is 
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assumed each one will take; for instance a primary care consultation was assumed to last 10 minutes, 
or a post mortem 1.5 hours. This dictated the sessional payment that would be received. For instance, 
for every 6 PHC consultations a PDS would be paid the equivalent of one hour of work at the 
sessional rate. In addition PDS received a flat dispensing fee for each prescription that they supply. 
PDS practices are required to submit claims monthly, detailing the name of each patient seen, the 
diagnosis and drugs dispensed or prescribed. 
The contract is therefore established to enable considerable demands to be made on the PDS where 
necessary. He or she is required to be available at all times to deliver a range of broadly specified 
services. Delivery of PHC services to state patients is just one aspect of this contract, although it 
represents the bulk of the work and therefore the income received for many practices. 
DURATION OF CONTRACT/ CONTRACT TERMINATION 
Duration of contracts varied between towns and differed from one month and indefinite (Table 6.2). 
Those contracts awarded before 1994 were valid until the PDS turned 65. More recently awarded 
contracts tended to have a shorter, fixed duration (e. g. one month) or be vague about duration - 
describing it as "open-ended" or "indefinite". 
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Table 6.2: Duration of various PDS contracts studied 
Site Duration of contract Notice period 
A-E Cape Until PDS 65" birthday 3 months 
B-E Cape Monthly renewal One month 
C-E Cape "1 happen to have seen the contract that 1 am supposed to 3 months on either side 
have but I have never actually signed one". If you don't 
give notice "in practice it just runs on and on " 
D-E Cape Monthly renewal. One month 
E-E Cape Until PDS 65" birthday 3 months on either side 
F-E Cape Originally was renewed monthly by letter from the Was 3 months. Now unsure 
province. Then made onto a three month contract which as not received fax from 
was faxed through every three months. Now they have Province for some time. 
not received faxes for several months. On the phone were 
told that the agreement was indefinite until they hear 
something. 
G-W Cape Until PDS 65` birthday 3 months on either side 
H-W Cape Until PDS 65h birthday 15 days on either side 
J-W Cape No actual contract. Understanding is thought to be open- Not clear 
ended and indefinite. "There is no end in sight" 
K-W Cape Until PDS 65" birthday 3 months on either side 
L-W Cape Until PDS 65" birthday 3 months on either side 
The contract could be terminated by the province with immediate effect Ihr any of the following 
reasons: 
" breach of a material condition of the contract 
" serious negligence or default in performing a duty assigned to the PDS 
" misconduct calculated to discredit the medical profession or the PDS office. 
Sanctions are also described in the case of a PDS leaving his post without having a locum in place. 
In this case, the Province was permitted to make arrangements for medical cover as they deemed fit 
and subtract the cost of this from the next payment to the PDS. Lastly, the contract could be 
suspended awaiting the outcome of an investigation into any breach of contract and any salary which 
would have been paid during that period withheld. Upon reinstatement, the PDS was entitled to 
receive this salary and any other payments due. In case of the termination of contract, the PDS was 
not entitled to any payments with effect from the start of his/her suspension. 
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THE NATURE OF THE CONTRACT 
Walsh et al (1997) suggest several dimensions in which the nature of contracts can be analysed. In 
particular they highlight types of contracts as varying along three dimensions: focus, form and 
content. Practical issues such as methods of dealing with risk, problems of ensuring quality and the 
use of default to cope with problems of unsatisfactory performance are also highlighted. The nature 
of the PDS contract is illuminated by examining these dimensions. 
First, the focus of the contract is revealed by whether it is specified in terms of inputs (what is 
required to do the work), methods (how the work is to be done) or performance (what are the results 
to be achieved? ) None of these dimensions are particularly clearly specified in the PDS contract. 
" In the case of inputs, only time and services of the PDS are mentioned. The way in which services 
are to be delivered is specified in terms of broad parameters such as place and time, but again little 
further specification is given. For instance, it is clear where services are to be delivered 
geographically, but whether they are to be delivered in the PDS private, surgery or a clinic or 
another location is not mentioned. Broad parameters are set on timing, in that the PDS must give 
priority to his PDS work and can be called upon at any time. However, details such as hours of 
opening of the PDS clinic are not specified, nor what type of after hours services must be 
available. 
" The method by which medical services of different types are to be delivered is not specified at all. 
" Last, there is no focus on results in the contract. No mention is made of any type of output other 
than specific medical services, and it is debatable whether these constitute inputs, methods or 
outputs! Certainly no quantities of outputs or patients to be seen are defined in the contract. 
The contract therefore has a superficial focus on inputs and methods but it does not clearly specify 
either the inputs required or the methods to be used to any useful degree. It also confounds Walsh's 
prediction that "we would expect a closer focus on results where the nature of the work is d cult to 
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specify" in that whilst the nature of PDS work is varied and clearly difficult to specify, results are not 
specified and indeed also would be difficult to specify. This incomplete focus of the contract reflects 
both the partial nature in which the purchaser chooses to define the service which they are 
purchasing, but also underlying difficulties in writing contracts for a service of this nature, as was 
predicted to be the case in the previous chapter. 
Second, the form of the contract refers to the level of formality and whether the contract is based on 
a fixed or variable price. This contract is written in formal terms and is based on a series of fixed 
prices, but the quantity of services delivered can differ, with no upper limit on the amount of services 
that a PDS can deliver. Price per item is not altered by the volume of services. 
Third, the content of the contract deals with issues of how the services are to be provided, how they 
are defined and the nature of contract conditions covering issues such as arbitration, variation and 
default. In the case of the PDS contract, content is quite varied. How services are to be delivered and 
how they are defined is a mixture of broad brush definitions, such as "render medical services 
required" and quite specific stipulations such as: 
"perform tooth extractions on a state patient, a needy person or prisoner as required for immediate 
pain relief, but only in cases where the services of a dentist are not available' 
Variation in the contract is dealt with in broad terms, giving the Province what appears to be the 
power to vary most conditions of contract. This power appears quite one-sided with no provision for 
the PDS to vary the terms of the contract from their side. The Deputy Director General is permitted 
to issue "standing instructions... from time to time... " in accordance with which the PDS must perform 
his duties, and the Administrator "shall have the right to amend the contract... " with only some 
requirements for notice to be given. Hence the contract is not "closed", in the sense that the nature of 
the relationship it defines could be altered quite radically by the purchaser. On the other hand, 
sanctions for default in some cases are quite detailed e. g. departure from town without arranging for a 
locum, but other issues of malpractice and the sanctions that could be invoked are not dealt with at 
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all, apart from termination. The contract does give an impression of the range of sanctions available: 
termination, suspension and deduction of money from payments due appear to be the main options 
which the province can exercise. However the manner in which they may do so are not specified in a 
comprehensive way by the contract. 
How the contract deals with risk and the link between risk and quality supports Walsh et al's (1997) 
finding in the UK that "the general tendency has been for the client, who is naturally highly risk- 
averse, to write the contract so that it is the provider who bears the greater risk". The PDS contract 
brings providers into an effectively open-ended commitment to the state - they sign an undertaking to 
give priority to state work the volume of which they cannot always control, and they can be called 
upon to perform a range of new functions at the wish of the DOH or the magistrate. The risk imposed 
on the PDS is that the volume of work generated by the PDS contract is so large that they are unable 
to maintain their own private practice and that the payment levels set by the Province will not be an 
adequate compensation for their time. On the other side, the Province now faces an open-ended 
commitment to pay the PDS for a volume of work which it may not be able to control, although prior 
to 1996 this risk was controlled by the mechanism that patients had to either pay a fee or obtain a 
certificate of indigency from the magistrate. The payment of the same fee per item of work suggests 
that quality of PDS services should not suffer as volume rises. However, setting payment at a low 
rate means that PDS are encouraged to maximise the volume of services that they provide, and the 
fact that there is a finite amount of work that can be performed by a PDS may mean that as volume is 
maximised, quality will suffer. 
Lastly, methods of ensuring quality are suggested by Walsh et at (1997) as a practical issue that has 
to be tackled in specifying a contract. It is observed that this is: 
"likely to pose particular problems where (quality) cannot easily be defined and may be difficult to 
observe: much depends on the character of the information available and the way in which access to 
it is distributed - whether providers have more information than purchasers. " 
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The PDS contract appears to have found it least problematic to bypass issues of quality of services 
altogether. The word quality is not mentioned in the contract. It is specified that the PDS must 
submit all information in writing ("claims, recommendations, reports and other official 
communications ") and that he must "keep adequate records regarding his official services and 
render an annual report and returns on the prescribed form ". However none of these 
communications deal with the quality of services delivered or attempt to monitor quality. 
A further dimension of the contract to be considered is the degree of its completeness, meaning the 
degree to which it has specified what is to happen in all possible eventualities. Whilst there is not an 
attempt to specify each possible eventuality in this contract the division of risk (in terms of service 
delivery to the provider and in terms of payment to the purchaser) is quite clear. 
An analysis of the PDS contract according to the dimensions discussed above suggest that it offers 
more of a definition of a relationship between the Province and the PDS than any detailed 
specification of issues such as inputs, methods or outputs. Its focus and content both are quite varied, 
and range between highly detailed specifications and general `catch all' measures. The contract 
relies on an open-ended commitment from the PDS to take on all work that is directed towards him. 
It also relies on an open-ended budget on the side of the province to pay for these services (although 
there used to be a filter in place in the form of the magistrate's office). Overall the general nature of 
the relationship suggested by this contract is one where all eventualities can be dealt with, but only 
whilst both'-)f these points hold. 
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CONTRACT AWARD PROCESS 
The PDS contract is awarded to an individual doctor rather than a group practice. The contracts 
examined here were awarded between 1973 and 1998. Features of the contract award process in each 
town are shown in table 6.3. Most contracts were not awarded as the result of any competitive 
process, most not even moving between practices, but just passed from an older doctor to a more 
junior one: five of the contracts were awarded when the incumbent PDS left the practice to a junior 
successor and in the other six cases, one doctor had joined a practice and taken on the PDS contract 
from a senior partner as he joined, three more doctors had bought practices which held PDS contracts 
and two practices had taken over the PDS work following the death of the town's previous PDS. 
Four PDS were asked by the DOH to apply for the job in writing. The others had either been 
approached directly by the DOH or had simply taken over the work from a departing partner, with the 
change being followed up later by a change of name on the contract by the DOH. Of the four who 
had applied in writing, two said that the job had been advertised and two were not sure if the s was the 
case. Only one of those who applied in writing knew for certain that someone else had also applied 
for the job. 
In the case of the four most recently awarded contracts, no written contract had ever been provided, 
the contract having been only ever awarded verbally. Three of the PDS operating without a written 
contract were in the Eastern Cape. 
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PROCESS OF NEGOTIATION OVER CONTRACT 
The contract appears to be viewed very much as a `given'; around or outside of which various deals 
may be negotiated directly with the Province, but the outcome of such negotiations would not be 
reflected in the standardised contract document: 
"that was a standard contract. take it or leave it" PDS, Eastern Cape 
The contract's nature is standard across all PDS, and there was little negotiation about terms. 
Whether a practice took the contract was determined by whether they needed the work or felt that 
they could refuse it, rather than because of the attractiveness or otherwise of specific contract terms. 
Echoing some of the comments reported in the previous chapter, two PDS in the Western Cape 
described how the DOH were desperate to find a doctor in one town to be PDS, but even then did not 
mention that this created an opportunity to negotiate more favourable terms in the contract. 
"nobody was interested in doing PDS work, it was really a very underpaid service, and not nice work 
to do..... I wouldn't have taken it if there was another PDS in this town, but you can't be the only 
practice and not be the PDS. These patients have to be seen " PDS, Western Cape 
.... we 
just knew that the state needed us and we needed them so we had a talk and we realised that 
we would have to do it. We had no inclination of not doing it.... we didn't actually need the pot 
sweetened, we just sort of drifted from the one situation into the next " PDS, Western Cape 
Contract form was therefore not seen as a subject for negotiation. Even where practices were in a 
strong bargaining position there was little appetite to try and change the terms of the contract. 
PDS AND PURCHASER OPINIONS LN TIIE CONTRACT 
In the sections below both PDS' and purchasers' opinions about the specification of the contract are 
reported, in particular the adequacy with which contractual requirements are laid out, the payment 
mechanism and beliefs about what would constitute a breach of contract on either side and what 
sanctions are stipulated. These comments by both purchaser and provider highlight several points. 
First, whilst all of the doctors interviewed are effectively working under the same contract, it is 
interesting to see the variety in their opinions both about how well it is specified and even the details 
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of what it says. This suggests that the written contract is only marginal as a defining factor in the 
relationship between purchaser and provider. It is also important to note that in the case of four 
doctors interviewed there was no written contract; they were operating only with an understanding of 
what would be written in their contract, if they had one. 
PDS views on contract specification 
"the contract says that we have to do the work that they want us to do. That they can employ you 
basically in any way. The contract stipulates that you must see state patients. And they can stipulate 
which state patients you see....... So just as they increased the patients in 1994 and 1996.... the Lord 
giveth and the Lord taketh away! .... " PDS, Eastern Cape 
Opinions differed between PDS as to whether the contract was well specified and what services they 
were expected to deliver. In many cases the attitude to the contract was one of tolerance rather than 
seeing it as a guide to the contractual relationship. Some PDS referred to it as if they were 
humouring the province by continuing to work under a document that in many respects no longer had 
any relevance to the work that they do: 
"ii'ell it (the contract) ... is just not being adhered to by the state, so whether 
it's specified or not 
doesn't really make any difference, at this time. " PDS, Eastern Cape 
Another said: 
"well those old contracts are irrelevant for the present situation. The nature of the practice has 
changed too much.......... is that really a contract? It's more a job description of what you must do" 
PDS, Western Cape 
About the degree of detail with which services were specified by the contract the following 
comments were made: 
"we haven't got a very fixed contract, we have the contract that I signed 14 years ago, it hasn't 
changed, it's a very basic and very loose type of contract. It's not binding any of the parties, it just 
sort of asks the practitioner to give a decent service and if he doesn't comply with that he is to be 
dismissed. But it doesn't give you a timescale or any sort of insurance of how long or what your 
income will be, what your services will consist of and they can decrease it or increase it as they see 
fit" 
"..... (services to be delivered) aren't spelt out in any clear way. " PDS, Western Cape 
" It was broadly put. It basically had different clauses in it, for instance... that DS patients would 
have priority over my private patients...... that I should do medical and forensic services, that's it " 
PDS, Eastern Cape 
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"it has got a broad framnework. It says that you must look after the poorer part of the people, those 
that can't afford private health care. That's your job, a broad description. And you must provide 
medico legal services" PDS, Western Cape 
No mention was made by any PDS about quality in contract specifications. One doctor offered a 
negative definition of the quality that they were expected to offer: 
"in the old contract I think it said that you have to give a service to such an extent that there won't be 
any complaints" PDS, Western Cape 
More exasperation was expressed by one PDS about how poorly the services were specified by his 
contract: 
"....... my contract is one line long. It says "you are hereby appointed district surgeon for the month 
of February ". And I think that was about 3 years back! So basically there is no contract. " 
PDS, Eastern Cape 
Interestingly, two PDS that were happy with the detail of contract specification were both working 
without a contract, although they both have prior experience of working in practices where there were 
contracts. This almost suggests that they find it easier to operate as PDS and understand the nature of 
the service without any recourse to written form. 
Specifications such as the types of inputs to be used, or the level or quality of output to be delivered 
were thought by all PDS to be entirely absent from the contract specifications. One regional manager 
pointed out how this was also to the advantage of the PDS, allowing them to make unlimited use of 
state support services such as laboratory services. 
When asked to name what they saw as the main responsibilities of a PDS, doctors' descriptions were 
very similar; stressing their role in curative primary care for state patients and medico-legal services: 
"basically I render primary and curative services to indigent patients and I do forensic work as 
well. " PDS, Eastern Cape 
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"I have got to provide curative health services during office hours to state patients. PLUS I have to 
do medico legal work like drunken driving and rape cases after hours as well as in office hours. and 
then we also have to do the disability grants, certifying of mentally ill patients etc. " 
PDS, Western Cape 
Most PDS said that they had learned what was involved in the job from their predecessor: 
"(I learnt itfrom) ... the guy who was DS when 
I arrived in Jan 1983" PDS, Western Cape 
" (I learnt itfrom) ... thne and 
DrX... what do you call that? in- service training. " PDS, WesternCape 
At one extreme, one PDS had never seen a copy of his contract or of any PDS contract, having learnt 
the whole system from other doctors in practices where he had worked. 
PDS were also confident that the services they were delivering were all broadly in line with each 
other. The chairman of one of the PDS committees described how he saw the system operating: 
"Everybody does what he thinks. 
and do you think that everybody does the same? 
I daresay that you will get a great variance in terms of quality. 
But if I lined up 10 PDS and said "please describe what it means" do you think that I would get 
roughly the saure answer? 
probably roughly the same answer, depending on whether the town has a hospital or not ". 
PDS Western Cape 
PDS saw their professional opinion and discretion playing a considerable role in determining what 
services they will provide. Therefore despite feeling that the contract was poorly specified, most 
PDS were happy to have this left to their individual discretion: 
"they say "be a doctor to our patients " and that's what we do " PDS, Western Cape 
"it's just that we all do what we think is our duty " PDS, Western Cape 
whilst another explained: 
" the specification is vague is because they know the services that we have been providing all the 
time so we are not new to this" PDS, Western Cape 
and another said: 
"there is a certain standard of medical care and of humanitarian care, which I don't need the 
province to tell me. " PDS, Eastern Cape 
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One regional manager also echoed this preference of doctors to define their own working practices, 
saying that he felt that the new capped payment system was preferred because it gave them greater 
autonomy to decide how to deliver services. 
Whilst most PDS practices visited did operate along remarkably similar lines, one practice was an 
exception. They were using sisters to screen patients and only referring a small proportion to be seen 
by the PDS. Given that they were working under the same contract as all the other PDS visited, this 
variation suggests an interesting breadth to how the contract can be interpreted, or alternatively that 
they are breaching their contract by using sisters and the Province is choosing to overlook this. The 
province acknowledged that they knew that nurses were being used to screen patients but said this 
had not been agreed. However, they took no action to stop the practice. This was a curious anomaly. 
If it is permitted under the contract it is strange that other PDS practices do not do the same. This 
again suggests that the true definition of the service to be offered lies outside of the written contract. 
Purchaser views on contract specification 
Purchasers in the Western Cape felt that some aspects of contract specification were of limited 
importance. For instance: 
"the fact that the contract might be for a defined period doesn't influence the relationship with the 
doctors... because there aren't a lot of options" Regional Manager, Western Cape. 
There was also some confusion as to which contract PDS were working under, as they had agreed 
subsequent capping of their services which was not included in the original contract. The contract 
document was clearly out of date but the subsequent agreement was not seen as a contract: 
"I didn't give them a contract. We were sort of agreeing on teens that they consented to.... " 
Regional Manager, Western Cape 
This is further complicated by the Free State court case which ruled that PDS were employees of the 
state. Regional managers complained of not knowing whether to treat them as state employees or 
not: 
"they adopt the ruling when it suits them" Regional Manager, Western Cape 
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In general regional managers in the Western Cape also were of the opinion that contracts were poorly 
specified: 
"the original DS contract, the services aren't specifically specified, or adequately, except for the 
subdivisions e. g. primary care, forensics, ex-officio work etc" Regional Manager, Western Cape 
Overall there appeared to be a general frustration with the contract. Regional managers stressed that 
the contracts were an inheritance, both from the previous Provincial authority and from `Head Office' 
(Provincial Administration of the Western Cape). One regional manager's office was not even in 
possession of copies of the contracts; 
"... so we don't know the contracts too well" Regional Manager, Western Cape 
This view was echoed in the Eastern Cape, where one regional manager said of the contract; 
"I can't remember the contract. I have just forgotten about it " Regional Manager, Eastern Cape 
PDS opinions on breach of contract and sanctions 
Table 6.4 summarises PDS' views of what would constitute a breach of contract. Their 
understanding of the different sanctions which could be applied against them is also shown. Fraud, 
and failing to deliver services either through absence or some other reason were the main areas that 
PDS identified as breaches of contract on their side. One PDS mentioned rendering poor quality 
services to patients. Another said it was impossible to say what a breach of contract could be, given 
that he was operating without a written contract anyway. 
What would constitute a breach of contract on the side of the DOH was less easy for PDS to define, 
suggesting that it is not something often considered as a possibility. Most frequently mentioned was 
any way in which the DOH could suddenly reduce the PDS' income, for instance either suddenly 
taking away the work, allowing a competitor in to the market or reducing the volume of patients by 
changing the terms of the contract at short notice. Essentially, threatening the PDS income was 
interpreted as a breach of contract, suggesting their reliance on that guaranteed income. 
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In terms of the sanctions that could be brought by the DOH, termination and suspension were the 
main ones expected by the PDS. Sanctions or penalties which the PDS could exercise against the 
DOH were much more difficult; a general lack of choices "outside of common law" and the difficulty 
of tackling such a huge institution were both mentioned. 
Purchaser opinions on breach of contract and sanctions 
Defining a breach of contract was seen by one regional manager as: 
"something that you have to use a lot of common sense in deciding. .. any 
doctor makes mistakes in his 
career" Regional Manager, Western Cape 
In both provinces there was a strong perception that terminating the PDS contract would be 
problematic. Managers in the Eastern Cape were at pains to stress that once a PDS resigned or left, 
they took care not to replace him with the same type of contractual relationship, careful not to give 
what they called "a contract" but only an "agreement". One Western Cape manager described how 
there were several PDS that he would like to dismiss, and the only problem stopping him from doing 
that was the contract: 
".... I can't do anything with the contract': 
Frustration was expressed by some managers at what they saw as the impossibility of terminating 
contracts with PDS: 
"we must have some means of terminating the contract " Regional Manager, Western Cape 
"we feel that it's too difficult to get rid of them " Regional Manager, Western Cape 
"all the provinces have been trying to get out of their existing contracts but they found there is no 
way in which these contracts can be called up" Regional Manager, Eastern Cape 
"we wanted to stop the contracts but then we withdrew because we couldn't" 
Regional Manager, Eastern Cape 
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However this widely held view was contradicted by one regional manager, who echoed very closely 
how the Free State eventually approached the termination of their PDS contracts: 
"I think that it's extremely simple to get rid of them. In terns of the existing contract and the (Free 
State) court case and in terms of the Labour Relations Act, we just tell them that we don't need them 
anymore in terms of our operational requirements... I can't see why it needs to be so difficult to get 
them out of the system " Regional Manager, Western Cape 
Whilst this would involve the payment of redundancy pay, termination of the contracts was 
nevertheless possible. This opinion is borne out by legal experts who have followed the court cases 
relating to this contract. It is not clear what had given rise to the widely held view that termination of 
contracts was not possible and it is interesting that this was such a consistently held view, despite 
being of questionable validity. This may possibly be due to an aversion to the idea of having to pay 
redundancy to private sector doctors, or a recognition that in effect the health service's degree of 
dependence on some PDS in remote areas made it better to do nothing. This argument serves as a 
convenient smokescreen for a government that would ideally like to terminate the contracts but feels 
that this is not practical (this is discussed in greater detail in the next chapter). 
One manager in the Eastern Cape who felt that the contract was very clearly specified: 
"it details everything, pages and pages, absolutely, a)b)c)d) and e) etc. It just goes on and on about 
all the cover that they are supposed to provide to the indigent, to the community, 24 hours service, 7 
days of the week, emergency calls, etc. " Regional Manager, Eastern Cape 
felt that it had also been clearly breached on both sides: on the side of the PDS by using nurses to 
screen patients, and on the side of the province in not giving the pay reviews and salary increments to 
the PDS that they were entitled to. Judging by his description, this manager obviously knows the 
contract well. He felt that failure to take sanctions against PDS who had breached the contract was 
not a result of vague service specification but a lack of resources and capacity to adequately monitor 
and police the contract. 
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Opinions on payment mechanisms and financial incentives 
The payment mechanism of the contract created a clear set of incentives. First there was a clear 
incentive to see as many patients as possible under the fee for service (FFS) arrangement. It was 
recognised by both regional managers and PDS that the time allocations contained in the contract for 
different services overstate the actual time spent with a patient. In reality the incentive is to see high 
volumes of patients much more quickly, thereby increasing the hourly salary dramatically: 
"R54 an hour... that's what we get paid. Theoretically, that's if we spent 10 minutes with every 10 
minute consultation. The bottom line is that if I saw only 6 PDS patients an hour, I would die of 
hunger. Which is why we have got this conveyor belt method... " PDS, Eastern Cape 
"what you do Js you make up the discrepancy between the private patient and the state patient by 
spending less time %i'ith the state patient" PDS, Western Cape 
"many of these guys just look at the patient and then let them go out and say that was 12 minutes" 
Regional Manager, Western Cape 
In areas of the Western Cape where the capping of payments was operating, for these PDS the 
payment mechanism was more resembling a salary, with the incentive becoming to see a set limit of 
patients in as little time as possible. 
Generally PDS preferred the idea of fee for service payment to any alternative and justified it as 
follows: 
"the doctors, feel that they are being paid well for what they do now. So the patients also get a good 
service. Because you actually think of this man as being a patient of yours and not as being a 
hassle....! know that this government is completely against fee for service but it works well, and it's 
not just me. The other reason why it works is that we have a better income, so we prefer to stay here. 
I don't want to go away, why should 1? " PDS, Western Cape 
The second incentive created by the system of payment of the contract was competition with other 
primary care providers. Because doctors were being paid on a FFS basis, if they wished to increase 
volumes of patients they may chose to do this by "stealing" patients from the clinic, rather than 
working in a co-operative relationship with them. One regional manager expressed his reservations 
about the contract design: 
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"one of the key issues is that with the present system the PDS function independently of most of the 
primary care team and the more patients that they see the more money they earn. So there is a 
perverse incentive to run down the primary health care services and to try and see as many patients 
as you can " Regional Manager, Eastern Cape 
Payment for different parts of the PDS services were very varied and for some services such as 
forensic work, felt to be unrealistically low. One PDS described that if he spent a whole day driving 
to appear in court he would still only be paid for the time that he was in court. Payment for out of 
hours work is the same as if it were in working hours, also making this type of work relatively more 
unattractive. 
PDS described a trade-off between the straightforward, high volume "easy" money provided by 
daytime PHC work and the more demanding and relatively worse paid after hours work: 
4411'hat we always said in the past was that the volume of patients that we saw during the day, what 
you might call the easy work, like BP reviews etc, that made up financially for the after hours work. 
After hours work you get paid the same whether it's 3 minutes or 10 hours" PDS, Eastern Cape 
"what we don't get paid for is being on duty. We are on duty 24 hours..... we are not going to be 
paid. We are only going to be paid for any service that we might render, and then it is going to beat 
a daytime rate" PDS, Western Cape 
Therefore, the payment mechanism and the contract are seen as functioning as a whole rather than 
each service component of the contract standing alone. There is cross-subsidisation between 
different parts of the contract, with the primary care work being used to sweeten the poorly paid and 
unpleasant nature of the after hours and medico legal work. 
Cross subsidisation from one section of the contract to another was also clearly recognised by the 
regional managers: 
"the PHC is the one that makes them happy as far as the income is concerned" Regional Manager, 
Eastern Cape 
"It's not the medico legal work where they get their money. They get their money from the primary 
care services. And we want to take out the primary care services " Regional Director, Eastern Cape 
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The contract works as a package with one set of services dependent for their delivery on the financial 
rewards for a separate package of services. The system is also dependent on the PDS not choosing to 
do the more financially rewarding aspects of the work and neglecting the other parts of the contract. 
One regional manager was of the view that given that PDS are remunerated on a fee for service 
payment the lack of detailed specification of the contract was not a problem as: 
"there is no risk of underservicing in a FFS system" Regional Manager, Western Cape 
This was seen to be an advantage, but one to be weighed up against the risk of over-servicing. 
Another regional manager complained that such an open-ended fee for service contract: 
"can't establish a ceiling" Regional Manager, Western Cape 
This problem could also be reflected in the writing of unnecessary prescriptions for patients to 
receive the dispensing fee. 
CONCLUSION 
This chapter has described the design of the PDS contract, its award process, variations in its duration 
and the fact that some PDS did not have a copy of the written contract. It has also described the 
views of both PDS and policy-makers on how well the contract specified the work expected of the 
PDS, what constituted a breach of contract, and the incentives created by the payment mechanism. 
These comments have also highlighted the role of other factors in shaping the nature of PDS services. 
Data presented in this chapter show the contract to be incomplete and that it was not usually awarded 
as part of a competitive process. These factors signal a clear departure from many of the assumptions 
of the classical contracting model described in chapter 2. The PDS contract served to distribute risk 
between purchaser and provider but left the specific nature of either commitment quite open-ended. 
The service provider faced a wide range of possible claims that could be made on his/her time and 
were open for definition in the future by the government. In return the nature of the contract design 
allowed her/him to manipulate the income that it generated, and this in turn constituted a risk faced 
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by the purchaser. The contract was also quite out of date, referring to systems and personnel who 
were important in the functioning of the system when this contract was drawn up, but who were no 
longer relevant. 
In the interviews with purchasers and providers, there was general agreement that the nature of 
service delivery was fairly standardised, although largely determined by the PDS themselves rather 
than what was specified in the contract. PDS were happy feeling that service delivery was left up to 
their professional discretion and not overly specified or interfered with by the province, although 
some of them expressed frustration with having no copy of their contract or being unsure whether it 
was still valid. Purchasers interviewed also expressed frustration with the out of date contract and the 
perceived difficulty of amending or terminating it. This created a tendency for them to by pass 
written agreements and make verbal arrangements. 
Overall the impression emerges of two contracts- the written contract, which is perceived as 
incomplete and problematic by both purchaser and provider, and the `operational' contract, which 
exists almost independently of the written contract (in some cases PDS had no copy of a written 
contract) and is defined by a combination of circumstance, history, verbal agreements and 
professional judgement by PDS. Such elements external to the contract document per se appear to 
be effectively the driving force in shaping this contractual relationship. The next chapter will 
examine both the nature of operation of the contract and some of these external factors underlying its 
operation in greater detail. 
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CHAPTER 7: TIIE CONTRACTUAL OUTCOME - OPERATION OF AN INCOMPLETE 
CONTRACT 
Previous chapters have reviewed aspects of the five factors shown in the top row of figure 7.1. This 
chapter focuses on the issue of how the contract operates, seeking to explain both how the contract 
design described in chapter 6, and other external factors described in chapter 5, influence this. 
Figure 7.1: Influences upon contract performance and operation 
Contract Purchaser Motivation Nature of Nature of 
Design & capacity of provider service market 
Incentives ' 
Contract performance and operation 
" Monitoring 
" Service Delivery 
" Payment 
" Changes to contract 
S. 
Trust? x 
Purchaser/ 
Provider 
`": Dependence? 
In the first section of this chapter, contract operation is explored via the examination of four 
contractual functions shown in the centre of figure 7.1: service delivery, monitoring, payment and 
changes to the contract. An exploration of how each of these operates is followed by a brief 
discussion about what each reveals about the nature of the contract and its operation. In the second 
section, the importance of two informal controls (trust and dependence) on determining the contract's 
operation is highlighted. To differing degrees these are argued to underlie the operation of the 
contract, acting in this case as the "glue" which holds this incompletely specified and monitored 
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contractual relationship together. They act as less formal contractual mechanisms and substitutes for 
the stipulations of a complete contract. 
SECTION 1: OPERATION OF CONTRACTUAL FUNCTIONS 
SERVICE DELIVERY 
An important clue to the influence of any type of contract on behaviour is the nature of the services 
that are delivered under it. This, to some extent, will reveal how much the design of the contract is 
controlling the behaviour of providers, although assessing which aspects of service delivery are 
attributable to contract design and which to some of the other factors shown in figure 7.1, especially 
individual motivation, is problematic. This is particularly true in the case of a contract where the 
requirements of service delivery are so vaguely specified. The data presented below describe features 
of service delivery in the PDS clinics visited in comparison with public sector clinics in similar 
settings. The inclusion of public sector clinic data is an attempt to aid comparison with services 
which are not influenced by a contract. However, conclusions on the influence of the PDS contract 
design or other factors on the way in which they deliver services are still cautious as a result of the 
multitude of influences on service delivery. 
The previous chapter described the PDS contract's fee for service design and subsequent incentive to 
increase volumes of patients, and reduce the resources spent on each patient (with the exception of 
drugs, which are supplied by the province). The nature of services delivered can be examined in 
terms of the volume, the type and the quality. Data presented below describe some features of the 
services that PDS deliver in comparison with public sector sites. Data on the volume and type of 
service delivery seek to demonstrate to what extent PDS are responding to the financial incentives in 
the contract. The quality of services delivered are difficult to assess objectively, but some 
perceptions of users and non-users of the service are presented from focus group discussions to give a 
sense of the impressions of quality of care of PDS services. 
163 
However as well as the incentives contained in the contract, there may be other, external influences 
on the nature of services delivered, in particular their quality. For example, to the extent that they are 
left to determine the services they will deliver, one provider may simply chose to deliver a higher 
quality service. As well as contractual incentives, providers' individual motivations and the demand 
for their services will therefore also influence the nature of services delivered. 
Volume, cost and structural quality of services22 
Table 7.1: Type of services delivered (% of total patients) 
Provider Curative Chronic Antenatal Total 
care and 
family 
planning 
NVC PDS n=4 68.0% 30.0% 2.0", 100.0'% 
EC PDS (n=5) 46.0% 49.0% 5.011, ý% 100.0% 
Public sector: rural facilities2. n=4 67.0% 25.0% 8.0% 100.0% 
Table 7.2: Patients seen per full time equivalent (FTE) consulting professional 
Provider Average annual workload per FTE consulting (range) 
WC PDS (n=4) 19184 (14002-23360) 
EC PDS (n=5) 13162(36117- 2736) 
Public sector: rural facilities (n=4) 9722 (7237-11490) 
Table 7.3: Mean and median consultation time and time spent in clinic (minutes) 
WC PDS (n=4) EC PDS n=S 
Mean consultation time 3.11 5.1 
Median consultation time 3.7 5.2 
Mean time in clinic 115.0 127.0 
Median time in clinic 92.0 75.0 
Public n=4 
7.6 
6.8 
136.0 
103.0 
Table 7.1 shows that the public sector clinics delivered a higher proportion of preventive services 
such as antenatal care and family planning. High volumes of patients seen per PDS practitioner is 
reflected in the figures of average annual workload per full time equivalent (FTE) consulting staff 
22 The data presented in tables 7.1 to 7.6 are drawn from the results of the broader research project New purchaser/provider 
relationships in health care: the desirability of contracts with primary care providers' 
'' Details of some elements of PDS performance are presented in comparison with an average for 4 rural public sector sites. 
More details of these sites are given in appendix 1. 
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member, shown in table 7.2. Table 7.3 shows that PI)S facilities had the shortest consultation times2'. 
In the Western Cape, where access to the PDS is not restricted by a need for referral, the consultation 
time was particularly brief. PDS in the WC were seeing over double the volume of patients per 
clinical staff member than public sector facility personnel in the same province. They were therefore 
seeing high volumes of patients in short periods of time, which makes sense in terms of the incentives 
created by the contract, but could also be a simple reaction to demand from the community. Such 
high volumes of patients and short consultation times are likely to have negative implications for the 
quality of the service being delivered. 
Table 7.4: Average cost per clinic visit (Rand) 
WC 
PDS 
(n=4) 
% EC PDS 
(n=5) 
% Rural public 
sector with 
sessional 
doctors 25 
n=3 
% Rural 
public 
sector 
average 
n=4 
% 
Internal admin and management 1.13 2.7% 1.27 3.01, '0 1.43 3.71),,, 1.58 4.2°%% 
Building operating costs 1.74 4.1% 2.99 7.2% 3.19 8.2% 2.94 7.9% 
Diagnostic tests 0.94 2.2% 0.59 1.4% 1.05 2.6% 1.02 2.7% 
Transport/vehicle running costs 0.17 2.8% 0.23 0.6% 0.56 1.4% 0.67 1.8% 
Recurrent cost excl. staff & drugs 4.98 11.8% 5.08 12.2% 6.23 15.9% 6.21 16.6% 
Clinical staff 17.28 41.1% 20.44 49.0% 14.84 37.8% 13.58 36.3% 
Medical and surgical supplies 15.58 37.0% 10.14 24.3% 12.03 30.6% 11.80 31.6°rö 
Total recurrent cost 37.84 89.9% 35.66 85.5% 33.10 84.4% 31.59 84.5% 
Building costs 0.58 1.4% 2.55 6. I% 3.71 9.5% 3.90 10.4"/" 
Medical Equipment 0.11 0.2% 0.10 0.2% 0.25 0.6% 0.22 0.6 
Furniture and equipment 0.03 0.1% 0.11 0.3% 0.10 0.2% 0.10 0.3% 
Vehicle costs 3.55 8.4% 3.29 7.9°/> 2.08 5.3% 1.55 4.2% 
Total capital cost 4.27 10.1% 6.05 14.50/ 6.14 15.6% 5.77 15.5"/° 
Total cost 41.11 100.0% 41.71 1100.0% 1 39.24 100.0% 37.36 100% 
Table 7.4 shows the average costs for PDS practices in the EC and WC and the four public sector 
rural clinics as a comparison. Spending on items that are reimbursed by the contract (staff costs and 
drugs) is in line with or higher than the public sector. When it is considered that PDS are operating 
24 PDS had the shortest consultation times of all the facilities evaluated in the research project 2, Three of the rural public sector clinics had doctors visiting the clinic on a sessional basis and therefore had a staff 
complement which was more comparable to the PDS practices in terms of cost. One of the public sector rural clinics did not 
have any doctors employed. 
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with lower staff per patient ratios (see for instance table 7.2 for patients per FTE), spending on 
clinical staff costs is relatively very high. Meanwhile, spending on other recurrent items is 
consistently lower, presumably reflecting the fact that they are not reimbursed by the contract. 
Capital spending, in particular building costs and medical equipment, is also low. Vehicle costs are 
relatively high because they are calculated as a portion of the PDS' private vehicle costs. There was 
considerable variation in the cost structure between PUS practices, a breakdown of costs per facility 
visited is shown in Appendix V. 
Drugs were supplied directly from the provincial drug depot, and for this area of expenditure the PDS 
are in line with other public sector services. Table 7.5 shows some more detailed drug use indicators. 
The PDS prescribed roughly the same number of drugs and antibiotics as their public sector 
counterparts, although their use of generic names was lower. 
Table 7.5: Drug use indicators (high and low range between facilities shown) 
No. of drugs per script % antibiotics % gen cric name used 
PDS range 2.0-2.3 24"0-35% l l%--18% 
Public sector range 1.7-2.5 22° ö-4K'ß 33%-37% 
Finally, the results of an assessment of structural quality shown in Table 7.6 below also suggest that 
PDS spend little on areas of the service for which they will not be reimbursed e. g. purchase and 
upkeep of facilities and equipment. Each PDS facility was scored on a standardised checklist for 
structural quality. This included the categories of. infrastructure, access, management and staffing, 
patient environment, drug supplies and equipment, tracer drugs and diagnostic tests a. id lab services. 
Out of these categories the indicators shown in the table below were chosen as those most likely to be 
influenced by contract design. The percentage of PDS practices that scored adequately in these 
categories is again shown in comparison with the same public sector clinics. 
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Table 7.6: Indicators of structural quality of care 
Structural indicator WC PDS EC i'DS Public sector 
General state of repair of facilities Adequate/poor Poor (iood/ade uate 
Adequate toilets 0% 20% 90% 
Functioning refrigerator 100% 100% 100% 
Adequate emergency kit 25% 40% 45% 
Items of essential equipment 75% 80% 100% 
Lockable drug storage facility 75% 60% 75% 
Waiting area: large enough and under 
cover 
75% 40% 65% 
Adequate patient records kept 75% 80% 100% 
That PDS practices may minimise expenditure on structural facilities for their state patients, as a 
result of a contract design where these costs are not reimbursed, appears to be borne out by the 
general state of repair of their rooms and the adequacy of simple facilities such as toilets. All but one 
PDS practice had either non-existent or grossly inadequate toilet facilities for their state patients. 
Facilities were far more cramped and in worse states of repair than for the public sector. PDS did not 
purchase new equipment for the PDS side of their practice or put money into improvement of its 
facilities. One practice did not keep patient records for their state patients. Although generally on 
the low end of the spectrum, other structural indicators are not greatly out of line with the weaknesses 
and strengths of other models that were investigated. 
Data presented so far suggest that PDS were delivering a low cost, high volume service but little can 
be concluded about its quality. Inference from the evidence presented would suggest that the quality 
of the services will be reduced by the short time spent with each patient and the low structural quality 
observed. Further evidence from FGD discussions rin in five of the towns where PDS practices were 
evaluated sheds light on the opinion of users and non-users within the community about the quality of 
the services. 
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Perceptions frone FGDs 
Extracts of these FGDs are presented below. The opinion of users and non-users of the PDS services 
was largely negative, with the separation of services from private patients, the waiting time, attitude 
of personnel, lack of privacy, adequacy of examination and medicines all criticised. The limitations 
of this type of evidence are then briefly discussed. 
Long waiting times and short consultation times were a common cause of complaint, with PDS being 
perceived as only issuing drugs without giving a proper examination: 
' you are not even fully in the consulting room yet, and he is done with you " 
"all he does is sit down, look at you, and start to write" 
"all he did was write medicines on a piece of paper... he didn't even ask me to lie on the bed" 
"all the people get the same medication, irrespective of complaint " 
" "sometimes we have to come back the next day if they cannot attend to its 
you go to the doctor in the morning and you come home at 7 in the evening. The doctor comes, he 
drinks tea, he has a cigarette, walks around then he helps the people in front (private patients) then 
he has another cup of tea..... . 
Comments on the interpersonal quality of the consultation, or the doctor's apparent level of caring 
and motivation, varied a great deal from practice to practice. 
"at the state doctor, it isn't really about the patient's well being, its about the money that he is going 
to get at the end of Me month from the state ... 
hejust neglects the sick-people " 
`you can see that this man doesn't care less" 
"they really have a way of making you feel like rubbish " 
Positive comments were made about two doctors specifically: 
"I must say that he always gives me a regular examination, a good exanmination... he won't be 
aggressive or anything, he is all right " 
"I cannot say whether he is good or bad but he does have sonic care" 
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"he is friendly and active " 
"lie listens to what you have to say. Everyone understands him because he speaks isiXhosa like us, 
which makes it easy for us to explain to him what the problem is. That's what we like about him " 
"he usually takes a lot of time, checking thoroughly so that you are also satisfied. " 
In most focus groups the issue of racial discrimination was raised, as well as the lack of privacy at 
some PDS where they use a "conveyor belt" method of seeing the maximum number of patients in 
minimum time: 
"he is too concerned about the whites and the medical aid patients" 
"i fa white person comes, then they are treat cd first" 
"all the people were sitting in a row and the doctor examines them starting from one side to the 
other.... and later on the sister came around and the people said what's wrong with them" 
Whilst this data from FGDs adds a useful perspective to understanding the way in which PDS deliv. r 
services, it must be treated with some caution. First there is a tendency of FGD participants to focus 
on "atrocity" stories and therefore give an unduly negative picture of the service described 
(Silverman 2000, Schneider and Palmer forthcoming) and second because these FGDs were at least 
as negative about other services, particularly the public sector. For instance it was said of nurses in 
the public sector clinics: 
"she doesn't examine you, she just gives you medicine and sends you home" and also of hospital 
services: 
"they just give you pills and ask how you feel, then write down your response" 
Again, separating out the influence of the contract from other factors is problematic. Problems of 
poor quality due to large volumes of patients being seen may be attributed to contractual incentives 
but could equally be a consequence of the under-resourcing of the health system, as is demonstrated 
by many urban public sector health facilities being equally over-crowded. 
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Evidence on service delivery suggests behaviour that would be predicted if PDS were responding to 
financial incentives in the contract, but cannot rule out other influences and explanations. In 
particular, whilst it is difficult to capture this in any of the data presented here, it was clear from 
direct observation at the different PDS practices that there was considerable variation in the way that 
each practice was run, how patients were treated and their level of satisfaction with the service. This 
suggests a considerable role is played by each individual's motivation in determining the type of 
services that get delivered under an incomplete contract. 
MONITORING OF SERVICE DELIVERY 
This section considers the operation of the contract in terms of the process of monitoring. The degree 
to which the purchaser is able to know what is taking place under the contract and the degree to 
which the provider sees the threat of monitoring as a control on his/her activities are examined. Due 
to a lack of capacity at provincial and regional level and the nature of the service, monitoring was 
recognised by both purchaser and provider to be both imperfect and incomplete. There was a 
complex mixture of justifications presented for this, ranging from an unwillingness of the province to 
monitor, through their lack of capacity to do so, to the opinion that monitoring of services such as the 
PDS deliver was simply not feasible. 
The degree to which PDS services are monitored depends both on the feasibility of monitoring this 
type of service and the capacity in the province to carry out the task. Several levels/degrees of 
monitoring, varying both in formality and the degree to which they were practised, were mentioned 
by managers and PDS, these are shown in the tables below: 
170 
Table 7.7 : Types of monitoring 
Types of monitoring commonly used by 
both provinces 
Type of control exercised by this type of monitoring 
Monitoring of global financial target Are the claims In, the PDS within the budget limit set? 
Administrative monitoring/ monitoring for 
irregularities 
Do the claims add uqp? Is the province pairing for seFl'ic c'S that it 
received? 
Drug use monitoring From the drugs used, what volume and type of sen"ices appear 
to have been deli1"crc'd: ' 
Types of monitoring mentioned as a good 
idea, but not practised 
Monitoring of the service profile Is the service pattern a)realistic? h)appropriate? 
Monitoring of quality of services delivered Are good quality services being delivered? 
Monitoring of outcomes Are health indicators in the district improving? 
In addition, table 7.8 shows that the following more informal controls on service delivery were 
suggested: 
Table 7.8: Informal monitoring and control on service delivery 
Informal methods of monitoring Likely effectiveness 
Monitoring by other health professionals in cli// 'rs /i-om town to town cccoreling to incliVViclºurl. inirnlred 
town e. g. other doctors, pharmacist, clinic 
sister 
Complaints from patients/community These are described us seldom - one manager gurv (uº e ample 
ofreec'iiving 2 complaints per months. for all services in the 
whoh, region (IRON) people and 14 hospitals) 
Other controls on service delivery Examples 
mentioned 
Policy e. g. restricting access hr requesting a re/ierral Irony the clinic 
provides further way of checking if volumes are realistic 
Incentives e. g. make payment too low for incentive to increase volumes of 
patients really seen : "the time it takes to see these patients and 
(their) increasing sophistication.. means that you don't have 
time 
. 
for your private tirork. So you will lose. 1f you have to 
physically see all those patients you will lose" PDS, Eastern 
Ca e 
Control drug use e. g drug procurement via central drug depot to allow 
monitoring of what drugs issued/prescribed 
Threat of sanctions e. g. existence of bodies such as the Heath Commission which 
investigate raud 
Strength of monitoring function in each province 
Opinions on the effectiveness of basic monitoring differed between the two provinces. Whilst in the 
Western Cape there was some confidence that basic financial monitoring was effective, in the Eastern 
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Cape this was doubted. It was clear in both provinces that quality of services delivered was not being 
effectively monitored. 
Monitoring procedures - Western Cape 
The Western Cape system of monitoring relies to a large extent on the computer supplied by the 
province to each practice. This records details of each individual patient's visit - name, date of visit, 
diagnosis and what drugs were prescribed. At the end of every month each PDS sends these details 
to the Provincial head office. Here figures are processed and then claims passed to the regional office 
for payment. Regional offices monitor monthly claims to ensure that they are within the budget limit 
set for each PDS practice. They expressed little interest in monitoring beyond this level of detail: 
"The head office is looking at the procedures that they are doing. I pay no attention to what they are 
doing at all! We just monitor the expenditure and inform them if they are going to overspend " 
Regional Manager, Western Cape 
Drug use is also assessed as an indicator of the volume of service delivery. 
«1 think that our office takes more seriously the monitoring of medicines.... We have excellent or 
better than average pharmaceutical control.... " Regional Manager, Western Cape 
Monitoring procedures - Eastern Cape 
In the Eastern Cape there was no computer system. For each individual patient a form recorded the 
date, name, address, diagnosis, medication prescribed and length of time spent with the patient. Each 
form was signed by the PDS and sent to the regional head office monthly. Here they were checked 
for any obvious numerical errors but further problems were unlikely to be picked up as checking was 
done by a junior clerk, described by one provincial manager as having "no insight into what she is 
doing". Once this review is completed payment proceeded. Although there was no formal review 
process by which this would happen, if the province believed that there was a problem with the 
claims of a certain practice, e. g. there seem to be high volumes of patients relative to the population 
or someone has complained, then all claims from that practice were entered onto a computer and 
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more thorough analysis of the service patterns carried out. An Eastern Cape manager described some 
of the abuses of the system which they tried to pick up: 
" PDS seeing a large population compared to the size of the town 
" Doctors writing 5 items on a prescription and then claiming for 5 prescriptions on consecutive 
days 
" Claims for additional services such as X-rays that do not contain the name of the patient 
Effectiveness of monitoring 
In the Western Cape there was a belief that basic financial monitoring was effective and likely to 
pick up inconsistencies in claims, even if unable to address broader issues such as the accuracy of 
claims and the quality of care delivered. This belief was shared by both PDS and regional managers. 
Western Cape PDS felt that the figures that they submitted were rigorously checked and that 
inconsistencies would be picked up: 
"... if you are up or down with your consultations or if you do more surgery than they think 
is 
necessary then they will pick it up, so they do monitor. That was started mainly.... after the computer 
system was brought in " PDS, Western Cape 
".. I saw a patient about 5 times in one month. I had an explanation and I was very pleased that they 
picked it up. It takes about a month for them to come back. " PDS, Western Cape 
"They monitor exactly what we do " PDS, Western Cape 
In contrast, in the Eastern Cape neither PDS nor managers felt that even basic administrative 
monitoring was taking place. One manager commented: 
"Monitoring? - There is nothing going on" Regional Manager, Eastern Cape 
Whilst a PDS said: 
"Oh we can get away with murder... up to about 1992 we were tinder the impression that all statistics 
were monitored, but since then, nothing. I remember one month the sister forgot to send in the 
practice's claims, and we only realised it about 6 weeks later, and no one inquired .. why all of a 
sudden these statistics weren't there" PDS, Eastern Cape 
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Another PDS observed: 
".. it's quite easy to use some of the PDS medicines for your private patients. I don't think that, I 
mean I don't get the impression anyway that, supposedly they have to tally the medicines that we 
have ordered from those forms. Apart from the numbers I don't think there is much monitoring" 
PDS, Eastern Cape. 
In both provinces there was little expectation that quality of care was or could be actively monitored: 
"'I don't think we have good monitoring. It depends on what you want to monitor, administrative 
monitoring the system is good at doing ... If you talk about clinical monitoring then that's a 
different 
ball game " Regional Manager, Western Cape 
"I think they monitor the amount of work. In all the discussions that we have had the quality of care 
has never been discussed. It's always been about money... we have never discussed what we are 
doing or how well we are doing. " PDS, Western Cape 
Regional managers and PDS expressed doubt about the feasibility of monitoring either the type or 
quality of services that a PDS delivers: 
" monitoring medical practitioners Js a very very tricky business, tinder the best conditions" 
Regional Manager, Western Cape 
"I don't have any control over what they do, many just look at the patient. " Regional Manager, 
Western Cape 
"Unless you are there how can you see i fa guy spends 12 minutes or whether he does a procedure or 
whether... I personally feel that there is no ways that you can police that kind of a system 
Regional Manager, Western Cape 
Whilst PDS echoed this opinion from their side: 
"quality of care I don't think they really know what is going on. They don't even have an idea...! 
don't see how they can do it. " PDS, Eastern Cape 
"... they don't know; with the amount of patients that we see, whether we see one patient ten times or 
ten patients once" PDS, Eastern Cape 
In the Eastern Cape the overall failure to monitor was also blamed on a lack of resources and capacity 
to monitor. A manager commented that his department used to visit every PDS every 3 to 6 months, 
nowadays PDS practices were only visited " to put out afire ". Others said 
"it was very easy to do that when we had the staff and the vehicles and the time "/. "we haven't got 
the staff to do that work anymore" / "if they could just appoint someone to visit and inspect these 
part time district surgeons, it would immediately eliminate all those kinds of things happening" 
Regional Manager, Eastern Cape 
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PDS also appeared to think that monitoring their activities would be relatively straightforward if the 
capacity was there: 
it would be very easy to audit us. A clerk with a matric education could walk into this practice and 
say "please give me the stitf . 
f" and he could physically count and look at it. Alternatively for every 
patient I see I have to have a letter of referral. So its actually a very simple but very foolproof 
system. It's ve, y easy to monitor. They just don't do it" PDS, Eastern Cape 
But the view of regional managers that currently such capacity was lacking was echoed: 
"when Bisho'6 took over the admin, everything just fell flat. We haven't had reviews of our figures 
for I think three or four years. "/ "they are doing crisis management "/ "1 don't know if they have got 
the manpower to read all those things every month. But hope/ülly they do " PDS, Eastern Cape 
Whilst monitoring was generally acknowledged to be weak, and the risk of being penalised by the 
Province small, the Department of Health's ultimate sanction, an investigation for fraud was still seen 
as an unpleasant deterrent. One PDS described their experience: 
" tine had a very intense investigation because my previous partner was quite confrontational.., it was 
very embarrassing for its. Loss of face in front of the whole town. The police turned up, seized our 
records. They gave its no warning. .... they took one month and then they went through that whole 
month and they went to individuals and asked. They went to a lot of people..... " PDS, Eastern Cape 
Data presented in these two sections on service delivery and monitoring beg the question of what is 
determining the behaviour of PDS in delivering services. First it seems that the design of the contract 
has some effect and that PDS to an extent are responding to financial incentives by seeing high 
volumes of patients, keeping consultations short and minimising some elements of expenditure on 
their PDS practice. Second there appears to be some deterrent from outright fraud provided by the 
formal monitoring mechanism, but this is not able to ascertain and therefore influence the type or 
quality of services delivered by PDS. This leaves more informal mechanisms to explain the 
remainder of influences upon service delivery. 
26 The provincial capital of the newly created Eastern Cape Province 
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Forms of informal monitoring/control 
One of these mechanisms may be a form of informal monitoring by people within the community. 
The manner in which this operates is linked to issues of the motivation of PDS, in this case the 
preservation of their reputation. Particularly in the Western Cape this was perceived by PDS as 
playing an important role: 
"... The incentive in the contract is this: every patient you sec is related to somebody else. It's often 
likely to be a private patient. So you cannot afford to mess up your practice by giving bad service. So 
you have to be reasonable, you have to be decent, otherwise you can lose your private practice. It's 
a great thing combining public and private practice, it will keep both to a decent standard" PDS, 
Western Cape 
Another doctor described how his reputation as a doctor applied regardless of whether he was 
treating state or private patients: 
"patients don't make a djf. ý`erence between state and private patients, they say its Dr X who does this 
and does that. So in areas like this the state patients is always going to receive a first world service if 
it is rendered by a private practitioner because he can't service one patient on a third world basis 
and the next one on a first world. There is no way you can do that" PDS, Western Cape 
Monitoring by other health professionals ("My peer review is my chemist in town... ') 
as well as patient complaints were also mentioned in the Eastern Cape but doubts were cast as to 
what extent these mechanisms could be relied upon. One PDS observed that in many years in that 
town not one patient had complained: 
"Short of cleliberately killing someone. Then somebody might complain ". PDS, Eastern Cape 
Monitoring of the contract does not therefore appear to provide great control over the services 
delivered. In conjunction with ü vaguely specified contract it appears that to a large a degree the PDS 
work is open to interpretation by the individual. 
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PAYMENT 
Many PDS had experienced late or inadequate payment by the Province. Four of the five PDS 
interviewed in the Eastern Cape said that they had experienced 3-4 month delays at least once and 
often payment was incomplete. In some cases, debts were still outstanding. In other cases, whilst 
payment for clinical services was made, the dispensing fee was not included: 
(`it's not a sure thing, you can't bank on it' PDS, Eastern Cape). Obligations by the province to 
review the contract payment levels were also felt to be neglected: 
"..... there are shortcomings and there are things that the government hasn't changed. for instance 
our travelling fees, that hasn't been increased in almost 10 years. In the meantime petrol has gone 
up by almost 400% so if you look at the figures of the AA now.... I am making a loss with every clinic 
that I travel to, and I am spending a lot of time on the road which I don't get paid for, so every call 
out and every clinic is an expense and that they are not willing to change. " PDS, Western Cape 
In the Western Cape there were also quite common experiences of delays in payment but there were 
no references to cases of money outstanding to be paid. One practice described how if their cheque 
was late they would go to the provincial offices and "stand there until it gets written ". PDS 
responded to late payment in a variety of ways, but never by stopping service delivery. On one 
occasion one practice both went to the chairman of the Democratic Party in that area and threatened 
the DOH that they would stop rendering services before they received their payment. On another 
occasion the representative for the Eastern Cape PDS association consulted lawyers and informed the 
province that they were doing so. In both these cases payment was eventually received without the 
threatened action having to take place. 
Some PDS also cited examples of delivering services for which they already knew they would not be 
paid by the province. In one case a practice in the Western Cape that had been capped at an average 
of 100 patients per day was seeing 118 on average. "I have never asked them to pay me for the extra 
18, they haven't paid me for the extra 18 so I have done it for nothing" 
Overall the payment function relies on toleration by PDS of late or inaccurate payment. PDS are 
unwilling to use the ultimate sanction of withdrawing services but use many other methods to secure 
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payment by approaching officials, threatening the withdrawal of services or indirectly threatening 
legal action. One PDS who did approach a lawyer over issues of non-payment explained how legal 
action worried him: 
"Yes it did It did worrynme. That's why 1 waited so long" PDS, Eastern Cape. 
NEGOTIATIONS OVER CHANGES TO THE CONTRACT 
A long standing contract such as that for PDS services will inevitably have to adapt to changing 
circumstances. How this is done is a good indicator of how the contract operates. 
There are various areas in which the terms of the PDS contract have changed or are still changing, 
and this has implications for the income of PDS. They can be grouped into issues of a) how patients 
access the system (PHC made free, referrals from clinic) and b) changes to what services PDS are 
expected /permitted to provide (services for chronic patients, drug dispensing). This section analyses 
the way in which the change to the contract is introduced and the reactions of P. DS. 
a) Changes to how patients access PDS services 
The introduction of free health care (described in chapter 4) saw a 40% increase in demand for PDS 
services which led provinces to seek to control expenditure on these services. As was outlined in 
chapter 4, in the Eastern Cape this was achieved by a requirement for referral from the PHC clinic 
and in the Western Cape by capping the total numbers of patients that can be seen by some high 
volume PDS practices. This combination of policies meant that PDS first had to ad: pt to a huge 
increase in demand for services and then a sharp reduction. 
PDS in both provinces complained that subsequent controls on access to their services were 
introduced with no negotiation and very suddenly. Both policies of capping (WC) and requirement of 
clinic referral (EC) were introduced at very short notice. In the Western Cape there was some 
agreement by PDS that they were willing to be capped, but they felt that this was then violated by the 
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province making a further unilateral decision to increase the degree by which their budgets were cut. 
In the Eastern Cape the policy of clinic referral was introduced with no negotiation. This meant that 
practices which had had to expand quickly to cope with the sudden increase in demand following the 
introduction of free primary care, had to again contract and staff had to be laid off at very short 
notice. In the case of the Eastern Cape, PDS were given two weeks notice that they may only see 
patients who had a referral letter from the clinic: 
"the letter just pitched up here.. They just sent us this and we had to make choices and determine 
what we were going to do, and the clinics knew nothing and we had to tell them that they were taking 
on the outpatient load from now on. " PDS, Eastern Cape 
For the Western Cape, one PDS describes how patient numbers increased and then capping was 
introduced: 
"from 800 patients a month to 4000... we adapted and coped and people were happy. I think this 
was a tremendous service, it surely should have made Mandela'' and Zuma? x happy... they wanted to 
give medicine to the people and we achieved it at a veryfair price.... and yet at the end, you don't get 
thanked, you get capped... suddenly, in the middle of this year, without fair warning, they capped us" 
PDS, Western Cape 
The capping system was viewed by some WC PDS as effectively a slow form of dismissal by 
drastically limiting their income. One PDS described the wish to take legal action against the 
province, but feared for the consequences of such action: 
"you've been rendered redundant, and you are going to leave, your practice is going to collapse, but 
you don't get a package, you don't get paid out. So you have been sacked, in a subtle way, without 
being renumerated in some sort of way. And we think this is unfair labour practice. ire feel we 
should take this to dispute, but these things are way above us, it just frightens me, personally, to 
death. I don't know how those things work .. I don't know enough about it. It's uncertain times, you 
want to look after your job, you have got a lot of overheads. and your own family etc... and you don't 
want to risk your job. Say you lose a thing like this, after you are without a job, or they bear a 
grudge... " PDS, Western Cape 
A regional manager described how the terms of the written contract did not play a huge role in this 
type of negotiation. He dealt with the PDS' discontent as follows: 
"saying to the PDS just take us to the constitutional court, I was playing with fire a bit, luckily I 
haven't burnt my fingers. The negotiation with the PDS is not a legalistic negotiation, it's a 
negotiation that basically appeals for common sense and for sanity to prevail. I was saying to them 
"I can't lose you but you have become unaffordable". Regional Manager, Western Cape 
27 President Nelson Mandela 
28 Minister of Health for South Africa 1994-1999 
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b) changes to what services PDS are expected /permitted to provide 
Issues such as PDS' right to dispense from their practice (and earn a dispensing fee) and which types 
of PHC services they should deliver (e. g. whether chronic patients need to visit the PDS for each 
check up) were also subject to change. This was again felt to be at short notice and unnegotiated by 
the Provincial DOH. Comments included: 
"one day, out of the blue we were told that we tigere giving up dispensing" PDS, Eastern Cape 
"it hasn't been officially stated, but the message that v ve get through the grapevine frown Bisho is 
that they plan to do away ... with us 
dispensing" PDS, Eastern Cape 
It was also felt by some that salary reviews were random, at the whim of the province and according 
to their ability to pay: 
"the last time they reviewed our salary it actually dropped, that was in 1993 or 1992. They actually 
applied that unilaterally " PDS, Eastern Cape 
"So when u'e approached them on the situation (lack of increments) they said well there is too much 
fraud going on and they need to audit and review everything.. But we know that the province hasn't 
got any money, and they are using it as a delaying tactic. " PDS, Eastern Cape 
Other PDS expressed feelings of defencelessness when they talked about the way that the terms of 
their contracts were altered: 
11 Without my consent they have now capped nie by 26 or 30% And this now sets a precedent, it means 
next year they can cap me by 50% We cannot allow that precedent to continue. It's just that 
precedent I don't like" PDS, Western Cape 
But this PDS when questioned about how he could stand up against such a precedent admitted that he 
had very little recourse, other than legally, and the idea of that again `frightened him to death': 
"I am scared of going through this whole legal process which I know nothing about. It's too 
w familiar for me. It might cost me a lot, it might cost nie my job. I don't want to be seen in the 
paper. I don't want to go through this whole rigmarole. I am a doctor" PDS, Western Cape 
However, more fundamental change to the contract design did not follow this pattern and appeared 
to require greater negotiation and agreement. There was an ongoing attempt by both the Western and 
Eastern Cape to fundamentally alter the nature of the contract: 
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"we want the doctor to go and visit the clinic as such and see rq errals... be available for after hours 
emergency work and do medico legal work ... the contracts that the province has devised so far and 
offered .... they are not lucrative enough to retain them in these places. " Regional Manager, Eastern Cape 
They appeared less able to proceed with such a major revision without the co-operation of the PDS. 
The approach to this major change to contracts has been more consultative, with policy documents 
circulated for comment and several meetings between PDS and provincial officials. At the time of 
the research no consensus had been reached in either province, but there was a generally more 
positive attitude towards the process of negotiation. PDS commented: 
"I think that they will write a new contract that will be negotiated with its as well. There has been a 
promise to us that we will negotiate it... they must be reasonable... it's totally unfair to go to the 
clinic. " PDS Eastern Cape 
"you used to just get a letter and it was just fi otn the top. Now we have a committee and we have 
discussions every 6 weeks. It's much better. " PDS Western Cape 
It is possible that provinces are adopting a more co-operative approach to this change in the contract 
because it is clear that they cannot introduce such radical changes unilaterally. The dependence 
which increased the willingness of PDS to adapt to small changes in contractual terms appeared to be 
mutual - radical changes to contractual terms cannot be made unilaterally by the purchaser for fear 
that they may lose their service provider altogether. 
The manner in which both PDS and the purchasers react to solving problems of weak monitoring, 
payment problems and changes to the contract was heavily influenced by the lack of competition 
within the market and the reliance of PDS on continuing their income from the province, as well as 
their perception that the community that they lived in relies on them to continue rendering services. 
This last point is clearly illustrated by the example of the PDS rendering services to more patients 
than he will be paid for. Again it appears that the operation of the contract is being as much 
determined by factors which are not contained within its formal structures as by those that are. The 
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next section turns to some possible explanations of the nature of the contractual relationship arising 
in this context. 
SECTION 2: SUBSTITUTES FOR A COMPLETE CONTRACT 
Data presented in the previous section suggest that PDS are influenced by the incentives contained in 
the contract, and that in such an incompletely specified contract many areas are also left to their 
discretion. In addition, late payment and abrupt changes to the contract rely on the PDS' willingness 
to co-operate for the contractual relationship to survive. 
In discussing each of these features of the contractual relationship, the role of external or "residual" 
factors in determining how individuals act under an incomplete contract were identified. It is clear 
from the interview data that each contractual relationship was to some extent determined by how the 
individuals concerned chose to interpret it and chose to act and this in turn was influenced by the 
context in which the contract was operating. In recognition of this, the final section of this chapter 
examines two potential influences upon how individuals chose to act, namely trust and dependence. 
To some extent, such informal controls arise from the context and combination of factors described in 
chapter 5. 
TRUST 
As was shown by the review of the literature in chapter 2, trust between parties has been highlighted 
as a possible determinant of how contractual functions are carried out. In the context of many long- 
running, incomplete contracts, resort to trust as a method of co-operation is common. Its role in the 
PDS contract was therefore explored during the semi-structured interviews with purchasers and PDS. 
The setting in which trust is discussed is one in which the prevalence of fraud under the contract was 
acknowledged by both PDS and provincial managers. For instance, provincial officials often refer to 
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"the kind of fraud taking place under the PDS" and the fact that PDS are "bending the rules - we 
know that it's happening. " 
PDS also referred to: 
"... district surgeons who (are) cheating. I suppose statistically there always will be one or two" 
PDS, Eastern Cape 
and that: 
"cheating... happens a lot in the other districts - guys would claim for the same patients twice a 
day... " PDS, Eastern Cape 
Against such a background of acknowledged fraud, unsurprisingly the role of trust in PDS 
relationships was varied. 
Different levels at which trust could play a role in the operation of the PDS contract were between 
PDS and individual government officials at regional and provincial level, between PDS and regional 
and provincial government, and between PDS and the National Department of Health. Different 
types and degrees of trust were reviewed in chapter 2, for instance the distinction between 
competence, goodwill and contractual trust, and types of inter-personal trust. In explaining the 
workings of the PDS relationship it appeared that inter-personal trust and competence trust were the 
most important. The nature of each relationship between an individual PDS and their regional 
manager was highly individual, correspondingly as the relationship became more distant, for 
instance, between the PDS and the National Department of Health, trust was lessened. Competence 
trust was important because the nature of the services being contracted are professional, raising 
professional competence as a key issue. 
Where positive statements were made about trust, its nature tended to be interpersonal, based on a 
history of successful interaction: 
"That is why our monitoring and our relationship depends more on our inter personal, and our 
relationships, that's the defining things, not the contract. .... 
We haven't depended very much on 
strict legal definitions of what we expect of people. And the rest is very much a gentleman's 
agreement if you want, or an understanding amongst peers that that is what we should be doing" 
Regional Manager, Western Cape 
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Provincial managers spoke about PDS on an individual basis "X is OK, I don't trust Y" and PDS also 
appeared to feel that they could rely on certain individuals, being able to say with more confidence 
about one individual: "he won't dish us" than they were willing to comment on any level of the 
Department of Health more generally. One PDS said of the provincial manager in charge of 
restructuring the PDS; 
"I basically trust him, that he wouldn't come tip with a thing that would totally do the DS" 
PDS, Western Cape. 
When asked questions about trust, the response was often given for an individual level. - 
44 a lot of it is to do with Dr XI mean you ask inc if I trust this man, I have to, but from what I have 
seen of him, I will trust hint " PDS, Western Cape 
whilst many comments stressed the individual nature of evaluating trust, along the following lines: 
"well the only person who really does much for me is Mr X.... " PDS, Eastern Cape 
In response to a question about trust in the provincial level of the Department of Health, many PDS 
also picked out an individual and said "well, I trust him". 
or for example: 
"now this gentleman's type of agreement works much better. I have no idea how much of this is 
because of the personality of Dr K that it works so well. I think that if somebody else might come 
into his place it might change, but at the moment this works very well " PDS, Western Cape 
Regional managers responses to questions about trust were also often brought to an individual level. 
One regional manager explained that he trusted some PDS and some he trusted not at all. Ile said 
that he had a specific opinion about each one and behaved according to that. 
The role of prior experience and history was important in establishing such individual trust. Practices 
which saw themselves as having a trusting relationship with the province often based that on close 
interaction in the past. For instance: 
"where we differ from quite a few other practices is that I think that we have quite an open 
relationship with the state because we were the pilots for the computer system so we have been 
working closely together for a long time. So we don't really have a problem. " PDS Western Cape 
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At the other extreme, an impression of a complete breakdown of trust was reflected in comments by 
PDS in the Eastern Cape: 
"they dont trust us..... I think that there is massive distrust from Bisho" PDS, Eastern Cape 
"there are a few rotten apples in the bag... so they have decided that we are all taking them for a 
ride" PDS, Eastern Cape 
This was echoed by the comments of provincial managers in both provinces: 
"there is deep seated mistrust amongst some of the managers in the Department " 
Regional Manager, Eastern Cape 
" there is a lot of corruption you know-you can't trust any doctor, they are crooks.... It's a struggle 
to trust. Maybe it's the situation that people are working in that is not conducive to trust 
Regional Director, Eastern Cape 
"I can't believe that all those drugs are only used for state patients" 
Regional Manager, Western Cape 
As well as the importance of an individual dimension in the type of trust characterising some parts of 
the PDS system, a second noticeable feature is that trust was fostered by the impression of shared 
beliefs and motivations. Comments about why there was little trust in many of the PDS-purchaser 
relationships usually included some reference to suspicion of the motivation of the other party or 
historical experiences of unreliability. 
For instance, as distance increased and the degree of personal experience or interaction decreased, the 
more sinister the plans and motivations of government departments were assumed to be. PDS clearly 
considered it easier to trust the regional and provincial government than the National Department of 
Health (NDOH). There was widespread mistrust and even fear of the motivations of national policy- 
makers and the influence that they could wield over a local situation. For instance: 
"They [the province] could be stringing its along. [getting rid of all PDS] might be part of a National 
Initiative. They have no control over it, they just get simply told that this is the end ". 
PDS, Eastern Cape 
"I trust them, but I realise that they are at the beck- and call of the ministers and the politicians and 
the budget. They can be told that their budget has been cut by 50% and they have got no choice 
PDS, Western Cape 
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In some comments it almost seemed as if the PDS found it easier to blame the NDOII for aspects of 
policy with which they did not agree. They made the NDOII into a scapegoat because it was further 
away and easier to blame and they did not have to interact with it: 
"the health system as it is now has just been posed onto then (the WC province) by central 
government. They have got to cope with it. They don't really agree with it but they have got to cope 
with it. " PDS, Western Cape 
"they (the province) won't stop the contract if it is in their hands because they are grateful for the 
service that we are rendering but the central government suddenly decides another system is going 
to be implemented, no matter what the cost is then they have no control' PDS, Western Cape 
Where there was feeling that the motivations of PDS and the province did not coincide this further 
exacerbated feelings of distrust. PDS constantly expressed doubts about the motivations of the 
provincial and national governments. For the PDS, a general lack of confidence in the underlying 
motivations of provincial decisions was coupled with a belief that decisions were being implemented 
for political rather than practical reasons. 
PDS also believed that the province held similar suspicions about their motivations, commenting on 
being allowed to employ nurses to screen patients, it was said: 
"they wouldn't pay the salary. because they are afraid that we might use that person for our own, 
devious purposes... " PDS, Western Cape 
and this was echoed by one regional manager commenting on their basic motivations: 
"If you don't monitor (PDS) and you don't get them to review themselves.... Then they are going to 
milk the system, everyone is going to milk the system " Regional Director, Eastern Cape 
Trust was diminished by the presence of great uncertainty about the future of the contract, again 
closely linked to a fear of the motivation of the Department of Health and a feeling of powerlessness. 
Uncertainty took a variety of forms, most noticeably about how much longer the PDS system would 
run for and the DOH's plans for restructuring the system: 
"I know that they will sack me if there is a black doctor who wants the job " PDS, Eastern Cape 
"Sometimes you feel that, ..., because you are white and you are Afrikaans you can very easily become a victim of a system. What is being done to me I will do to you " PDS, Western Cape 
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"... the impression that we get, that they would love to keep this system going for as long as they can 
and then sort of phase you out when they like. So there is certainly a lot of uncertainty concerning 
motives on both sides" PDS, Eastern Cape 
"the way that we read the situation is that Bisho would like to get rid of a lot of us and start a new 
system of their own making, preferably with darker skin personnel... " PDS, Eastern Cape 
Uncertainty led to frustration amongst PDS as expressed by one doctor: 
"I have a responsible job, it is difficult, the PDoH relies on inc. so why do they only give me one 
month contracts? If it's responsible there should be some permanence. This is the kind of thing that 
makes me nervous. " PDS, Eastern Cape 
The second important form of trust in this contractual relationship appeared to be what Sako (in 
Goddard and Mannion, 1998) defined "competence trust", or the belief that PDS would do a good job 
because they were trained professionals and therefore competent and would behave ethically. Again 
this is linked to the ideas of motivation and preservation of reputation discussed earlier. PDS also 
seemed comfortable with this idea that they would behave appropriately and be `self policing': 
"I hope that the relationship is one of taust. I hope they rely on inc to be a good doctor. And it is 
very unethical not to be one" PDS, Eastern Cape 
"many of them [the PDS] are outstanding medical o . 
ficers Regional Manager, Western Cape 
"he is causing us a lot of grief, but I think that as a clinician he is a good doctor" 
Regional Manager, Western Cape 
A belief in the strength of professional accountability also underlay WC provincial officials' 
expressions of confidence in the efficacy of a system in which PDS had to sign their claims 
personally. 
Whilst the PDS appeared to be trusted to be competent by regional managers, the reverse was not 
always true i. e. PDS did not appear to think of the DO!! as competent. At one Eastern Cape practice 
the short notice for policy requiring that patients be referred from the clinic as well as bad 
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experiences with late payments and non-existent salary reviews were used as examples of the poor 
management that they had come to expect from the province: 
"I trust them what I read from them, that's basically all the trust that we have; so I trust them to send 
me that sort of letter at short notice, that's all....! mean I don't trust them because my contract says 
that it should be reviewed and they don't do that. I speak to them, they don't do it. There is always 
hitches u'ith the payments. So what trust is that? " PDS, Eastern Cape 
Comments about the way that health policy was formulated, again reflecting a lack of competence 
trust as well as suspicion as to motivations, included: 
"I trust them to be inef cient. I trust them to further their political aims without being too practical 
about it" PDS, Eastern Cape 
"some services are just started whether it is cost effective or not, it is just started, and that sort of 
thing goes on over our heads all the time. If you just look at the impact of these free services, it was 
a disaster really ". PDS, Western Cape 
One doctor expressed his frustrations with the apparently confused policy of the NDOII more 
broadly: 
"I don't trust them [the NDOH]. You never know. Maybe AZT, maybe not`' Maybe this hospital, 
maybe not. Now from Cuba, now not from Cuba". Isn't that the impression that you get? That's the 
impression that the citizen in the street is also getting. " PDS, Western Cape 
The following conclusions about the nature of trust within the PDS contract can be made. First, trust 
was not always present in the contracts examined. Second, the most common type of trust apparent 
was interpersonal. Third, belief that the other party shared motivations and values seemed to increase 
trust and vice versa. This appeared to be linked to the perceived similarities and closeness between 
the contracting parties and hence the quality of their relationship. In both provinces trust was 
lessened as distance increased and frequency of interaction decreased between purchaser and 
provider. Greater levels of trust in the Western Cape were an example of this. The higher 
administrative capacity in the Western Cape contributed to closer management of the PDS system, 
most notably via the computerised monitoring system. This greater capacity and sophistication or the 
monitoring system itself may have contributed to the higher degrees of trust present, by creating an 
'9 referring to a slow decision by the Department of Health on whether to adopt a policy of giving short course anti"retroviral 
treatment to pregnant HIV positive women 
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atmosphere of greater confidence for contracting to take place. For instance, the ongoing reassurance 
provided by an effective monitoring system may have contributed to further establishing trust. It is 
interesting to note that if trust was bolstered by more effective monitoring, or more frequent 
communication, this would contradict the commonly accepted idea that trust acts as an efficient 
substitute for monitoring or that the more transactional aspects of contracting, such as monitoring, 
may actually erode trust in relationships. These findings may suggest that trust needs to be seen as a 
dynamic rather than a static element in contractual relationships, and higher levels of capacity and 
communication will contribute to its renewal. Last, competence trust appeared to play a role in the 
use of contracts to govern the delivery of professional services. This is likely to be strengthened in 
contracting with a profession, and is linked with ideas of professional motivation and reliance on 
doctors' feeling that they wish to safeguard their reputation. 
DEPENDENCE 
"You duck and dive, because some of the district surgeons they have got a bit of racial tendencies 
and the communities are unhappy. But I always tell the communities "let's go easy" because there 
are two choices, either I chuck this guy out, but then, what ann I going to do? How an: I going to 
replace the guy? And the other choice is to.... I tell the communities go easy..... " Regional Director, 
Eastern Cape 
More than trust, the key factor which arose from this research as underlying the nature of the 
contractual relationship was a recognition of mutual dependence by both parties. This was 
determined by the context and appeared to play a major role in determining how the PDS contract 
operated. As was discussed in chapter 5, a lack of competition for PDS services and a lack of 
substitutes to deliver the broad package of services that they provided made provincial purchasers 
dependent to differing degrees on the existing PDS. The PDS was also dependent on continued 
provincial work. About their dependence more generally on the services of PDS, regional managers 
commented: 
"? f some PDS resigned, we are not going to have any medical cover in the rural areas. Because we 
haven 't yet found an alternative that makes it lucrative enough for a medical officer to go to the rural 
areas" Regional Manager, Western Cape 
30 referring to the implementation of a policy to bring doctors from Cuba to staff rural hospitals 
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"How do you provide a 24 hour emergency service 7 days of the week and a medico legal service in 
a town without having the PDS do it for you? " Regional Managet, Eastern Cape 
Equally, most PDS relied on their incomes from this role to substitute their limited private practice 
and to ensure the viability of their practices. In particular they value the PDS income for its 
reliability and ability to give "a feeling of permanence ": 
"I think that there are very mixed feelings among district surgeons, because at times they feel very 
frustrated by the work that they do and about the problems that they have, but they also realise that 
they can't really be without it" PDS, Eastern Cape 
"to a very great extent I think that we are trapped. We are leaning on the good relationship with the 
government a lot. It has always been like that. I think that there is a way out but it will be very 
drastic. I have to fire people. " PDS, Western Cape 
This dependence was sometimes recognised by PDS as a tool to be used strategically in negotiations 
with the province: 
"It's lucky to be the only guy in town. That's the one strong point that I have. " PDS, Eastern Cape 
"... they wanted to change the system and then they realised that they didn't have the clinics in place 
and so they kept the system going... " PDS, Eastern Cape 
".. they said that they didn't ii'ant to cut our salaries because if they cut our salaries then the town 
would simply lose doctors... they have to keep a certain amount of doctors in the area" 
PDS, Western Cape. 
"It's difficult for the government to make a radical change, they are also trapped. If you are trapped 
you want to do things to help each other" PDS, Western Cape 
As described in chapter 5 on the contracting environme t for this case study, factors influencing the 
degree of mutual dependence differed from town to town. Each PDS practice's reliance on the PDS 
income was determined by the wealth of the town in which they were based, and hence the size of 
private practice which could be relied upon. One doctor in a poorer rural town (who said that he 
spent 90% of his time seeing PDS patients) explained that in the case of practices in larger towns: 
"if they take the DS completely away they are not going to lose a lot. Because they are still going to 
have a lot of private patients, a lot of patients who can pay R60. We haven't got one, not a single 
one. " PDS, Western Cape 
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Dependence for the province on particular PDS also varied from town to town. Often in smaller 
towns, the departure of the PDS would often signal the end of comprehensive medical cover for that 
town: 
"there are lots of areas where if the DS came tomorrow and said "I want to go" I would have 
problemns.... you must remember that a lot of the DS are also the medical superintendents of the 
hospitals where they are, and they are also the part time medical officers at the hospitals" 
Regional Manager, Western Cape 
"For the first time in our history we have got 5 towns without any medical officers .... You can't stay 
in a town where you don't earn enough money to survive" Regional Manager, Western Cape 
The effect of this mutual dependence by the contracting parties altered the terrain of the contract 
dramatically, lessening the power of either party and increasing the tendency to co-operate. The 
willingness of PDS to continue delivering services when not paid or in situations when it was unclear 
whether they were still employed as PDS demonstrates this. PDS referred to "being in good faith" 
and "even if there is no salary we continue rendering a service"As described earlier in this chapter, 
a feeling of powerlessness in dealing with the provincial purchaser was reflected quite clearly, for 
instance in this comment about late payment: 
"1 just waited, I didn't threaten anything" PDS, Western Cape 
About the sense of powerlessness on the re-negotiation of a future contract one PDS representative 
commented rather dramatically: 
"1 think that the people in general are more apathetic than anything else. They are like the scene of 
the Jewish people going to the gas chambers. They just think that whatever is going to be is going to 
be..... many of them would just like to see the thing drag on and let's keep our heads low and hope 
that it carries on " PD", Eastern Cape 
The nature of the dependence between province and doctor in many rural towns goes beyond the PDS 
contract, with several PDS recognising that even if these contracts terminated they would still have to 
work for the state in one form or other, making the maintenance of a good working relationship even 
more fundamental: 
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"in the end we will probably still work for the state but in a different capacity..... so we realise and I 
think the state realises too that we will always be linked to the state in some or other way" PDS, 
Western Cape 
Several examples of PDS extending their services beyond their direct duties were found in the case 
study. As well as the example of continuing to see state patients even after monthly faxes confirming 
their continued appointment as PDS had stopped arriving; ("we continued the work, even though we 
weren't certain that we were going to get paid" PDS, Eastern Cape) there were cases of PDS offering 
support to the local clinic's nurse or a newly arrived community service doctor in a neighbouring 
town. This may be a result of their recognition of the need to make themselves indispensable to the 
province, or their recognition of the unavoidable nature of their relationship with the province. 
Equally however it may be a result of their own professional or personal view of what their duty as a 
community doctor was. 
CONCLUSION 
This chapter has reviewed the manner in which a variety of contractual functions were carried out 
under the PDS contract. The examination has sought to shed light on the nature of the contractual 
relationship and what its determinants may be. Whilst the difficulties both of measuring and 
explaining the nature of service delivery were acknowledged, a key determinant of the nature of 
service delivery seems to be the financial incentives contained in the contract. The monitoring 
function was shown to be incomplete in either province but particularly weak in the Eastern Cape due 
to problems of capacity. Late payment for services and abrupt unnegotiated changes to the contract 
meant that the provinces to some extent rely on the goodwill of the PDS for the contract to continue. 
This examination of the way in which contractual functions were carried out highlights the variability 
of how each individual may respond to the contract, begging the question of what determined the 
behaviour of different individuals under similar contractual conditions. Three main determinants 
were identified. First is individual motivation, explored briefly in chapter 5, and second and third are 
the contextually determined factors of trust and dependence. The nature of these two factors and the 
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impact that they may have on the way in which individuals behave under the contract was explored in 
this chapter. In the case of trust, interpersonal trust and competence trust were found to be important 
but not always present. Mutual dependence between parties to the contract was finally highlighted as 
perhaps the core explanation for the features of the contractual relationship observed in this case 
study. 
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CHAPTER 8: CONTRACTING EXPERIENCES - THE CASES OF LESOTIIO AND A 
PRIVATE CAPITATED SCHEME 
The previous three chapters have described the case study of the PDS contract in South Africa in 
detail. This chapter summarises the key features of two further case studies in order to draw out their 
differences and similarities with the PDS contract and to facilitate further interpretation of 
contractual relationships. For each case, the environmental factors and context and history of the 
contract are highlighted and the contract design and outcomes of the contractual relationship 
reviewed. The inclusion of these two brief case studies broadens the research and strengthens the 
framework of analysis employed in the PDS case by using it to examine similarities and differences 
in other situations. In each case the combination of factors and the contractual outcome is different, 
making it possible to reflect on the possible role of the different factors used to analyse the PDS case 
study. 
Figure 8.1 (overleaf) summarises the factors that were analysed in previous chapters and their 
potential interaction to determine the nature of contract operation and performance. These factors 
will again be used in summarised form for the analysis in this chapter. 
CASE NUMBER 2: THE LESOTHO CONTRACT - DESCRIPTION, BACKGROUND AND CONTEXT 
This contract governed the delivery of general medical services (including emergency services) and 
occupational health services by a South African company at a series of construction sites in Lesotho. 
As part of this contract, two clinics adjacent to construction sites were equipped and staffed to offer 
services both to the construction workforce and members of the local community. In the case of the 
services offered to the local community, the Government of Lesotho reimbursed the contractor. It is 
this part of the contract which was of interest for this research as an example of the state reimbursing 
a private for-profit company for delivering primary care services to state patients. 
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Figure 8.1: Framework of factors useful in analysing nature of contractual relationship 
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Responsibility for running these clinics was contracted by the Lesotho Highlands Development 
Authority30 (LHDA) to the engineering consortium responsible for the overall construction contract, 
who then sub-contracted this medical service provision to a specialist. The specialist was a 
commercial South African company, who was given a "back to back"" contract, making this health 
care contract a three way agreement between the purchaser, the engineering contractor and a 
specialist medical sub-contractor. To access the services offered by the contractor clinics, members 
of the local community were required to pay a user charge of 15 Maloti (R15), which was then passed 
on by the contractor to LHDA. 
3' Lesotho Highlands Development Authority is the ultimate purchaser of all services for the Lesotho Highlands Water 
Project. 
31 meaning that the section of the contract dealing with medical services is simply passed on to a sub-contractor. 
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This contract for the delivery of health care provides a second perspective on the different conditions 
under which contracting for health in a low income country might occur. In particular this type of 
contract is a relevant example for many LMICs where the possibility exists to take advantage of 
commercial private sector activity in remote rural areas (typically mining, commercial farming and 
construction work) to benefit the public health of the surrounding communities. In addition, for this 
study, this contract provides an example of contracting with a commercial company in a situation of 
increased capacity to at least write, and potentially monitor, contracts. It also provides an alternative 
example of the way in which a contract for primary care services can be specified, and of a contract 
where there is a lessor role played by history in defining the nature of the contractual relationship. 
Other conditions remain more similar to the PDS case study. In particular, the nature of the service 
remains broadly similar and there was limited competition for the contract. 
In contrast to the PDS contract, this contract had very little relevant history or background and all of 
it was recent. It had been operational for one year at the time that this research was carried out. The 
service providers were outsiders to the community to whom they were expected to deliver services 
and would only remain there for the duration of the contract, although some of them had worked in 
different parts of Lesotho before. In addition, the remote setting, the temporary nature of the services 
to be provided by the contract and the fact that the contractor was an "import" to the area all lessened 
the role of any historical context in defining the nature of the contract. 
The outcome was a contractual relationship more reliant on the formal channels of the contract, but, 
despite its different setting and context, it still faced the problems of monitoring and therefore to 
some extent reliance on interpersonal relationships found to be common in the PDS case. 
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CASE NUMBER 3: THE PRIVATE CAPITATED SCIIEME - DESCRIPTION, BACKGROUND AND CONTEXT 
This final case study looked at a new and rapidly expanding model of capitatcd primary care 
provision available in the private sector of urban areas in South Africa. Branded, standardised 
primary health care services were offered via a chain of clinics by a for-profit provider to industrial 
companies, as part of a package of medical scheme cover for their employees. It is the provision of 
these services under a capitated contract that are examined in this case study. In this case the contract 
was a tripartite agreement between the company purchasing cover, a medical scheme (which provides 
a comprehensive package of cover for all levels of care) and the primary care service provider. The 
services offered and operation of each clinic were strictly controlled by standards established by the 
head office of the company, who likened the product to the "McDonalds of health care". Payment 
was on a capitated basis, with subscribers pre-paying a fixed amount per month for cover, whether 
they used the services or not. 
Over 20 clinics belonging to this provider are situated around South Africa, offering a highly 
standardised service. The company was organised in a tight hierarchical structure as described in 
chapter 4. All staff in the clinics were paid on a salaried basis and each clinic had both a full time 
manager who reported directly to head office and regular supervisory visits from an area manager, 
who was based at head office. In addition to this direct management supervision, each clinic was 
fitted with an extensive, specially designed computer system which was also linked directly to head 
office. There were computers in each consulting room/cubicle which carried an extensive range of 
treatment protocols. Clinical staff were required to enter details of each patient and their symptoms 
into this computer system and then follow the recommended action according to the company's 
approved protocols. Via this method, the effectiveness and appropriateness of service delivery was 
closely monitored by the company's head office. Drugs dispensed were drawn from an approved 
company formulary. 
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Similar to the Lesotho case and in contrast to the PDS, this type of contract had very little context or 
history. Multiple purchasers and providers rendered the idea of the contract being governed by any 
recourse to established interpersonal relationships unlikely. 
This case study thus provides an example of a contract operating under quite different conditions 
from the PDS or Lesotho case, and demonstrates the different nature of contracting for primary care 
services possible within the private sector. Key factors that are different in this contract are the 
degree of competition in the market, the ability to have a capitation payment mechanism (due to the 
ease of defining the population eligible to be treated as those who have subscribed), and the lack of 
any type of personal relationship between purchaser and provider. In particular, the urban position of 
the clinics provided a more competitive market setting whilst the nature of the contract meant that 
there were many potential purchasers for the package of services offered by the clinics at any one 
time. Very little monitoring was carried out by subscribing organisations, who relied on each user to 
judge the quality of the service and whether they wished to continue subscribing to it, and on 
controls/procedures internal to the provider company. Via a standardised clinic system, the well 
defined nature of the service being contracted and the lack of emphasis on monitoring made capacity 
less of an important issue. The differences in these factors build a quite different contractual picture. 
The same structure as for the PDS case study is used below to offer summarised descriptions of each 
set of factors and features of the contractual outcome for the two case studies. 
ENVIRONMENT FACTORS 
NATURE OF SERVICE 
Lesotho 
The service was highly asset specific. Site specificity, as was observed in the case of the PDS, was 
joined with a high degree of physical asset specificity and human asset specificity as equipment and 
personnel had to be brought into the area specially to deliver the total services required by the 
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contract (which included high tech services for construction site workers such as 24 hour 
emergency/trauma services and occupational health screening). 
As with the PDS case, there were problems of defining the content and boundaries of the service to 
be delivered and it was unclear how the services provided under the Lesotho contract should 
complement or substitute existing public sector services. There was some confusion over the 
respective roles of the contracted clinics and the public sector in delivering the full range of primary 
care services. Whilst the purchaser expressed the wish that the contractor should provide a 
comprehensive range of services, the contractor said that they did not wish to duplicate the services 
offered by the public clinic as this may lead to problems when their contract ended. They also 
expressed concerns about having to refer local community patients into Lesotho's weak public sector, 
where the treatment they would receive would be very poor or non-existent, whilst private patients 
requiring referral were sent straight to the South African private sector. 
Private Capitated scheme 
This contract simply offered access to all services provided by any clinic in the branded chain. As 
described, all clinics were run on the same protocols and strict guidelines, meaning that in the case of 
each type of service demanded, its nature was already well defined. Last, because this contract lay 
entirely within the private sector there was no confusion how the services delivered under this 
contract should complement or substitute existing public sector services. 
Asset specificity of the service was lower than in the other cases, due to the urban setting of service 
delivery. This meant that for clinical staff their current livelihood was not invested in the success of 
this particular contract as they would be likely to easily find employment elsewhere in the same area. 
Equally, the physical assets of the clinic were not there purely for the service of the contract and were 
also serving patients who paid fee for service, or could be put to another use relatively easily, given 
their urban setting. 
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NATURE OF MARKET 
Lesotho 
As with the PDS, the Lesotho market was found to be uncompetitive, both as a result of the remote 
geographical area and the complexity of the total package of services required by the contract. 'There 
were few contractors in this market able to provide this type of service and none of them were based 
in Lesotho. Neither site where clinics were evaluated had any potential substitute to provide the 
relatively sophisticated services required; there were no doctors in practice in the area, no other 
facilities with any diagnostic equipment and the nearest facility operating a 24 hour service was 
several hours' journey away. 
Given that there was no direct competition within the existing market, providers would have to enter 
the market to contest it, making barriers to entry highly relevant. In a situation of geographical 
remoteness where foreign firms were the only ones with appropriate capacity, these were high. 
Equally, appropriately skilled personnel willing to work in remote areas in this politically unstable 
country were in limited supply. 
Whilst the lack of competition or contestability of the market is similar to that described for the PDS 
contract, the nature of the provider meant that the same issues of dependence did not arise for both 
parties to the contract, but was more one-sided for the purchaser. For the medical services sub- 
contractor this contract represented only a small part of their overall business, which was based in 
South Africa. In contrast, the purchaser remained quite dependent on this provider, due to the lack of 
providers with the capacity to offer the combination of services that they demanded. The engineering 
consortia were themselves operating under considerable time pressure and so from this point of view 
a change of sub-contractor was also undesirable: 
"the contract is too complicated. There are too many demands. Just say that they kick [the current 
sub-contractor] out and they bring in new people. How nmuch time do you think they will allow those 
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people to settle in? There won't be any time because the project is running Then they stand a 
chance to lose money then. " Purchaser, LIIDA 
Private Capitated Scheme 
The dynamic nature of the private sector in urban areas of South Africa was highlighted in chapter 4. 
Consequently the nature of the market for the services offered by the private capitatcd scheme clinics 
was strikingly different from the two case studies already presented. Various providers, principally 
other networks of private, for-profit clinics and private GPs / Independent Practitioner Associations 
competed to offer similar services to potential patients either on a fee for service or capitated basis. 
Competition was based on price and the perceived quality of the service. Competition was greater 
due to the urban setting and secondly because subscribers were themselves directly choosing which 
type of primary care service to subscribe to32, which made the number of purchasers in the market 
high. Therefore the private capitated scheme was not limited to dependence on the government as a 
purchaser but could independently offer services to a range of individuals and company subscribers. 
This market structure meant that each purchaser and provider was less powerful, due to the 
possibility of their replacement, which in turn had implications for the likelihood of sanctions such as 
exit being invoked in the relationship. 
GOVERNMENT CAPACITY TO WRITE AND MANAGE CONTRACTS 
Lesotho 
Overall technical capacity for contracting in Lesotho was far greater than in the case of the PDS. 
Ultimate responsibility for contract management lay with LIMA, a centre of technical expertise, 
supported by a combination of World Bank, European Union and bilateral donor funding and 
employing a range of experts on various aspects of contract specification and management. In 
addition, LHDA employed a consulting engineer to further aid the overseeing of contracts. There 
was no specific expertise in contracting for health services within LUUDA but there were public health 
32 each industrial company may offer its workers a range of medical scheme packages 
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specialists, including Lesotho's previous Permanent Secretary for Health as chief of the 
Environmental Services Division and at least one other medical doctor with a PhD in public health. 
Private capitated scheme 
There was a high degree of technical and managerial capacity internal to the service provider with the 
company employing lawyers and marketing experts to design the contract that it used. As described 
above there was also an extensive system of hierarchical control - internal, hierarchical monitoring 
relied on computer systems which were directly linked to head office and area managers visiting 
clinics regularly. 
HUMAN FACTORS, ORGANISATIONAL CONTEXT & MOTIVATION OF PROVIDERS 
Lesotho 
In interviews, the motivation of both the engineering contractor who held the overall contract and the 
sub-contractor, medical services were expressed purely in terms of profit. The engineering 
contractor's comments expressed a lack of interest in the whole health contracting process. A 
representative was emphatic that the obligation to run the health services had not been an undertaking 
made by choice: 
"We are contracted to construct this tunnel... . now over and above the construction contract 
is a 
contract to provide the medical services..... the provision of those (medical) services was included in 
that contract, so it wasn't any choice or decision by us... that was LNDA's decision" 
Engineering contractor, LHWP 
From the perspective of the subcontractor, a doctor described how the engineering contractor: 
" regards the clinic as such an unimportant part of the contract... we become not only second best but 
totally insignificant" Medical officer, medical sub-contractor 
The sub-contractor, medical services also clearly framed their motivation in profit-seeking terms: 
"It's like hotel management. We know how to do it "/"this company is profit seeking" 
Manager, medical sub-contractor 
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Motivation for service delivery was described at clinic level in terms of maintaining the firm's 
reputation and professional standards: 
"Me believe that [the provider] is an international company and that [it] has standards to maintain 
and we like to maintain those standards" Project manager, medical sub-contractor 
In contrast to the PDS system, no one at any level in the company mentioned a feeling of duty to the 
community. This is largely explained by the distance between personnel working for the contractor, 
even at clinic level, and the community. All employees had moved to the site from elsewhere and 
were living there only for the duration of the contract. The remoteness of the setting seemed to take 
its toll on the morale and motivation of staff, which appeared to be lower at the more remote of the 
two clinics. Comments revealed a lack of concern about whether the services being provided were 
comprehensive or were covering all those in need in the local community population. A lack of 
regard for the welfare of the community was demonstrated by the comments of an administrator, 
which contrasts some of the views expressed in the PDS case study: 
"At first the local community wasn't going to pay anything but then we negotiated because we said 
that we would have the locals here every single day for all kinds of things. We said to them NO. " 
Administrator, medical sub-contractor 
One doctor claimed: 
"there is no point in us duplicating what the MOH is doing. They do the antenatal care, 
immunisations and we do the curative " Medical officer, private capitated scheme 
However, it was clearly known that the MOH clinic in that area was closed, meaning that there would 
be no preventive care provided by any facility. Another doctor, when asked "who is immunising 
babies in this area? " replied "nobody", but did not appear to feel any responsibility for this. 
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Private Capitated Scheme 
The motivation of the company offering the private capitated scheme was again expressed purely in 
commercial, prof it-seeking terms. The company had perceived a gap in the market for good quality, 
low cost primary care services and based their method of delivery and especially the capitated 
payment approach on the idea of what they termed the "health care triangle". This emphasised easy 
access to quality services without a user fee at the `bottom' of the triangle, so that health problems 
would be treated at an early stage and the number of patients likely to need expensive referrals would 
be minimised. This underlying commercial motivation contributed to a wish to provide services 
which were both effective and perceived to be of good quality by the community. 
CONTRACT DESIGN, AWARD AND NEGOTIATION PROCESS 
LESOTHO CONTRACT DESIGN 
The Lesotho contract was subject to a long and formal award process. A prequalification phase 
started in September 1996 and service delivery under the health care contract only commenced 
in 
April/May 1999. The process of bid evaluation was also more formal. Nevertheless, the key feature 
of the contract award process, as with the PDS contract, remained a lack of competition. Whilst 
competition for the overall construction contract was keen, there was very little effective competition 
for the medical services contract. The eight engineering consortia competing for the overall project 
offered only two properly qualified medical sub-contractors between them. There were no bids from 
Lesotho based groups, NGOs or missions. 
In contrast with the nature of the PDS contract, the general preamble to the Lesotho contract 
emphasised that the nature of the interaction was to be specified entirely within the written document: 
"this sub-contract embodies the entire agreement between the Contractor and the Sub-Contractor. 
The parties shall not be bound by or be liable for any statement, representation, promise, inducement 
or understanding of any kind or nature not set forth herein. No changes, amendments or 
modifications of any of the terms and conditions hereof shall be valid unless reduced to writing and 
signed by both parties. This clause itself is not subject to variation without the written and signed 
agreement of both parties" 
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The form of the contract was that of a typical construction contract, laying down basic principles 
governing the way that the services were to be delivered and only specifying actual facilities and 
services to be operated in an addendum to the contract and a bill of quantities. The duration of the 
contract was fixed at five years. 
Ditties specified 
Also unlike the PDS contract, the Lesotho contract was focussed on input requirements. These 
included the staffing, equipping (including with medical supplies) and operation of 4 clinics and first 
aid posts for five construction sites. Nevertheless, as with the PDS contract, actual services to be 
delivered were specified broadly, as "general and medical conditions - non job related'; "midwifery 
and paediatric services . "serious medical diagnosis, initial treatment"; "minor ailments" and 
"domestic accidents ". 
On the subject of the quality of the services to be delivered the main contract said that the "sub- 
contractor shall implement and maintain to the satisfaction of the contractor appropriate and 
adequate quality assurance and quality control programmies in accordance with formally established 
procedures " but no further detail was given. 
Method of payment 
The Bill of Quantities specifying all inputs that would be supplied by the contractor identified those 
to be paid according to a "fixed charge" and others as a "time-related charge". Fixed charges were 
paid for capital items and as a one-off payment per member of staff, and included a 5% mark-up on 
the cost of any equipment to cover handling expenses for the sub-contractor. Payment of salary and 
other recurrent expenditures was covered by the time related charge. Every month whilst a member 
of staff was on site, a charge equivalent to their salary was paid. Maintenance of the clinic buildings 
was also paid for as a time related charge. 
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The contractor could claim for drugs that were dispensed at the rates that would be used by GPs with 
a privately insured patient, which was a 50% mark up on cost. This is the only variable payment in 
the design of this contract; all other charges were laid out and calculated in the Bill of Quantities and 
therefore at the bid stage. 
Reporting, sanctions and penalties 
Various detailed provisions were made in the sub-contract for reporting mechanisms between the 
sub-contractor and the contractor and access for the contractor to the sub-contractor's site of work 
and work plans. Levels of written communication were closely specified but do not always appear 
entirely appropriate. For instance the sub-contractor must provide the contractor with periodic plans 
of work and then report progress against them, a task not easily achieved for service delivery in 
response to the unpredictable demand for health care. 
Sanctions and penalties were also laid out in greater detail than in the case of the PDS. If the main 
contract was delayed due to delays in provision of health services, the sub-contractor was liable for 
any fines on behalf of the contractor. If the sub-contractor failed to execute the sub-contract works so 
as to: 
"materially affect the proper execution of the sub-contract works, the contractor may give notice 
requiring him to either make good such failure or neglect or provide details in writing of the 
measures that will be taken to remedy the situation. " 
This may be followed by seven days notice and then termination of the sub-contract. Failing to 
provide the documentation required by the main contractor (e. g. purchase orders or work plans) also 
constituted a breach of contract. In this case, payments could be delayed or withheld. 
For any other disputes between the contractor and the sub-contract the contract specified that an 
arbitrator between the parties would be appointed. There was no mention of sanctions which the sub- 
contractor may exercise against the principal contractor. 
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Purchaser and Provider opinions of the contract 
Despite the different style of the Lesotho contract, many of the comments by those involved with it 
echoed the same themes as the PDS case study. The difficulty of specifying the requirements of 
providing a primary care service in a contract and the potential gap between what the contract 
stipulated and what services were delivered was again raised. The engineers saw this as a problem 
inherent in any contract: 
"it's very clear what the employer wants fron the contractor. Of course you always find out later we 
should have added this or that, but that goes with technical specifications too. So, it's not particular 
that it's a new thing with health care specifications, " Engineering contractor, LHWP 
Whilst the sub-contractor said of the manner of contract specification: 
"(the) contract looks well specified but it is in fact a list of equipment to 
Medical officer, medical sub-contractor 
Members of LHDA also expressed frustration with the process of trying to specify health care 
activities in a contract and the degree to which the contract was open to interpretation: 
"you see it doesn't actually spell out what they should do. It says that they have to do health 
promotion activities and prevention. And they could say that that doesn't mean that they have to do 
vaccinations, that they have to do whatever... they could say that people come here and we teach 
them about health promotion and preventive stuff, we give them condoms, so we are doing it. But 
unfortunately most of' the people are of the clinical mindset" Purchaser, LIDA 
The inability of contract specification to act as a substitute for motivation was also commented on: 
"they aren't really doing PHC, it is there in the contract but they are still not doing it. This is the 
problem, you can tell someone else to do something and they will still say yes they are doing it, but 
they need to believe in it very enthusiastically and to understand what has to be done. There is no 
reason why they shouldn't do vaccinations there, under Ss. And they don't do it. There is no reason 
why they can't do Family Planning... " Purchaser, LIIDA 
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PRIVATE CAPITATED SCHEME CONTRACT DESIGN 
The contract was a tripartite agreement with a medical scheme, the subscriber (industrial company) 
and the service provider (private capitated scheme). A standard contract was offered to multiple 
purchasers simultaneously. Entry into and exit from the contract was determined by the purchaser 
and could take place on a rolling basis e. g. there was no fixed duration to the contract. Within each 
company subscribing to a contract with the provider, individuals could start and stop coverage with 
that scheme by means of whether they made a monthly payment. Both the company and individual 
subscribers under the scheme could exit the contract at any time by giving notice or simply stopping 
the monthly subscription payments. 
The contract was brief, in the forum of a memorandum of understanding between the three parties with 
an appendix detailing the package of benefits on offer. The marketing manager commented about the 
single comprehensive package of services on offer that it was a way of minimising complications 
with different entitlements for different patients: 
"it's like all Mercedes conic with air-conditioning. You get it whether you want it or not. If you 
don't tit ant it you don't use it, but you still pay for it. " Marketing manager, private capitated scheme 
Access to all clinic services was unlimited and the services available were specified in one long list: 
consultations, acute medication, chronic medication, pathology, radiology, ECG tests, pregnancy tests 
and family planning, immunisation, injury on duty, antenatal care and sonar, minor trauma, 
conservative dentistry (fillings, cleanings, extractions, preventative treatment, fluoride treatment) 
optometry, and then hospital in-patient and outpatient care (but these were to be provided by a 
different provider). 
Two limitations were imposed on subscribers' entitlements 1) out of hospital specialist visits were 
limited to three per year and 2) out of network visits" were limited to two per year. The contract did 
not outline any requirements in terms of the reporting obligations of the service provider, monitoring 
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or changes to the contract. The only breach of contract outlined was non-payment by a subscriber, in 
which case their rights to receive treatment was simply terminated. 
The head office of the service provider received payments from each subscribing company according 
to the number of workers to be covered at the beginning of the month. When a patient with capitated 
cover visited a clinic, the head office reimbursed the clinic for the cost of drugs dispensed to the 
capitated patients, but their visit represented no additional income for the clinic. For referrals, each 
individual covered or their family group was limited to three specialist referrals per annum and these 
were financed by the company's head office. Basic pathology was done at each clinic and more 
specialised testing services also paid for by head office. 
To further strengthen incentives to minimise visits whilst keeping patients healthy at primary care 
level, in some cases of this contract there was a form of risk-sharing specified between the private 
capitated scheme provider a-1d the medical scheme. This specified target outcomes in terms of 
maximum hospitalisation rates or expense for patients falling under their responsibility for primary 
care services. If hospitalisation rates exceeded this level, they would be required to pay a share of the 
resulting expense to the medical scheme: 
" we are saying `you can trust us. We will not allow this to happen' ". Manager, private capitated 
scheme 
(It is interesting to note how the phrase trust is used here - they do not actually ask for trust, they are 
using financial mechanisms to signal that trustworthy behaviour will be assured). 
33 visits to GPs in areas where there is no clinic owned by the company 
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TIIE CONTRACTUAL OUTCOME " OPERATION OF THE CONTRACTS 
CONTRACT INCENTIVES 
Lesotho 
Managers of the sub- contractor, medical services described the incentives contained in the contract: 
"there is no fat in it, I can tell you right now. The contract, the value of what we get out, is fixed " 
"We really gain nothing from the consultations point of view because we don't get the money, 
whether we charge the guy or not. It's the drugs. " 
"it's only that we only have drugs to make our main profit, and the little bit that we get on the stajT' 
The financial incentives in the contract were to ensure that all goods specified in the Bill of 
Quantities were in place to gain the administration fee on each one and in addition, the mark up on 
each drug prescribed of 50% gave an incentive to supply a high volume of expensive drugs. As the 
contract was not fee for service, there was no incentive to see high volumes of patients as in the 
PDS 
contract. The sub-contractor was required to pass the user fee on to LHDA and so even this 
did not 
act as an incentive to see local community patients. There was also a limited supply of potential 
patients, as the neighbouring communities were not large and the likelihood of people travelling great 
distances to access the service was limited by Lesotho's rough terrain, poor transport and the 
relatively high user fee (R15 vs R5 to R10 in Lesotho Government clinics). 
Private capitated scheme 
"great thing about [this] system is that there are no perverse incentives. Health care providers don't 
even see drug representatives. There is a formulary. They have no room to prescribe what they like. 
They have no incentive to refer...... Chairman, private capitated scheme 
Head office had strong incentives to control costs created by the capitated payment system. Strong 
hierarchical management was used to align incentives at clinic level to keep patients healthy at the 
minimum cost level possible, in particular minimising the use of expensive referrals, tests or drugs. 
This was done by a system of strict monitoring of clinical practice and drug use. In addition, the risk 
sharing between primary and secondary level care providers in some versions of the contract 
strengthened incentives for head office to minimise referrals. However, there were also incentives 
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acting to prevent under-treatment of patients. First, patients had to believe that they were receiving 
adequate care to continue subscribing to this scheme. Second, if there was consistent under-treatment 
of sick patients, this would worsen their condition, resulting in eventual expensive referral. This 
further encouraged greater interest in preventive care and cautious referral, as summed up by one 
manager: 
"the watchword is appropriate rc/ýrrals. Thai is what we are trying to do, u/ppropilate rc! %rruls 
Manager, private capitated scheme 
SERVICE DELIVERY 
As with the PDS contract, Table 8.1 suggests that in Lesotho the services being delivered were 
overwhelmingly curative, reflecting the problems of specifying the boundaries of the service to he 
delivered in relation to the public sector services available, and the contractor's preference to deliver 
curative consultations rather than preventive. Reasons for this preference probably included that they 
may take less time and generate more profits on drugs. For instance, antenatal care was actively 
discouraged by the Lesotho clinics as they did not wish to be involved in del veries and so 
encouraged pregnant women to seek antenatal care in the public sector. As mentioned above, 
ininiunisations were also not offered. 
Volume cost and structural quality of services" 
Table 8.1: Type of services delivered (% of total patients) 
Service category Lesotho Private capitated scheme 
Acute 84.0% 74.7% 
Chronic 14.0% 12.5% 
ANC/PNC/FP 2.0% 12.9% 
Total 100.0% 100.0% 
In the case of the private capitated scheme, a higher proportion of antenatal/postnatal and family 
planning services shows that a more comprehensive service was being delivered, and may also reflect 
`a The data presented in tables 8.1 to 8.6 are drawn from the results of the broader research project New purchaser/provider 
relationships in health care: the desirability of contracts with primary care providers' 
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a greater tendency to give attention to `preventive" aspects of' primary care services due to the 
capitated, risk sharing contract design described above. 
Table 8 .2 shows one measure of the volume of patients being seen in the clinics. The average 
patients seen per full time equivalent (FTE) professional were the lowest in the Lesotho clinics. 
demonstrating that staffing levels were kept high relative to patient volumes. This combination was 
also reflected in long consultation times as shown in table 8.3. 
Table 8.2: Patients seen per full time equivalent (FTE) consulting professional 
Type of provider Patients per FTE per annum 
Lesotho range (2 clinics) 803-1076 
Private capitated scheme range (2 clinics) 10166-13089 
The private capitated scheme clinics had the longest average consultation time of all the models. 
This is likely to reflect the more demanding nature of private clients, and their higher expectations of 
the quality of care that they should receive, as well as perhaps the higher proportion of time given to 
preventive health care in line with the contract's incentives. The consultation time in the Lesotho 
clinics was also high relative to those reviewed in the PDS model and the public sector in chapter 7. 
Table 8.3: Average consultation time (minutes) 
Type of provider Average consultation time 
Lesotho 8 
Private capitated scheme 9 
The average cost of the services delivered is shown in Table 8.4 below. 
35 In South Africa, services such as antenatal care and family planning, TT3 treatment and some treatment of chronic cases are 
all classified under the term "preventive" 
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Table 8.4: Average cost per visit (Rand) 
Cost category Lesotho °/, Private 
capitated 
scheme 
"/o 
External admin and management 0.50 0.3`70 2.06 7.5% 
Internal admin and management 34.80 21.9% 3.03 8.6% 
Building operating costs 11.46 7.2% 3.42 9.6% 
Clinical staff 47.80 30.1% 9.17 25.7% 
Medical and surgical supplies 31.10 19.6% 9.06 25.4% 
Transport/vehicle running costs 8.21 5.2% 
Total recurrent cost 133.86 84.3% 27.33 76.8% 
Building costs 4.91 3.1% 2.23 6.2% 
Medical equipment 8.43 5.3% 3.12 8.8% 
Furniture and equipment 1.26 0.80ä 2.92 8.2% 
Vehicle costs 10.24 6.5% 
Total capital costs 24.84 15.7% 8.27 23.3% 
Total cost 158.70 100.0% 35.6 100.0% 
Overall the private capitated scheme ran at a lower cost than the Lesotho clinics and both the PDS 
cases and the public sector comparisons shown in the previous chapter. These clinics had very low 
recurrent costs, particularly for medical and surgical supplies and clinical personnel. Relatively 
generous capital sr ending may reflect the need to attract patients by having well maintained and 
equipped premises although the private capitated scheme's rather mixed structural scores reported 
below (Table 8.5) demonstrate that high capital spending was concentrated more on items that signal 
quality than items essential for technical quality. The costs of the Lesotho contract were extremely 
high, reflecting the incentives of a contract which reimbursed all costs with an additional mark-up, 
encouraging the contractor to maximise spending. 
Table 8.5: Structural quality of care indicators 
Structural indicator Lesotho contract 
clinics 
Private capitated 
scheme 
General state of repair of facilities Excellent (iood 
Adequate toilets 100% 75% 
Functioning refrigerator 100% 100% 
Adequate emergency kit 100% 25% 
Items of essential equipment 100% 75% 
Lockable drug storage facility 100% 75% 
Waiting area: large enough and 
under cover 
100% 100% 
Adequate patient records kept 100% 75% 
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For Lesotho, where the contract stipulated clearly the inputs required and gave an incentive to 
procure them by paying an administration fee of 5% for each item purchased, the input design of the 
contract clearly achieved good structural quality. However, the cost consequences of this, 
particularly in terms of medical equipment, were substantial, as shown in Table 8.4. 
Drug use indicators also suggest that the Lesotho contract encouraged generous prescribing pattenis. 
Of all the clinic models evaluated, the Lesotho clinics prescribed the highest number of drugs per 
script and the highest percentage of antibiotics to their patients. The private capitated scheme's 
incentive to minimise expenditure per patient visit was again reflected in it having the lowest number 
of drugs per script and a high use of generic drugs in their formulary. The competing needs of 
keeping costs down whilst maintaining an acceptable level of perceived quality for patients is 
reflected in their use of antibiotics still being in line with the PUS and public sector providers 
evaluated (Table 7.5) whilst drugs per script were lower and the proportion of'generic drugs used the 
highest. 
Table 8.6: Drug use indicators 
Number of drugs per script % antibiotics % generic name 
used 
Lesotho clinics 2.9 50.8% 49.2°/0 
Private capitated scheme 1.8 32.6% 41.2% 
From this performance data it seems that contracted providers behaviour was comparable with the 
financial incentives in their contract, with quite different patterns of service delivery in the two 
contracts. However, as with the PDS, it is difficult to state to what degree the patterns reflected by 
the data presented above are a result of contract design and what else might be influencing service 
delivery. 
Perceptions from I' GDs 
Focus Group Discussions with communities using both models of clinic examined by these case 
studies revealed that patients felt that both services were of a high standard. 
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In Lesotho, comments were made about the much better levels of resources available than in the 
public sector clinics, the cleanliness and the sophisticated equipment "there are enough nurses so 
the 
services are quicker "/ "we feel like we are going to town %i'hen we go there"/ 
"the clinic is very 
". 
clean.. the staff is clean "one even feels ashamed to walk on the clean 
floor and make it dirty 
Views on the treatment at the private capitated scheme's clinics were overwhelmingly positive. 
Commonly identified elements of positive experience were a good reception ("their reception 
is very 
good. When you get inside they ask you so nicely, "mania, what is the problenm? " They make you 
feel 
important); limited waiting time ("you don't have to wait in long queues, you walk in and they help 
you "); cleanliness ("you ask yourself why do places which cater for both black and white be clean 
whilst those that cater for blacks are dirty"); good attitudes of staff ("they really treat you like a 
patient "/ "their attitude is excellent ") and thorough attention and technical competence ("they check 
you thoroughly'). 
MONITORING 
Lesotho 
Monitoring was done principally via reports to the consulting engineer with few visits to the clinics. 
The consulting engineer employed a health and safety officer who visited construction sites and 
occasionally the clinics ("on the odd occasion') but it was acknowledged that what he did was: 
"not specialist monitoring, it's monitoring "is it open? " "are they treating people? " "... he wouldn't 
monitor to a decent level the PHCfacilities ". Purchaser, LHDA 
As with the PDS, concerns were expressed about the feasibility of technical monitoring for those 
given the responsibility: 
"we are a construction company so we do not have any people employed who have any knowledge of 
medical service provision or of the running of clinics, that's not our business " Consulting engineer, LHHWP 
Even administrative monitoring was acknowledged to be haphazard: 
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"if they give us a timesheet that is not correct, unless we catch then: by my popping in there one day 
and checking if that person is there ... tive wouldn't know" Engineering contractor, LIIWP 
In spite of the considerable capacity available to LIIDA and their consulting engineer, the monitoring 
function of the Lesotho contract therefore appeared to be subject to similar weaknesses as the PDS 
contract. The difficulty of monitoring the technical quality of services delivered, number of patients 
seen and number of drugs dispensed were raised in a very similar manner to the PDS case. The 
logistical difficulties of monitoring services delivered in remote settings were also echoed. Hlowever, 
unlike the PDS contract, greater confidence was expressed in the feasibility of monitoring inputs such 
as staffing levels, mainly as a reflection that both purchaser and provider were in the same small 
town: 
"our staff complement is laid down by our contract. We have to supply them with a list. We have a 
list of who we can employ and we have to supply names that have filled these posts. In such a small 
community they would know if these persons weren't employed. " 
Administrator, medical sub-contractor 
This was echoed by a member of the consulting engineer firm: 
"you cone to realise very quickly because we are in a small community, it's two villages and you 
know very soon if there are problems with the delivery of the service. " Engineering contractor, 
LHDA 
The strength of the community as a back up to the purchaser's monitoring also seemed more of a 
realistic option in this contract: 
"We have meetings with the local community on a regular basis and any problems would certainly 
come up very quickly if there was a serious problem. " Consulting engineer, LI IDA 
Whilst this is again similar to the PDS situation, in this case no doubts were expressed about the 
likelihood of the community to complain. This is due to the construction to which these clinics was 
attached having been a controversial development project and therefore accompanied by a multitude 
of community empowerment efforts and social research. Due to these unusual circumstances there 
appeared little doubt that this community knew the channels to make complaints and had the 
conf idence to do so: 
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"we report through committees, Then Principal chief We go to meetings with LIIDA. Here 
problems are reported and then taken to the right people" FGD participant 
There were therefore some reasons which made monitoring more likely to succeed in the Lesotho 
context than that of the PDS case reviewed earlier, but these were highly context specific, related to 
the small community and the existence of better established channels for complaint. 
Last, the incentive to exaggerate the number of patients seen was weaker: 
"we really gain nothing from the consultation point of view, because ne don't get the money ". 
Medical officer/ administrator, medical sub-contractor 
Nevertheless, again similar to some PDS, the medical sub-contractor commented of the monitoring 
arrangements that there was very little chance for either LIMA or the engineering contractor to know 
what services the contract was delivering and to what standard. Whilst they seemed "up on the ball" 
on issues regarding the treatment of the workforce : 
"as for the local population we present ntonthly figures of numbers seen. But we could quite easily 
touch tip the figures if we wanted to. " Manager, medical sub-contractor 
The claim for drugs dispensed was also submitted simply as a total per patient and for all patients 
without any detailed breakdown of what drugs were dispensed and how much they cost. The 
administrator at one clinic said that although she had once been asked to submit a stock report 
showing opening and closing month balances, she had never done so. 
The feasibility of little used monitoring mechanisms such as spot checks, as with the PDS, were 
acknowledged and seen as a threat despite their lack of use: 
" if they feel like it they can come and audit the books, they can look at a guy on the list and say 
"well here's Mr Smith "and could we please have a look at his file to make sure that he came on that 
day? ". "Have they ever come and tried to do that? " "No" Medical officer/administrator, medical 
sub-contractor 
One key difference between the Lesotho contract and the PDS was a greater number of administrative 
personnel and tasks attached to the operation of the Lesotho contract, generating greater transaction 
costs. In the view of the provider this had made decisions slow and cumbersome 
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"MTC has to agree to everything that we buy and it takes them so long to agree to anything" Medical 
officer, medical sub-contractor 
Whilst the consulting engineer also expressed doubts about how reasonable some of the 
administrative demands of the contract were: 
"the employer has got a list called 'list of affected persons. It's a list very thick. I can't see the 
contractor or [the sub-contractor] trawling through that list" Engineering contractor, LIIDA 
There was a need for large quantities of paperwork to be carried out at the beginning of the contract 
to a degree that was found to be quite onerous by the provider, who supplied much of the requested 
documentation late. In addition, the description of the billing requirements to be sent in monthly by 
the provider was: 
"it takes hours and hours, days, to do a month end run. We have a lady working here who sits every 
morning of every day to do that" Project manager, medical sub-contractor 
In terms of staffing, there were personnel at the purchaser, the consulting engineer and the 
engineering consortium all involved in overseeing the payment arrangements and contractual 
negotiations related to this contract. The transactions costs of monitoring in the Lesotho case 
therefore appear high. These high costs reflect the more tightly specified contract as well as the 
greater number of "layers" involved in its operation (purchaser-) consulting cngineer4 engineering 
contractor-) provider). However, it is not clear from the comments reported above that incurring 
these greater costs was effective in improving the level of monitoring possible. 
Private capitated scheme 
The contract operated without formal monitoring by any purchaser, on the basis of simple monthly 
pre-payments. However, the company had its own quite extensive systems of monitoring the services 
delivered in each clinic both via use of clinical protocols and via financial monitoring. The 
computer system used in the clinics could also be accessed directly from head office, which 
considerably reduced asymmetries of information between clinic and head office. 
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In the context of a competitive market, each individual patient signed up under a company's contract 
had the opportunity to move to a different provider or stop having medical cover if they felt that the 
quality of services was inadequate or low for the price that they were paying and this was an 
additional monitoring mechanism. The main issue around monitoring in this case was therefore first 
whether patients were happy with the service and secondly whether they were in a position to 
monitor the technical quality of the services that they received. A public purchaser is generally not 
willing to leave this function to purchasers, fearing that they would not be able to adequately monitor 
the services themselves, and concerned not to waste funds on poor service provision. In this case, 
because the purchaser is in effect the user of the service-" and there is no public funding involved, it 
appeared more acceptable to allow them to take responsibility for deciding on the acceptability of the 
service that they received. 
PAYMENT 
Lesotho 
There had been no problems with payments in the Lesotho contract. Payments were considered to be 
generally accurate and on time. 
Private capitated scheme 
If payment was not made on time by subscribers to the scheme, their right to access services was 
simply terminated. This was laid out clearly in the contract: 
"non paying members or groups will be suspended where no payment is received by the end of the 
month, and will not be eligible for services ". 
'6 Payment systems vary but subscriptions would either be deducted 100% from an individual's income by their employer 
and paid to a medical scheme or would be paid jointly by employer and employee. 
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CHANGES TO THE CONTRACT 
Lesotho 
Changes to the contract were another source of transaction costs in the Lesotho contract. Initially, for 
all parties to the contract, time was taken up dealing with shortcomings in the original contract and 
the facilities provided. One engineer described: 
"lots of wrangling over documentation and needing changes to the contract e. g. extension, parking 
bays, whether the providers were to deal with all road accidents in the area" Engineering 
contractor, LHDA 
There were "endless discussions" between the contractor, the consulting engineer and LIIDA as each 
issue that came up which was not dealt with in the original specification had to be renegotiated. 
However, unlike the monitoring function, the manner in which changes to the contract were 
approached in the Lesotho case study did not resemble the PDS situation. All alterations to the terms 
of the contract were subject to negotiation and made within the terms of the written contract. There 
were no examples of the type of abrupt unilateral changes to the terms of the agreement common in 
the PDS case. Nevertheless the need for contract variation due to the impossibility of accurately 
specifying a contract for the service was acknowledged by the consulting engineer: 
" it is obvious in a contract like this that nobody can think of every contingency. So you can raise 
variation orders and negotiate them with the clients through the engineer etc where extra money 
is 
required. You may have forgotten something or underestimated the complexity of something". 
Consulting engineer, LHDA 
So far disputes about how to interpret the terms of the contract had all been resolved without the need 
for arbitration. The manner in which contractual disputes were approached was to seek informal 
agreement between individuals and then formalise this within a variation to the contract: 
"We talk: around them and negotiate things. It very often starts out as an informal thing, picking up 
the phone etc and once you have negotiated around and sort of agreed then you send a formal letter 
in so that there can't be any disputes... " Engineering contractor, LHDA 
"every now and then someone will cone along and read the contract and say that that isn't the way 
that we should be doing it..... it never really comes to a dispute. It just comes to an interpretation of 
how we should be doing it" Project manager, medical sub-contractor 
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However, changes to the contract which may have been desirable from the point of view of the sub- 
contractor, were not always achieved. A manager of the service provider complained: 
"there is never any chance to renegotiate the terms of the contract " Manager, medical sub-contractor 
This often resulted in the medical contractor having to bear risk where the terms of the contract had 
originally specified something which was inappropriate, due to the difficulty of changing the contract 
terms. Thus the same power of the purchaser to determine changes to the contract as described under 
the PDS case study is shown here as the purchaser's power to block changes to the contract. This 
was illustrated in the following cases. First was a need for greater staffing levels than were specified 
in the original Bill of Quantities to run a 24 hour service. The sub-contractor raised this issue at the 
time of contract negotiation but was told by the principal contractor not to seek to change the Bill of 
Quantities but to just use the staff hours specified for the total contract at a faster rate. A manager for 
the sub-contractor commented: 
"we are sort of taking an advance on the man months and hoping that at the end of the day it will 
square off.... we are just hoping and praying that things will work out" Manager, medical sub- 
contractor 
Similar problems with the rigidities of the contract design occurred due to the lapse of one year 
between bidding and starting work on the contract. Prices for fixed items had been set at the contract 
award stage and in some cases had increased by up to three times by the time that the items came to 
be purchased. These differences in prices had to be borne by the sub-contractor as the contract made 
no allowance for cost inflation and no change could be negotiated. However, there were other 
examples where LHDA bore the risk of a change to the contract. Where problems had arisen from a 
mismatch between the tender specification calling for services to be delivered for which there was no 
provision made in the clinic design, LHDA had agreed to build such extra facilities. 
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Private capitated scheme 
Changes to the contract were not made other than rare changes to the package of benefits offered by 
the scheme to bring this in line with what the clinics were offering. When this took place a new 
addendum to the contract was simply circulated to all subscribers. 
SUBSTITUTES FOR A COMPLETE CONTRACT 
Lesotho 
Similarities to the PDS included the monitoring function which still appeared weak, and evidence that 
financial incentives were strongly influencing the manner in which services were delivered. In 
contrast, the payment and variation functions of the Lesotho contract were carried out more formally 
than in the case of the PDS contract, with considerable formal negotiation surrounding the terms of 
the contract, and where these were changed this was done with mutual agreement. 
Given the greater formality of this contract's functioning, there was potentially a lesscr role played 
by the "residual" or external factors highlighted under the PDS case as shaping the contractual 
relationship. Interviewees did have less to say on this subject. However, although with less vigour, 
the same issues were raised as for the PDS contract, such as recognition of a degree of dependence on 
the part of the purchaser, and a tendency to bypass the formal contractual routes and rely on personal 
relationships to underpin the functioning of the contract. 
Echoing the PDS contract was a sense of dependence, for instance over-riding the formal stipulations 
of the contract regarding breach of contract: 
"We were given no time, from I May they wanted its to render a service and we couldn't do it. . --. It 
was stressful, there were lots of threats you know that they were going to close the site down.... So 
you get to the point where you just say "if you want to close it, close it " because you cannot close a 
contract like this in one day " Manager, medical sub-contractor 
Even at such a point of conflict the sanctions contained in the contract were not exercised. Again as 
with the PDS, there was use of the concept of competence trust and the importance of interpersonal 
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relations to express what governs the relationship when there is little control left for the purchaser 
over what the provider does: 
"well we trust them, yes certainly from the basis of a layman as far as medical services are 
concerned " Engineering contractor, LHDA 
"One can't go without the other... there is good co-operation between its you know. It's a friendly 
situation, we have our arguments and differences of opinion but at the end the work gets done. " 
Manager, medical sub-contractor 
Despite the clear stipulations of the contract that all agreements must be contained within it, and that 
there was to be no contact between the purchaser of the overall contract and the medical sub- 
contractor, the bulk of the contact appears to have been between the consulting engineer and LIIDA 
and the medical sub-contractor. The engineering consortia's personnel commented that they found it 
easier to "step out of the way" whilst the consulting engineer said: 
"I used to tend to deal with X [project director of medical sub-contractor] direct on a lot of issues. 
Going through the contractor as intermediary didn't add, it took some time" 
This was also commented on by the engineering consortium's manager: 
"The project manager and consulting engineers are good friends, that makes co-operation so much 
easier you know" Engineering contractor, LHDA 
Lastly however, the greater weight attached to the contract in the Lesotho case study was summed up 
by one of the sub-contractors: 
"You have to live according to the contract. As we all try to do it you know, but we don't always 
succeed. You cannot ignore the contract. Breach of contract is terrible" Manager, medical sub- 
contractor 
Since both this and the following case study were contra, ts with companies as opposed to 
individuals, the role of internal management in determining the nature of services delivered, as 
opposed to the decision process of an independent GP, is also relevant. In this case the chairman of 
the company still emphasised the role of personnel in determining what took place within the clinics: 
"... There is financial monitoring to make sure that it is running on what we predicted. But I can tell 
you that all of these contracts depend on your personnel. Bits of paper and computer systems in the 
end mean absolutely nothing" Chairman, medical sub-contractor 
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Private capitated scheme 
Given the anonymous nature of the purchasers, their multitude and the competitive nature of the 
market, the nature of this contractual relationship appears fundamentally different from either of 
those examined previously. Because there was no single institutional purchaser, purchasers were not 
interviewed for this case study. Service providers, when asked for their impression of how the 
contract operated or asked to describe the nature of the contractual relationship, looked bemused. It 
appeared that the brief contract and list of benefits seemed to require no further explanation, 
effectively describing and framing service delivery with no further reliance on interpersonal 
relationships to help determine how the contract should operate. In fact this private capitated 
scheme contract is a good example of a contractual relationship where there were no specific, 
consistent interpersonal relationships. 
Several factors explain why this final contract operated so differently from the previous two case 
studies. First, the service provider operated on very closely managed protocols and guidelines set by 
internal, hierarchical systems of management, which made it easier to define what services were to be 
offered under the contract and how. This provider was an example of a company with functioning, 
strong systems of internal management and these were the primary force in determining the nature of 
service delivery. Second it was possible to define the population to be treated and hence to use 
capitation payment in the contract design which created an effective, desirable package of incentives 
for providers to deliver cost-effective care that gave due attention to preventive services. Third, a 
competitive market acted as a Lack up to ensuring the quality of service delivery by providing an exit 
option for subscribers. All of these factors appear to lessen the need to "check up" found in the other 
two contracts, with monitoring one of the most problematic features of the other contracts reviewed. 
However, the method of operation of this contract, leaving monitoring and judgement of the quality 
of service essentially up to the user, is of questionable effectiveness in ensuring the technical quality 
of the services. As was discussed in chapter 2, whilst patients may be able to judge the interpersonal 
quality of the consultation, their waiting times and whether the environment in the clinic is 
224 
satisfactory, they may be less able to judge whether the quality of care that they arc receiving is 
technically adequate. 
CONCLUSION 
This chapter has shown the varying nature of contract design and external factors in the case of two 
further case studies of contracting for primary care services in South Africa and Lesotho. Both cases 
demonstrated quite different approaches to contract design and payment for broadly similar types of 
service. They also demonstrated the impact of variations in external factors such as the level of 
capacity, degree of market competition and nature of provider on the nature of how a contract 
operates. The Lesotho case demonstrates an attempt to use considerable capacity to specify a 
contract for primary care services in a more complete way, against a similar backdrop to that of the 
PDS case study of a lack of competition for the contract, and the difficulty of separating out services 
to be provided by the contractor from those provided by public sector clinics. The result is a more 
detailed contract document, but one which is still not possible to monitor adequately and to some 
extent is still reliant on interpersonal relationships and recognition of some forms of dependence and 
trust for its operation, whilst also having higher transaction costs. In contrast, the urban setting of 
the private capitated scheme demonstrated the impact of an increase in the number of both purchasers 
and providers on the nature of a contract for primary care services, as well as the role that internal 
systems of hierarchical management can potentially play in replacing the rather `ad hoc' manner in 
which service delivery was defined and monitored in the previous two case studies. Overall the 
functioning of the contract was quite dramatically different. 
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CHAPTER 9: DISCUSSION OF FINDINGS 
This thesis set out to explore the nature of contractual relationships for primary care, services in an 
LMIC, and factors controlling and influencing this. Previous chapters have presented data on the 
external factors, contract design and resulting contractual relationship from three case studies of 
contracts for primary care services. A broad literature review in chapter 2 gave rise to a framework 
which synthesised many potential factors in influencing the nature of contracts and was used to 
examine these case studies. The framework is presented again below as figure 9.1, with some 
additions showing controlling mechanisms which the case studies suggested were important elements 
in explaining the contracts' functioning. 
In line with some of the more recent literature on public service contracting in the UK reviewed in 
chapter 2, the nature of these case studies emphasised that factors and circumstances surrounding 
each contract were at least as important as the contract document itself. The nature of each 
contractual relationship was made up of a combination of all of the factors shown in figure 9.1, and 
an understanding of it had to include the `contractual substitutes' or operating mechanisms shown in 
the bottom section, as well as the environment in which it was operating, to truly explain its 
functioning. The three case studies highlighted different combinations of these factors making it 
possible to consider what the influence of each was in greater detail than if only one case 
(combination of factors) had been studied. 
This chapter considers some of the strengths and weaknesses of the methodology of the study used 
and then discusses each case study and its findings in turn. Findings highlighted by a comparison 
between the case studies are then discussed. In this discussion the term "contract" is often used to 
describe the broader contractual relationship rather than a single document. 
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Figure 9.1: Components of a contractual relationship 
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METHODOLOGICAL AND DATA ISSUES 
Research into contracts faces a number of difficulties. First, despite the urgency for more 
information about the nature of contracts in LMICs, there is a dearth of suitable research methods for 
addressing this. This is because there are relatively few functioning examples of contracts, making 
large scale quantitative studies rarely feasible, and because the nature of the research questions being 
asked also often requires a qualitative approach to allow for the complexity of the factors that need to 
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be included. Second, it is difficult to disentangle factors which are relevant indicators of contractual 
performance from the very `noisy' world and multitude of other influences amongst which health 
care contracts operate. This study was therefore faced with a limited methodology to address a 
complex topic. The largely qualitative case study approach adopted had both strengths and 
weaknesses. Strengths were its ability to accommodate the variety of factors that needed to be 
considered. Case studies were able to examine contracts as multi-faceted phenomena, using 
documentary sources, performance data and interviews to access both facts and perceptions about the 
contracts. They were thus able to deal both with more concrete factors such as the level of 
competition (which can be objectively compared), and other more subjective concepts such as the 
role of obligation, trust and dependence. 
Whilst case studies appear to have been the most appropriate approach, several problems were still 
encountered due to the complex nature of the study subject. For instance, some concepts used to 
explain the dynamics of these contracts are not easily `measured' or accessed in a consistent manner 
and whilst interviews seem to be the most effective way of doing so, they still give only partial and 
highly subjective access. The problems of drawing conclusions to anything broader than the case 
level with data which are a highly situated account of a social phenomenon must also be 
acknowledged. For this study, a mechanism for doing this via use of a theoretical framework is 
described in greater detail in the concluding chapter. A related problem, making even comparison 
between the three cases difficult, was the differing nature of the information which the case studies 
yielded. The naturt of the results of each case study were themselves a reflection of the nature of 
each contract, showing the difficulties in such interview based case studies of separating out results 
from the research process itself. For instance, interviews about the PDS contract, arguably the most 
dependent on external contractual substitutes, also provided the richest interview data as interviewees 
spoke at length about the nature of their interaction within the contractual relationship rather than just 
the nuts and bolts of contract design. In contrast, interviewees asked about the private capitated 
scheme contract were able to describe its functioning but had little to say on the more abstract issues 
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which appeared to be so important to understanding the PDS case. This was in itself a form of 
finding. Therefore it was sometimes difficult to separate out the form in which results presented 
themselves from the findings themselves. 
The heavy reliance on interview data in this study also raises the question of the influence of the 
interviewer's own role in the research process and how this is likely to have affected the study's 
findings. Interviewees were apparently willing to speak very openly about the contractual 
relationships in question due to the distance of the interviewer from the issue e. g. a foreign researcher 
coming from an overseas university. They appeared to speak frankly about their opinions of the other 
party in the contractual relationship and were happy to do so. Some providers, in particular the PDS, 
may have been less frank about the nature of service delivery which took place under the contract 
than they would have been with a medically trained person or a South African. There may have been 
a tendency to hope that a foreign researcher would be less sensitive to the history of the PDS system 
and the sometimes still discriminatory way in which services were delivered. Given that the nature o: ' 
service delivery under the contract was not the main focus of the study, this is unlikely to have been a 
major drawback. 
In some cases it was possible to triangulate findings methodologically by drawing on data on service 
delivery or cross-checking perceptions with facts, and where this was so it has been carried out. For 
instance, checks could be made of willingness to resort to legal sanctions (stated in interviews) versus 
whether lawyers had ever been employed, or the volume of patients seen versus what was said about 
the incentives contained in the contract, but there are many examples where such triangulation was 
not possible e. g. in response to questions about more subjective issues such as trust and motivation. 
Because there was not an opportunity to observe the day to day interaction between purchaser and 
provider over a long time period, an account of the nature of the relationship had to a large extent to 
rely on what was said about it by those involved. 
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Triangulation of analysis and member validation were not carried out and both of these could have 
potentially strengthened the findings of the study. As mentioned in chapter 3, member validation was 
felt to be inappropriate due to the sensitive nature of some of the information (particularly in the PDS 
case) and the lack of time of most of those interviewed to read and respond to this type of analysis. 
Triangulation of analysis could have lessened its extreme reliance on one person's interpretation of 
the data, but the feasibility of such triangulation seemed doubtful. This was partly logistical (the 
analysis was a long-winded task that few appropriately qualified researchers would have been willing 
to undertake for someone else's PhD thesis) and partly due to questions about the usefulness of 
triangulation in this type of study. The way in which the interview data were analysed and written up 
must be acknowledged to be a single unique commentary on the phenomenon under investigation and 
the analysis of a second researcher was likely to produce a second unique commentary. How these 
two competing narratives would then be reconciled may have been problematic. Seale (1999 p. 57) 
cites Ciccourel's critique of triangulation in qualitative research which may become `indefinite' - 
different versions of commentaries on a single set of data may cont'nue to be produced for as long as 
you increase the number of individuals doing the analysis. He summarises Ciccourel's point as "that 
we are all, including social researchers, engaged in story telling at all times": 
In conclusion, this study's heavy reliance on interviews reflects the strengths of this type of 
qualitative inquiry and also the dearth of other methods available to triangulate findings on the 
complex set of factors identified in this study. The strengths and weaknesses of the study's 
methodology are in fact the same - that some parts are a largely subjective account of the experiences 
of individuals involved in operating contracts for primary care services. By reporting their accounts, 
the study is vulnerable to manipulation by those interviewed. However, equally its strength is that it 
is able to reflect some of the richness and inter-connectedness of the influences upon how contracts 
operate. It is safe to conclude that what is said and revealed by each of the interviewees in the study 
may not be a complete factual account, but is in its turn highly revealing about the nature of the 
contracting relationship, which was the ultimate subject of the study. 
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DISCUSSION OF EACH CASE STUDY 
The PDS case 
The bulk of this thesis has been taken up with data from the case study of the PDS contract. This 
section briefly reviews the contract's strengths as a case study and its likely relevance to other 
contracts in LMICs. The nature of the contractual relationship that was revealed by the case study is 
then reviewed in terms of the nature of external factors present, the degree of control exercised by 
contract design and monitoring and the role of other factors as controlling mechanisms in the 
contractual relationship. 
The PDS contract is a rare example of a well-established and widely functioning contract for primary 
care services in an LMIC. Because it is a standard contract with a series of self-employed 
individuals, it offers a chance to examine the degree to which the same contract may operate in 
different settings. In one sense tie model represented by the PDS contract is quite widespread - 
other Southern African countries such as Zimbabwe or Namibia have or have had a similar system as 
did Britain in the 19`x' Century, and it is an obvious solution to the problem of weak public services in 
sparsely populated areas where there are private sector resources that can be drawn upon. However it 
is also important to acknowledge the uniqueness of this contract's setting. It is a system surviving 
from the "old" South Africa into the "new". The political and historical context of the contract mean 
that it is surrounded by uncertainty and confusion and this may have influenced the findings of the 
case study. It also makes it a case study in which the history and context of the contract are a 
profound influence and this has implications for the relevance of its findings to other, newer 
contractual forms. 
The literature review in chapter 2, in particular the work of MacNeil (1974; 1978) highlighted that 
contracts can come in a variety of shapes and forms. In the case of the PDS case study, the contract 
document was incomplete and even out of date; for instance it still referred to a system of referral of 
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patients from a magistrate that had ceased to exist in 1996. Overall, the contract's operation 
resembled MacNeil's concept of the relational contract, with an emphasis on the continuance of the 
contractual relationship over time and the social context and situation between the contracting parties 
being at least as important determinants as the written contract. In that sense the "contract" studied 
was far more than a document and to a large extent was a construct of the people involved in the 
contractual relationship. Many of the PDS interviewed either could not find their contracts or had not 
been given one. In such cases the service was being operated according to what the PDS thought the 
contract would say, if they had one. 
A review of the environment in which the PDS contract operated revealed the context and history of 
the contract as an important force which encompassed many influences such as the nature of the 
service being contracted (confusion over the curative/preventive split) the supply of doctors, capacity 
of the government to manage contracts adequately, the attitude and motivation of providers, and to 
some extent the mutual dependence of purchaser and provider. In particular, South Africa's 
apartheid past left not only organisational problems (with the government facing huge problems of 
organisational capacity, a tight budgetary situation and the upheaval of re-organisation) but also 
flavoured the relationship between purchasers and providers - two sets of people who had 
historically belonged to opposing `sides' of South African society. Both organisational and 
interpersonal issues had a clear impact on the way in which the PDS contract was managed. Poor 
government capacity to define policy, write and monitor contracts and manage financial systems were 
all largely historically determined, but were key influences on the current functioning of the PDS 
contract. Differences in capacity between the Western and Eastern Cape were also historically 
determined, and again a clear determinant of the nature of the contractual relationship. Weaker 
Eastern Cape provincial management was reflected by a contractual relationship characterised by less 
trust, weaker monitoring and a higher degree of suspicion and antagonism between the two parties. 
Roots of this were partly historical, partly due to present weak capacity but ultimately all of this was 
historically determined. 
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A second major external influence on the nature of the contractual relationship was the situation of 
bilateral monopoly in most PDS towns. In all of the towns visited there was little effective 
competition or even contestability of the market. There was one purchasing authority, the province, 
and only a third of towns visited had any potential competition in the form of more than one private 
practice which could potentially take on the PDS work. In addition, it was not clear that any of these 
practices would actually have been interested in the work. Williamson's fundamental transformation 
was relevant (Williamson 1985) - once one practice had secured the PDS contract it was likely to 
stay with them until they chose to terminate it; few other practices would remain within the market 
as few towns could support private practices that would both survive without the PDS contract and 
then wish to compete for it when it became available. In addition, geographic barriers to entry and 
exit of the market tended to be high, making the market very segmented. Exacerbating this lack of 
competition was the unpleasant nature of some PDS work, the 24 hour commitment required and the 
perception that being the PDS could damage private practice, in towns where there was t. choice of 
practices for private patients. There was also a degree of human asset specificity involved in who 
knew how to do the work. All these factors decreased potential competition for the contract. The 
difficulty of finding substitutes to deliver such a broad service were extensive, and suggested that the 
sense of mutual dependence which characterised this case study was likely to be a permanent feature. 
Classic mechanisms of contractual control are via specification and monitoring. In the case of the 
PDS, neither of these appeared likely to exercise much influence on their individual behaviour. TLe 
contract design offered a framework to the relationship by setting some parameters, but was not able 
to define its day to day functioning in any detail. The exact specification of duties was vague and 
open to future revision. Risk allocation was broadly clear but the nature of the commitment on both 
sides quite open-ended - the service provider could be called upon to deliver a range of unspecified 
duties in the future, whilst the purchaser faced an open-ended financial commitment. The contract 
was not specified in terms of either inputs or outputs, but more in terms of process and obligation on 
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the part of the service provider. The difficulties of distinguishing this from a general clause contract 
of employment, the legal problem which was at the heart of the court case in the Free State (described 
in chapter 4) was summarised by the presiding judge's summing up of that case: 
"to define the word 'employee' in such a way that it is easy to make the distinction between an 
employee and an independent contractor, or to put it differently, to make a distinction between a 
contract of service and a contract of work is one of the most difficult question which the courts have 
grappled with for decades " (Basson et al 1998) 
Comments by PDS that their contract was out-dated, irrelevant, and `more of a job description than a 
contract' echo this. 
The result of this vague specification was a contract that was open to interpretation by all parties. 
PDS did this as a group and individually. They helped to interpret the contract by passing on to 
colleagues and successors their interpretation of what was expected. Many mentioned that they did 
what they thought was "right" and that they were confident that most PDS delivered roughly the same 
type of service. They emphasised the role of professional discretion and competence in determining 
the nature of service delivery under the contract. For individual practices, there was an overall sense 
of contract definition as "do it yourself'. For example, different interpretations made of the contract 
document included, in the Eastern Cape, one practice using nurses to screen their patients, another 
by-passing the requirement that patients be referred by the clinic, whilst other PDS continued to see 
only referred patients. PDS tended to describe their contract with the emphasis on "their"- 
emphasising that it was a relationship framed by whatever deals they had struck with the province 
and using the original written document more as a starting point. 
Another external influence making the contract open to interpretation was the fragmented nature of 
service provision, making the definition of services to be delivered context-specific in the extreme 
and varying from town to town. Here, the role of history and weak capacity meant that the contract 
was not only open to interpretation, but virtually required it. Whilst this situation was very context 
specific, it may highlight what could be perennial problems in specifying contracts for primary health 
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care on any basis other than a block grant - for primary care services, what services need to be 
delivered, in what quantity or to whom, are all problematic to specify in any detail. Contracting out 
one specific service also highlights the difficulties of separating out areas of responsibility between 
public and private sectors. PDS still rely on the public health infrastructure for their referral 
networks, public sector drugs and other services such as ambulances. They cannot operate 
independently of these services and their ability to deliver an adequate PDS service is dependent on 
other parts of the public sector. This is likely to be a relevant problem for many examples of 
selective contracting out of primary care services by the public sector. 
The second obvious method of contractual control, monitoring, was also beset with difficulties and 
highlighted the influence of many of the factors shown in figure 9.1. The nature of the service, lack 
of choice of provider and the weak capacity of the purchaser all combined to make monitoring 
difficult and its value questionable. Monitoring in both provinces was restricted to a very basic form. 
In the Western Cape, treater financial and administrative capacity was demonstrated by a more 
comprehensive monitoring system via a computer programme, but neither province made any attempt 
to monitor the quality or appropriateness of care delivered and even basic financial monitoring was 
acknowledged to be patchy, particularly in the Eastern Cape. Again, many of these problems are 
likely to be of relevance elsewhere, although to what degree the weak monitoring of PDS was 
attributable to poor capacity combined with the problematic nature of the service, and to what degree 
to the province simply perceiving it as not a high priority, is not possible to say. Whatever the cause, 
PDS did not seem to perceive mi nitoring as a control on their behaviour, beyond perhaps the distant 
threat of being investigated for fraud. Monitoring was not acting as any form of realistic control on 
the actions of the PDS. 
Explanations offered for why monitoring was so weak also reflect on the broader nature of the 
contractual relationship. In the Eastern Cape, PDS complained that the lack of monitoring was a 
problem of the province not bothering to do their job and in some cases preferring to believe that the 
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PDS were not honest than bother to check up on what they were actually doing. This negative view 
of the province was particular to the Eastern Cape, and accompanied by a feeling that they were out 
of touch and unconcerned with what was happening in the areas where PDS were working. In the 
Western Cape PDS had a more positive relationship with the provincial purchaser and although they 
also saw the province as relatively unconcerned to monitor them, they put this down to the province 
feeling confident to leave these issues up to their professional discretion. 
The inadequate control of PDS service delivery exercised by contract design and monitoring leads to 
the question of what other mechanisms were controlling the interaction between purchaser and 
provider in this contract, as well as the behaviour of PDS in their practices. Three sets of 
explanations of more informal controlling mechanisms arose in the case study; dependence, 
individual motivation and trust. Each of these is briefly discussed in turn. 
After examining external factors and contract design and monitoring, an explanation is still necessary 
for why PDS continued to co-operate in a system by which they often felt mistreated, and equally 
why the province did not terminate a system that many of them appeared openly to resent. For most 
practices, the question of whether to compete for the PDS contract was either an answer of "must 
have/ must do" or "don't want". A sense on the part of both purchaser and provider that "we don't 
have options" served to lessen the importance of factors such as the completeness of the contract or 
the monitoring function in recognition that the contract must continue in all eventualities. Reasons 
. or this were financial dependence on the part of the PDS and a lack of options to get the service 
delivered for the province. The instances of late payment, non-payment and abrupt, unilateral changes 
to the contract are examples of a form of tolerance or dependence on the side of PDS. The question 
of why PDS continue to render services when they are not paid can be explained by either their 
feeling of obligation to the community or a feeling of fear of confrontation with the province which 
may result in them terminating a contract on which the PDS financially depends. The combination of 
these factors differs from practice to practice and from individual to individual, linked to both their 
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financial situation and their individual approach to their role as PDS. A reluctance to get involvcd in 
legal action even with a valid reason, which has been observed in other studies of contracting 
(Williamson 1985; MacNeil 1974) was also borne out by this case study. PDS did not relish the 
prospect of any confrontation with the province and the explanation for this was a combination of 
needing the income from the PDS work, and recognising that it was work that they would anyway 
have to do. For many PDS, even if the province terminated their contracts, their role as community 
doctor would have to continue in some form or other. On the side of the province the lack of detailed 
specification of breach of contract and the penalties which would be incurred also suggests a 
recognition of the inevitably long term nature of the contractual relationship. 
This is also reflected in descriptions of the contract award process - in most cases there was no 
negotiation of the terms of the contract, and it was usually passed on within a practice or offered 
verbally to another doctor in the town. There was very little sense of a competitive process. For the 
provider there was less at stake if the service they delivered was poor quality because they knew that 
they were the only ones available to supply it and so were unlikely to lose their contract. The 
purchaser equally became resigned to the status quo in recognition of few alternatives to getting the 
service provided. Any value in even the limited degree of monitoring possible may 
have been 
lessened by the lack of realistic penalties available to the purchaser in the absence of an alternative 
provider. In some cases it appeared that the work was taken on reluctantly by the PDS, with the sense 
of not being able to say no. Rather than a competitively awarded contract, the process sometimes 
more resembled the fulfilling of an obligation or duty. 
This link between feelings of obligation and the taking on of the PDS contract introduces the 
important role of the motivation of providers. This is shown as an environmental or external factor in 
figure 9.1, and also as a factor on which contract operation relies. Both external factors and the 
influence of contract design and the incentives which that creates upon motivation must also be 
acknowledged. The data on PDS service delivery presented suggest that PDS responded to the 
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financial incentives created by their contract However, it was also clear from the case study that a 
degree of externally determined motivation for each provider strongly influenced how they worked 
under the conditions of the PDS contract. PDS spoke about their feelings of duty and sense of 
obligation as a doctor to treat all members of their local community and also about their concern to 
maintain a decent professional reputation in all of the work that they did. This also meant that they 
were happy to work under a poorly specified contract because they did not view it as the job of the 
provincial purchaser to tell them how to practice medicine. It is feasible that the sense of obligation 
or inability to refuse treatment to community members of some doctors was exploited by the 
provincial purchaser - some PDS were seeing patients beyond what they were allowed to charge the 
province for, others viewed the contract as minor compensation for a job that they would have to do 
anyway - another dimension increasing the PDS' resignation to the contractual relationship, no matter 
what form it takes. 
From practice to practice the manner in which PDS approached their role and their patients differed 
quite dramatically, some seeing themselves as fulfilling an important community and social role 
whereas others showed less concern for their role beyond that of delivering a service for which they 
would be paid. Such differences in motivation are probably beyond the control of a purchaser to 
influence via a contract, but remain a key influence on how the PDS contract operated. It was clear 
from comparing the transcripts of FGDs across sites and also from visiting all the practices that some 
PDS simply did a better job than others. Some of the explanation for this lies with them as 
individuals and how they perceive their role as PDS, factors which are socially and individually 
influenced. Potentially this is the most profound effect on the quality of the services delivered under 
the contract. It is also extremely difficult to assess in any meaningful way, especially prior to 
someone taking on the role of the PDS. Further, the likely outcome of interaction of an individual 
I'DS' existing personal motivation for his work with the incentives created by a specific contract is 
very difficult to judge. 
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In some cases, trust also acted as a substitute for the more formal contractual mechanisms of design 
and monitoring between the contracting parties. However it did not appear that trust was universal 
and a discussion of its role must acknowledge that, for this contract, the whole atmosphere between 
purchaser and provider was permeated with uncertainty regarding the future and the acceptance that 
many instances of fraud had taken place. Where there was trust between PDS and provider, 
interpersonal trust and competence trust were the most relevant categories to describe it. Trust 
between purchaser and provider appeared stronger in the Western Cape, suggesting that it benefited 
from situations where there was greater identification between parties to the contract and where 
monitoring could act as a complement to trust. In the Eastern Cape there was an assumption on the 
part of some provincial officials that all PDS were almost by definition cheats, and this could not be 
altered due to their inability to do even basic financial monitoring adequately. Trust and capacity to 
monitor therefore appear to have been positively correlated. 
Competence trust, or trust in the professional standards of PDS, appeared to underlie the operation of 
the PDS contract in all cases. Whilst the province may have had doubts about the financial probity of 
some of their PDS , few doubts were expressed about the technical quality of the services that 
they 
provided, although one manager did raise the issue of racism, suggesting that other aspects of care 
may be poor. In contrast, interpersonal trust was not always present between purchaser and provider 
and was most notably absent again in the Eastern Cape. 
Mishra's definition of trust (1996) is useful as one approach to analysing the nature of trust in the 
PDS contract: 
"one party's willingness to be vulnerable to another party based on the belief that the latter party is 
a)competent b) open c) concerned and d)reliable. Last, trust is voluntary... ". 
To use these categories to classify the situation between purchaser and PDS is quite illuminating. 
Both provinces appeared to rely on their PDS to be competent and reliable, but views on their degree 
of openness (taken here as honestness) and concern were formed about each individual and were not 
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always favourable. What the PDS felt about the province was even more negative, in particular in the 
Eastern Cape, where there was little evidence that they felt that the province fulfilled any of the 
above categories. Last, the criteria of voluntariness of trust was not always met as is very obvious 
from comments like "we have to trust them, we have no choice ". Puffit's (1998) continuum of trust 
to distrust, via hope and indifference, may be more useful to capture the essence of the PDS 
contractual relationship- whilst instances of unmitigated trust and distrust were present, what was 
more common was a mixture of hope and indifference in the dealings between PDS and province. 
Overall the findings from this case study did not confirm that trust automatically underlies complex 
contracting for public services. The weakness of many of the other determining factors for the 
relationship resulted in a situation that was often too antagonistic and uncertain for trust to perform 
any important function, with the exception of competence trust, which even in the "low trust" 
environment presented in this case, appeared to underlie the PDS contract. It was the need for shared 
beliefs and values to underlie much interpersonal trust, and the role played by history and context in 
providing these, that appeared to be where the PDS contract often failed. The prevailing climate of 
suspicion and uncertainty created by some PDS' fraudulent behaviour, recent changes in the 
government and the current government's less sympathetic attitude both to the private sector in 
general and to the PDS system in particular prevented trust from playing any major role in explaining 
how the PDS contract operated. Whilst this does not disprove the potential value of trust in 
contracting, it does show that to call upon trust as an explanation for all incomplete contracts is not 
accurate. 
Dependence and the individual motivations of PDS therefore emerge as strong residual explanatory 
factors for this case study. The concept of relational contracting is partially based in a recognition of 
the many situations in which dependence between purchaser and provider is important, but the 
example of this case is perhaps quite extreme. Once the incomplete contract, the poor monitoring , 
the partial trust, and the generally poor state of the contractual relationship is considered, there 
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remained a sense of HAVING to continue with this relationship and make it work because there was 
little choice. There was also a recognition that this dependence extended beyond just the PDS 
contract even if this terminated - the situation of bilateral monopoly/dependence between private and 
public sector in many rural towns would remain. Combined with a sense of having little control over 
the contractual relationship, dependence led to a reliance on the motivation of each PDS to do a 
reasonable job. These two factors interact - dependence can only develop in a system which 
does 
function in some form, and this is often a reflection of the individual motivation of the PDS. 
In conclusion, despite the incomplete nature of the written PDS contract and the unsatisfactory nature 
of the monitoring, a consideration of the nature of other controlling factors in the contractual 
relationship makes its functioning more understandable. These less formal but nonetheless important 
controlling factors need to be understood as defined by the particular circumstances and context of 
the contract. 
The Lesotho case 
The second case study contrasts with the PDS situation in a number of ways but most importantly it 
gives an example of what may be the effect of access to greater capacity on the nature of contracting 
for primary care services. The Lesotho contract was still in a remote rural setting but did not face the 
same shortage of management capacity as in the PDS case. Other differences with the PDS case are 
that instead of being with a series of individual self-employed providers, this contract was with a 
single commercial company, so the individuals delivering care were sui. ject to a system of 
hierarchical management and less immediately exposed to the incentives of the contract. Second, it 
was a contract with much less history or context to it. Third, the delivery of services under the 
contract was not a key activity or source of vital income for purchaser or provider companies, so the 
nature of dependence was less, or different. As with the PDS, this case study is again in a rather 
unique set of circumstances; although it is much less influenced by previous history, context still 
plays a large part. However, despite these differences, although proceedings were generally more 
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formal and paid more attention to the written contract, some findings were remarkably reminiscent of 
those from the PDS. 
There were some similarities in environmental factors with the PDS study, such as the problems of 
defining the nature of service delivery within the parameters of a public sector system and the lack of 
competition in the market. It was interesting that despite there being no historical ground to it, as 
there was in South Africa, the same tendency to separate curative and preventive services between 
the contracted and public sector clinics was noticeable. The second similar factor, lack of 
competition for the contract, was due to both the remote setting in which service delivery was taking 
place and the quite technical nature of the services contained within the whole contract (e. g. 24 hour 
doctor cover and emergency evacuation facilities). 
In contrast, the capacity situation for the Lesotho contract was quite different from the problems 
described in the South African public sector. With the well-resourced LIIDA acting as purchaser, 
and backed up by a firm of consulting engineers, there was plenty of expertise in writing contracts. 
The motivation of the provider was also different in that it was expressed purely in terms of profit 
seeking, and there was little connection or feeling of obligation between any of the contractors and 
the community that they were required to serve. 
The outcomes of this set of factors can be considered in turn. First the form of the contract was quite 
dramatically different from the PDS, and it is interesting to note how one of its clauses specifically 
emphasised that it was meant to encompass all relevant aspects of the contractual relationship and 
that resort to any other agreement outside of the contract was incorrect. Following this explicit 
attempt to be complete, the contract design focused heavily on inputs and specified these in great 
detail. Attempts were also made to specify the form of monitoring and possible breaches to the 
contract and ensuing penalties in complete detail, but some of these parts of the contract began to 
reflect the problems associated with trying to specify such issues in complete contractual terms. For 
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instance, monitoring via reports was specified in great detail but not in particularly practical or 
relevant terms, and there was still no attempt to tackle the issue of monitoring quality of care or the 
nature of service delivery by visiting the facility or by other potentially more effective means. 
Furthermore, despite the greater detail of the contract design, it still remained incomplete. Comments 
about this resembled the PDS case. Frustration was expressed by the purchaser about the problems 
of getting the provider to do what they wanted, such as deliver comprehensive primary care services, 
despite the fact that they felt it was clearly specified in the contract. Building on the PDS case which 
suggested the difficulty of specifying contracts for primary care generally, this suggests that any 
attempt at such specification, no matter how detailed, was still open to interpretation by those who 
deliver services. The same issue of poor control of providers and having to some extent to rely on 
their own motivation and determination of the meaning of the contract was raised as with the PDS 
contract. The central problem of the principal-agent relationship and its link to motivation was 
expressed by one Lesotho purchaser: 
"you can tell someone else to do something and they will still say yes they are doing it, but they need 
to believe in it very enthusiastically and to understand what has to be done": 
Monitoring the Lesotho contract was also problematic. Again, given the relatively greater capacity 
available compared to the PDS case, this suggests that the logistical and information problems 
inherent in monitoring primary care delivery in scattered or remote areas are not purely due to lack of 
capacity. Again in this case the purchaser resorted to reliance on the surrounding community to 
report any n: ljor problems with service delivery, although here because of the stronger nature of the 
community groups in this area and established channels for complaint, this was likely to be more 
effective. Overall, the greater level of capacity within this contract was only noticeable in minor 
ways, such as there having been no difficulties related to late or inaccurate payment of the contract. 
The level of transaction costs was also likely to have been raised by these additional "layers" of 
management expertise. 
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The incentives in the Lesotho contract were to supply all the inputs specified and maximise the value 
of drugs prescribed. The data on service delivery suggest that the provider was responding to these 
incentives, although again it is difficult to separate this out from the other potential influences, such 
as the higher standard of service delivery that the provider was accustomed to due to their largely 
private sector work. 
Overall this second contractual relationship had made a greater effort to lay out and abide by formal 
contractual mechanisms of specification and monitoring and there was a general sense of needing to 
pay attention to the written contract ("we maust live within the contract, breach of contract is 
terrible"). Nevertheless, the reality of the contract's functioning as described in the interviews still 
suggested a reliance on interpersonal relations and a recognition that both monitoring and 
specification of the contract were unsatisfactory. For instance, whilst changes to the contract were 
approached in a more formal, negotiated manner it was acknowledged that it was often a by-passing 
of the formal routes and a conversation between two individuals who knew each other socially that 
would clinch an agreement or smooth a dispute. One interviewee spoke of the tendency to lift the 
phone and then formalise the agreement contractually later, and also of the tendency not to follow the 
strict hierarchy of communication between the different parties to the contract as they were laid out" 
In conclusion, in this still incompletely specified and monitored contract, the role of other factors in 
controlling the behaviour of the contracting parties remained important and the role of trust and 
dependence in particular were acknowledged by both purchaser and provider. Here the nature of the 
relationship between purchaser and provider was less antagonistic and perhaps this made the 
potential role of trust correspondingly greater. The individual motivation of providers was lessened 
as a mechanism for determining their behaviour because the provider was a company and therefore 
hierarchical mechanisms also came into play to determine how service providers behaved (although 
;s that the sub-contractor, medical services should only communicate with the engineering contractor who would then 
communicate on their behalf with the consulting engineer and LH DA. 
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these mechanisms were stressed by the managing director of the contractor to rely on "personnel" 
rather than "systems"). 
The private capitated scheme 
The third case study was of contracting for primary care services entirely within the private sector. 
This is a weakness of the case, but overriden by the interesting addition of examining what the 
private sector can do to bring a different perspective to the study. Other strengths of the case were 
that it was not related to such a unique set of historical or geographical circumstances as either of the 
previous two case studies and that it was highly repeatable in many urban contexts (although whether 
this is true within the public sector is discussed further below). It was also highly relevant to the 
current dynamic of the health sector in South Africa which is seeing an increasing move towards low 
cost, privately provided primary care services, delivered by providers with whom the public sector 
could potentially contract in the future. 
In design, this case study differed slightly from the preceding two in that it lacked the same detailed 
interviews with individual purchasers and providers under the contract. This was because due to the 
more segmented nature of the market in which this contract was functioning and the greater number 
of institutional purchasers, there was not an equivalent single, large scale purchaser to be interviewed 
or provider facilities functioning under one single contract. Also, both purchasers and providers had 
less to say about the dynamics of the contractual relationship. In the case of providers this was 
because they did not differentiate between patients that they saw covered by this contract and those 
who were paying cash or who had other forms of health insurance. Less of the case study therefore 
came from interview data and more from document review and objective assessment of some external 
factors, reflecting the different, more self contained nature of the contractual relationship. 
In terms of the environmental factors described for the other case studies, this case had several 
considerable differences. First, with regard to the nature of the service, because of the way that the 
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provider was organised and managed, there was a very standardised service on offer, overseen by 
close internal management and monitoring, which made it very straightforward to specify in the 
contract. Also, because this contract was not involved in delivering services to public sector patients, 
there was no issue of how it would interact with existing public sector services. It was also possible 
to exactly define the population that were to be covered by the contract, which had implications for 
the payment mechanisms that could be used. The nature of the market for this contract was also 
profoundly different from the prior case studies, and resembled much more closely the market of neo- 
classical theory. First there were multiple purchasing organisations and even within these, each 
individual made their own decision whether to continue to subscribe to this package of health cover 
or not. Second there were a number of competing providers who could remain in the market because 
each contract was far smaller, making Williamson's (1985) fundamental transformation less relevant 
than for the previous two case studies. Basically the structure of competition and the market in this 
case study illuminate how far removed from a real market the other two case studies were. In this 
case there was a genuine choice of whether to remain in or exit from the contractual relationship. 
The option of changing provider was realistic, and the provider would not lose his livelihood if this 
took place. This situation of low dependence was further increased by the low asset specificity of the 
contractor clinics, largely because they were located in urban areas where there were multiple 
alternative uses for both their human and capital assets. 
Overall, the picture that then arises from this final case study is of a completely different nature of 
contractual relationship. Whilst tLis private capitated scheme's written contract was perhaps the 
simplest in its form and the shortest, it appeared to become the most comprehensive by virtue of the 
external factors described above. In particular the following factors created the correct environment 
for a contract less reliant on other controlling mechanisms -a well defined, comprehensive service, a 
defined population, and a payment mechanism which did not create any perverse incentives. The use 
of a capitation payment mechanism relied on having a defined population and being within a 
competitive market so that the risk of under-servicing was balanced out by the ability of patients to 
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exit from the contract and go elsewhere, as well as the risk to the provider of having to pay for 
specialist referrals. 
The second formal control mechanism, monitoring, also took a different form. First, the chain of 
clinics had in place strong, standardised internal systems of quality assurance and monitoring which 
constituted one type of control on service delivery. Second, the opportunity for each individual to opt 
in or out of subscribing to the private capitated scheme meant that the role of the individual in 
monitoring the acceptability of the service was greatly strengthened. 
The result was a contract that, unlike the previous two case studies, was free of reliance on 
interpersonal relations or interpretation for its functioning. Minimising the need for interpretation 
was reliance on a contract design that first, eliminated the incentive to over-service patients and 
guarded against under servicing by means of sharing risk with providers at higher levels of care and 
second, that was linked to a clearly specified, comprehensive package of services. Monitoring of the 
quality of service provision was carried out by internal control procedures of the provider and 
underpinned by the greater power of each individual consumer in judging whether the quality of the 
service was acceptable. 
The main question raised by this final case study is to what extent any of these observed 
characteristics could be replicated in other settings. In particular, the replicability of these conditions 
with a public sector purchaser is debatable; defining the population to be covered, achieving realistic 
competition within a market with a public sector purchaser, and relying on consumers to monitor 
services may all be problematic. A further difference is that if the state purchases on behalf of state 
patients, principal agent problems become relevant (with patient as principal and the state the agent) 
and patients no longer have the power to use the exit option at their discretion, taking their funding 
with them, which weakens many of the incentives in this contract design. 
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KEY OVERALL FINDINGS FROM THE CASE STUDIES 
The three case studies presented all demonstrate that contracts for primary care services were 
unlikely to be written in a complete way and that formal monitoring of such services was also likely 
to be incomplete. As suggested by some of the literature reviewed in chapter 2, operation of primary 
care contracts is better understood by looking at the circumstances and external factors which 
surround them and the more informal contractual controls that these circumstances gave rise to. For 
instance, in the PDS case, limited competition (arising from the external nature of the market) gave 
rise to dependence, and for the private capitated scheme, a favourable external context (competitive 
market, defined population, good internal management) allowed a simple contract to operate with few 
external controls. 
The Lesotho contract appears to sit somewhere between the two, with an attempt at a completely 
specified contract which falls short of success and relies to some extent on relational factors. Despite 
this range of contractual outcomes, a comparison of the case studies illuminat: s several features 
likely to have relevance for primary care contracts elsewhere. Some of these features are presented 
in figure 9.1. Below, the role of the formal contractual control mechanisms of design and monitoring 
are reviewed followed by a discussion of the importance of external factors and less formal 
contractual controls. Such contractual substitutes or controlling mechanisms act to complete 
contracts that are incompletely specified and monitored and arise from the external conditions of the 
market and the nature of the provider. These two factors combine to determine the type of influences 
shown in the last two columns of table 9.1. 
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With regard to contract design, contracts tended to be incompletely written and specified. 
Whilst Allen (1995) recommended that a contract should deal with inputs, outputs, 
throughputs, outcomes and quality, the contracts examined in this study all tended to focus on 
a list of services to be delivered, or inputs to be provided, alongside a payment mechanism. 
Observations in the literature regarding the difficulties of writing comprehensive contracts 
were clearly demonstrated by both the PDS and Lesotho cases, but perhaps most definitely by 
the Lesotho contract's unsuccessful attempt at completeness, given the ample contract 
writing capacity in LHDA. This contract attempted to specify in some detail issues of breach 
of contract, dispute resolution, and detailed monitoring requirements but whilst these were 
clearly laid out, they appeared of questionable relevance for a health service, especially the 
detailed monitoring requirements. None of the contracts tackled the issue of defining or 
monitoring the quality of services delivered. One aspect of the contract that was however 
clearly influential in all of the case studies was the package of financial incentives which it 
created. To a large extent, the very different nature of service delivery in the three types of 
facility visited was a result of the financial incentives in the contract. 
The case studies also demonstrated how the status of the written contract within the 
contractual relationship could vary. The PDS study gave an example of a contractual 
relationship that operated with some parties not even being in possession of a written 
contract. In Lesotho, there was greater respect for and recourse to the written document but it 
was still acknowledged that agreements were usually made `around' it rather than `through' 
it. Last, the private capitated scheme was an example of a short, succinct contract which 
managed to offer a very fixed set of services in a very specific way with success, largely due 
to the support of a favourable set of external factors. Each can be argued to work within their 
respective settings, demonstrating the importance of considering each of the factors identified 
in this study when designing a contractual system in an LMIC setting. 
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The second type of formal contractual control is monitoring. Again in all cases this was 
found to be problematic largely due to the nature of the service, but weak capacity and 
service delivery in remote areas also served to worsen these problems. The question of 
purchaser's motivation to put adequate monitoring systems in place was also raised. This 
may be due to their recognition of the impossibility of monitoring primary care services, but 
some comments by providers in the PDS case study and also Lesotho suggested that their 
belief was that purchasers simply did not make the effort to put adequate monitoring systems 
in place. This may be a reflection that in both the PDS and Lesotho cases purchasers were 
involved in the contract due to a lack of choice and perhaps this lessened their enthusiasm for 
the task of monitoring. Either way the case studies confirmed that either through lack of 
capacity, lack of will or lack of ability, formal monitoring by the purchaser of services 
delivered did not appear to be a feasible control mechanism. Monitoring by users and by 
peers was consistently raised as a more attractive alternative, although the effectiveness of 
this must also be considered closely. 
The case studies therefore demonstrate the limitations of the formal contractual functions of 
design and monitoring in controlling what takes place under a contract. This was largely due 
to the settings and circumstances in which contracting was taking place. Each setting also 
defined the type of controlling mechanisms that arose to substitute for complete contracts 
and extensive monitoring. 
Informal controls on contracts took a variety of forms. The PDS case demonstrated that the 
historical context of a contract can be very influential, but this is clearly something that will 
differ from case to case in its importance. In contrast, capacity was of great relevance in all 
the case studies. Adequate capacity appeared to be a necessary but not sufficient condition 
for the successful operation of contracts, but the precise nature of its role was difficult to 
assess. On one hand it is tempting to blame a lack of capacity for every gap within a 
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contracting relationship that falls short of the classical contracting model. But much in the 
case studies suggested that this may be an oversimplification. In Lesotho there was 
considerable expertise and financial capacity and yet there were still problems in the 
specifying and monitoring of the contract, suggesting some more fundamental problems in 
the asymmetries of information inherent in a service like primary care. On the other hand it 
was interesting that the private capitated scheme functioned with very little need for capacity 
to specify or monitor contracts so it is also possible for some contractual relationships to be 
self enforcing, or reliant on other systems of control such as a competitive market, a well- 
defined, influential beneficiary population and strong systems of internal management. 
These too can be included in the broadest definition of capacity (Bennett and Mills 1998). 
Another key aspect arising from a contract's setting was the degree of market competition. 
This appeared to be influenced by geographical setting - e. g. rural areas lacked competitive 
markets, and by the nature of the purchaser- e. g. a publicly purchised service reduces the 
competitiveness of any market. A comparison between the nature of the market in the 
private capitated scheme case study and the other two studies demonstrated this second point. 
By their nature, publicly purchased services will tend to be purchased in large blocks and by 
one purchaser. Because they are purchased in large blocks this will tend to also concentrate 
the provider market, as those who are not successful in winning the contract will have spare 
capacity (that which they would have used to provide the large block of services) and so have 
to either scale down or leave the market. This implies an inherent tendcicy to bilateral 
monopoly. The nature of the market that arises when there are many potential purchasers and 
providers is quite different. This has clear implications for public sector organisations 
wishing to contract out services in rural settings. 
The last set of important external factors is related to the nature of the provider with whom 
the contract is made, with the key difference being whether it is an individual or a company, 
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and then in turn the controls upon the behaviour of each of these. From these case studies it 
appeared that the motivation of individual providers was both an important determinant of 
contractual behaviour and quite variable. Case studies gave a sense of the different controls 
on the behaviour of individual GPs and for profit companies. One common factor was their 
response to financial incentives, suggested by the service delivery data in chapters 7 and 8. 
Beyond this, the divergent nature of an individual GP's motivation from that of a health care 
provider working within a for-profit company highlights some interesting differences in the 
way in which either can be controlled by a contractual mechanism. In addition to the social, 
financial and professional factors which go to determine an individual GP's professional 
behaviour, a service provider working in a company may face a second set of internal, 
hierarchical controls on his practice. This adds a further potential layer of control, and 
simultaneously lessens the importance of motivating factors more specific to the individual. 
A basic degree of trust underlay all the contracts studied, as it probably does all transactions. 
Beyond this, quite different degrees and types of trust characterised each set of 
purchaser/provider relationships reviewed in the case studies. Purchasers most commonly 
had competence trust in the providers, whilst certainly in the PDS case the providers did not 
necessarily have the same confidence in the abilities of the purchaser. In many cases of the 
PDS contract and within the Lesotho contract there was also evidence of interpersonal trust. 
But other potential components of trust were often missing; for instance in the PDS contract, 
trust that each party would be open and hon.. st. Some type of competence trust even seemed 
able to co-exist with considerable suspicion on both sides. The fact that there were greater 
expressions of trust in situations where there was more contact between contracting parties 
suggests that contract, trust and monitoring act not as alternatives but complements. The 
nature of trust in the private capitated scheme was highly impersonal and did not appear to be 
an important mechanism between the contracting parties. 
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CONCLUSION 
This chapter has discussed the findings from the three case studies examined by this research, 
as well as some of the shortcomings of the data available. Each contract was found to be 
very different in its setting, form and operation but looking at a combination of all of the case 
studies it is possible to shed light on some factors which are likely to be key for any 
contractual relationship in an LMIC. First, contract design and monitoring are both likely to 
be only partial controls on the operation of the contract. This means that in many cases 
penalties and sanctions may be ineffective in influencing providers' behaviour. Incentives 
may have better results, but only in situations where they are also not reliant on any formal 
monitoring for their operation. It also means that informal contractual controls such as trust, 
dependence and the motivation of individuals will be important, as will any hierarchical 
control within an organisation if the provider is a company rather than an individual. From 
the examples of these case studies, capacity, the competitiveness of the market (setting and 
nature of purchaser) and the nature of the provider are all highlighted as factors which will 
define the nature of such informal controls. 
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CIIAPTER 10: CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
This study has sought to describe the nature of three contractual relationships in Southern Africa in 
order to shed light on what different forms contracts for primary care services can take according to 
the various contexts in which they are set. It has also considered different controls on the behaviour 
of purchasers and providers under these different contractual forms. It aimed to start to redress the 
dearth of empirical data on the nature of contracts for primary care services and how they are 
operating in LMICs. This chapter will summarise conclusions both about the nature of each 
individual contract and what can potentially be generalised from these findings to policy on 
contracting in LMICs more broadly. For the latter, it is necessary to consider how findings useful to 
policy-makers can be generated from the case study approach adopted in the study. Via the 
framework of factors employed throughout the study, a series of conclusions and policy 
recommendations are made and the contribution that this study has made to knowledge about 
contracts for primary care in LMICs summarised. This addresses the final objective of the study 
by 
making recommendations on how policy-makers in South Africa and elsewhere could 
best approach a 
policy of contracting with the private sector, and what is likely to be appropriate for different types of 
service and different types of provider. Finally, suggestions are made for future research in this area. 
SUMMARY OF RESULTS CHAPTERS AND KEY FINDINGS 
The three contracts described in this study suggest that contracts for essentially similar primary level 
services do not conform to a pattern either in their design or in the manner of their operation. In 
particular the three contracts examined had very little in common in their contract design. To 
understand each contract it was necessary to examine a range of factors including their environmental 
context, the individuals involved (and whether the provider was an individual or a commercial 
company), the history of the contract and the nature of the service being contracted. In line with the 
objectives of study, the results chapters of this thesis have reported on a range of these factors for the 
three contracts. 
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In chapter 4, historical and policy context for each of the contracts was described. The PDS contract 
was heavily influenced by the history and current reform of the South African health sector. The 
other contracts carried less of a historical legacy. 
Chapters 5-7 then presented the PDS case study. Chapter 5 explored the environmental and Human 
factors potentially influencing the operation of the PDS contract. The market for PDS services 
resembled a bilateral monopoly with very little effective competition. Interaction between the PDS 
and existing public sector services made the nature of the service to be delivered highly context 
specific and therefore difficult to specify in a generally used contract. PDS described their 
motivations for being involved in contracting to the public sector as both financial and through a 
feeling of obligation to the community in which they lived. Both chapters 4 and 5 demonstrated the 
weakness of current provincial government capacity in South Africa to write and manage contracts. 
Chapter 6 described the PDS contract design and award process. The contract was not specified in 
detail, and was in many respects incomplete, simply distributing financial risk to the purchaser in 
return for an open-ended service delivery commitment by the provider. The contract award process 
showed few signs of any competition in the range of cases studied. Chapter 7 sought to describe the 
manner in which this incomplete contract operated and what mechanisms were used to complete it. 
PDS respond in a way consistent with the financial incentives in the contract whilst on the side of the 
purchaser monitoring was problematic and payment often incomplete or late. It was concluded that 
the contract's operation was dependent to a limited degree on trust between purchaser and provider 
and relied heavily on a situation of mutual dependence and the individual motivation or obligation of 
the PDS to ensure its continued functioning. 
Chapter 8 presented two briefer case studies of a contract in Lesotho and a private capitated scheme. 
The Lesotho contract, whilst being specified in greater detail and drawing on a higher level of 
capacity, appeared to resemble the PDS contract in the manner in which it still relied upon relational 
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factors to determine its operation. The private capitated scheme contract demonstrated a more 
impersonal contractual process, benefiting from a competitive market, a defined beneficiary 
population and a more comprehensive service to be delivered. 
CONCLUSIONS 
Conclusion that can be drawn from this study fall into two groups. First, substantive conclusions can 
be made about each of the three contracts which were the subject of the case studies. For each case, 
the nature of the contractual relationship and what the influences upon this were likely to have been 
can be described in definite terms. Second, theoretical conclusions can be drawn about what the 
three case studies reveal about the nature of contracts for primary care services more generally. This 
second set of conclusions are of greater interest to a wider audience of policy-makers, but their nature 
is more tentative. They focus on the possible nature and role of a range of factors identified to be 
influential in contractual relationships, rather than on general conclusions about contractual 
relationships per se. 
SUBSTANTIVE CONCLUSIONS ON TIIE THREE CASE STUDY CONTRACTS 
Conclusions on the PDS contract 
The nature of the PDS contract reflects the uncompetitive nature of the market in which it is 
delivered and the subsequent high degree of dependency between purchaser and provider. It 
conformed closely to MacNeil's model of a relational contract and demonstrated a marginal role 
played by the written contract in determining the conduct of the overall contractual relationship. The 
nature of the contract's operation appeared more determined by environmental factors in each town 
such as its health care delivery requirements and the nature of the individual PDS. Demand for the 
services of a PDS is difficult to predict and specify contractually and purchaser capacity to do this 
was weak in both provinces, but dramatically so in the Eastern Cape. Reflecting this weak capacity, 
the contract itself was incomplete and out of date, and many PDS were operating either without a 
copy of it, or not knowing where their copy was. 
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In both provinces monitoring was acknowledged as an inadequate check on the activities of PDS; this 
was blamed partly on lack of capacity but also on the inherent difficulties of monitoring scattered 
PHC service delivery. To a large extent PDS were left to determine individually the manner in which 
they would deliver services under the contract - and this decision was both socially and financially 
influenced. Aside from financial motivation, influences included what other colleagues did, 
professional standards, a feeling of obligation to the community to provide basic care to all and the 
wish to preserve a reputation as a good doctor in "their" town. Greater capacity to monitor and 
maintain regular communication acted as a positive reinforcement to the contractual relationship in 
the Western Cape but overall the contractual relationship was strained and distrustful - appearing to 
continue as a result of mutual recognition of dependence. 
Conclusions on the Lesotho contract 
The Lesotho contract exhibited both similarities and differences with the PDS case. Despite a greater 
attempt at detailed contract specification, the operation of the contract was again largely relational, 
influenced by a remote, uncompetitive market and the close proximity of purchaser and provider. 
The same problems of specifying the service adequately and how it integrated with public sector 
supplied services were encountered as with the PDS contract. High levels of capacity to manage and 
write contracts were available, but did not appear to solve the problems of monitoring and defining 
the contract exhibited in the PDS case study. 
The design of the contract concentrated on a comprehensive specification of inputs, but despite this, 
in the opinion of the purchasers, it failed to obtain the type of comprehensive service delivery 
desired. Monitoring was still problematic and the nature of service delivery again largely defined by 
what the provider was willing to do. Responding to the incentives of the contract design, service 
delivery was both high quality and high cost. As the contract was with a commercial company rather 
than a series of individuals, the role of each individual in interpreting the contract was lessened, with 
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clearer resort to hierarchical mechanisms in governing service delivery. Both purchaser and provider 
acknowledged the role of dependence and trust in determining the nature of the contractual 
relationship. 
Conclusions on the private capitated scheme contract 
The environmental context of the private capitated scheme was a dramatic contrast from the other 
two case studies. By being within the private sector and in an urban setting, the nature of the market 
was highly competitive. The nature of the service on offer under contract was also more easily 
specified as there was no necessary overlap with public sector services and contracts could be 
specified as covering all services on offer at any clinic which was part of the company. The nature of 
services delivered was therefore more resembling a comprehensive primary care service than in the 
case of the other two contracts. The more voluntary nature of each individual's entry into the 
contract also had some interesting consequences. First it was possible to define the population to be 
covered, which allowed for the use of a capitation payment mechanism. In conjunction with 
capitation, the contract design made the provider partially bear the risk of expensive referrals. This is 
likely to have increased attention to the preventive aspects of care. Second, incentives were stronger 
to ensure that the quality of care was acceptable to consumers, as they were effectively purchasers as 
well. Third, the opinion of users was the principal external monitoring mechanism used by this 
contract, reducing the problems of trying to monitor delivery of such a complex service by other 
means. The provider's strong hierarchical management controls acted as a second key mechanism of 
control. 
The private capitated scheme contract therefore represented a departure from the more relational 
contracts of the PDS and Lesotho models. Key differences which contributed to this are a 
competitive market (providing a feasible exit option), a defined population (allowing the use of 
capitation payment) and the use of alternative monitoring mechanisms rather then the purchaser 
attempting to monitor service delivery itself. 
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110W CAN CONCLUSIONS FROM THE CASE STUDIES BE GENF: R. I, IsF: D? 
As well as conclusions specific to their own operation, the three case studies can offer findings inure 
broadly generalisable to contracting in an LMIC environment. However, given the debate about the 
use of case-studies to generate generalisable findings, it is desirable to describe the mechanism by 
which they are suggested in this study. This analysis draws on the type of approach suggested by 
authors such as Mitchell (1983) and Yin (1994) of a line of generalisation from specific findings back 
to some theoretical framework. Some of the factors which have been used as an analytical tool 
throughout this study are the level to which generalisation is sought. Rather than trying to predict the 
nature of any type of contractual relationship, conclusions drawn below relate to the possible 
characteristics of each factor influencing the nature of a contract's operation. This can provide a 
framework by which the essential characteristics of any contractual relationship, potential or real, can 
be analysed. The factors about which conclusions are drawn are shown in table 10.1. The aim of the 
conclusions drawn by this study is to suggest possibilities relevant to a range of contractual situations 
rather than dictate any particular set of findings or action. 
Table 10.1 : Factors for which generalisable conclusions may be drawn 
Category Factor (example) 
Environmental context Nature of market; Nature of ser% ice; Capacity 
Human and organisational context (Individual motivation; Hierarchical control) 
Formal contract controlling mechanisms Contract design; Monitoring 
Informal contract controlling mechanisms Contractual substitutes/relational mechanisms (e. g. 
trust, dependence, individual motivation, and 
hierarchical control). 
A second issue of generalisability is to what extent the conditions and context in which contracts in 
this study were operating can be argued to shed useful light on what may he the case in other I, MICs. 
Whilst classified as an LMIC, South Africa is relatively affluent in comparison to most LMICs, 
certainly in Africa. The setting of this study is probably most directly comparable to middle income 
countries in Asia and Latin America. Whilst it is not possible to predict what the nature of each 
factor will be in different settings, the resources employed in the South African health sector are 
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generous, implying that in other low income settings problems of low capacity will be exacerbated 
and in some areas markets of providers may be even less competitive or non-existent due to a lack of 
human resources. It should also be recognised that in other countries, the dynamic between public 
and private sectors may be quite different, altering what was recognised as an important contextual 
factor in the South African setting. 
CONCLUSIONS PER FACTOR 
Factors which have emerged as important determinants of the nature of the contractual relationships 
studied here are reviewed below, and some conclusions about their broader relevance to LMIC 
contract settings drawn. 
ENVIRONMENTAL CONTEXT 
I. Nature of market 
The case studies all demonstrated that the nature of the market in which contracting took place was a 
key determinant of the nature of the contractual relationship. The competitiveness of the market is 
made up of the number of potential purchasers of a service and the number of potential suppliers. In 
the case of both the Lesotho and PDS cases there was a bilateral monopoly, or a single purchaser and 
usually a single potential supplier. This created a situation of dependence which had a clear impact 
on the working of the contractual relationship. The private capitated scheme contrasted with the 
other two case studies by demonstrating the impact of a competitive market on the way in which a 
contract can function. Here both purchaser and provider were not reliant on one another and 
consequently the nature of the contractual relationship was no longer dependent or particularly 
relational. Other problems in the functioning of contractual relationships were potentially lessened 
by the `exit' option which this competitive market represented. 
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Generalisable conclusions about the nature of the market: 
1) The market in which a contract is let and its degree of competitiveness are key in determining the 
nature of contract that will arise. 
2) Principal determinants of whether a market was competitive that were highlighted by these case 
studies was whether the setting was rural or urban, and the nature of the purchaser. 
3) Rural settings were more likely to have uncompetitive markets due to the smaller size of the 
market which could not support many suppliers. 
4) Public purchasers offering large contracts encouraged market concentration and reduced 
competition. 
II. Nature of service 
Considerable asymmetries of information will exist in any contractual relationship governing the 
delivery of clinical primary care services. This is due to their broad nature and the way in which they 
inter-relate with other parts of the health system, which does not make them easy to specify 
separately in a contract or to monitor. 
In terms of service specification, both the Lesotho and the PDS case study demonstrated similar 
problems. These arose in defining the separation of contracted from public sector services (echoing 
the findings of Broomberg (1997) regarding contracting out hospitals) and in encouraging service 
providers to deliver preventive services. If some form of public sector service exists alongside the 
service that is being contracted out, it is likely to be difficult to specify comprehensively the nature of 
services to be contracted out. This situation is worsened if the contract is to cover a number of 
different clinics and the precise nature of the public/private mix in each clinic area is different. Fiere 
either very detailed contracts would have to be written for each case or a more general clause 
contract, which in some respects is incomplete, will tend to be used. 
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Because primary care services are the first point of contact between a patient and the health service, 
service delivery is always via multiple, scattered sites. The nature of primary care is also that it is 
made up of a broad variety of activities, demand Tor which is unpredictable. Monitoring of a service 
that is delivered in unpredictable quantities, at unpredictable times in a series of scattered locations 
has considerable inherent difficulties. 
Gencralisable conclusions about the nature of the service: 
1) Primary care services are difficult to specify comprehensively in a contract due to the 
unpredictable nature and volume of the services to be delivered 
2) In particular, specifying one part of a primary care package which is to be delivered in tandem 
with other (often public sector) service providers is problematic 
3) Contracts for primary care services will therefore tend to be incomplete 
4) Monitoring of a service of such unpredictable volume and nature which is delivered in many 
cattered locations will also tend to be incomplete. 
III. Capacity 
Capacity on the part of the purchaser to write and monitor contracts adequately is an important 
support for a contract to function adequately. However, given the inherent difficulties in writing 
contracts and monitoring for primary care services described above, the role of adequate capacity 
should not be overestimated. The Lesotho case study gave an example of a situation in which despite 
high levels o; capacity, contract specification and monitoring were both still incomplete, due to these 
asymmetries of information inherent in primary care service delivery. On the other hand, the contrast 
between the Western and Eastern Cape PDS case studies suggests the positive effects of stronger 
capacity in the greater success of the Western Cape PDS relationship. 
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Generalisable conclusions about capacity: 
1) Capacity is an important support to the functioning of contractual relationships, but its existence 
does not solve all problems inherent to their functioning 
2) A minimal level of capacity for the administration and payment of contracts must be in place to 
assure their adequate management 
3) Beyond this minimal level, a further role for capacity appears to be two fold: 
9 Rather than being able to enforce the contract in any way, to execute some monitoring functions 
competently enough that they act as a marginal deterrent 
" To enable the devotion of time and resources to maintaining adequate degrees of communication 
between purchaser and provider. This helps to ensure the continuance of a cordial relationship 
and some mutual understanding of the perspective of each contracting party. 
HUMAN AND ORGANISATIONAL CONTEXT 
The case studies revealed the role of the individual as another extremely important factor, especially 
in the operation of incomplete contracts with individual service providers. Incompletely specified 
contracts with individuals are likely to rely heavily on each individual's personal decisions about 
how 
to deliver care. The PDS case was a good example of this. In the case of contracts with commercial 
companies it is necessary to consider their internal management structure and to what extent these 
control the behaviour of frontline providers. In such a setting, individual motivation will still be 
important but may be less directly affected by the contract and be more affected by the nature of the 
I 
employment contract and hierarchical supervision. The private capitated scheme is a good example 
of a company which had sufficiently strong internal monitoring mechanisms for these to act as a 
control on the behaviour of providers. 
Generalisable conclusions about the hunian/organisational context of contracts: 
1) Behaviour of health care providers is controlled by multiple influences, of which the design of 
the contract is only one 
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2) Whether health care providers are employed by a company, and therefore subject to hierarchical 
control, or self-employed is a further important factor in controlling their behaviour 
3) It is also important to make allowance for the social and historical influences upon individuals 
which will to some extent determine the nature of a contractual relationship 
4) In addition, for individual service providers, motivating factors will include the following - 
" Personal psychology and beliefs e. g. feelings of duty, obligation, attitude to the 
community that they are serving 
0 Professional ethics, and the wish to preserve a good reputation 
0 Financial incentives 
5) For service providers working in a company setting, the hierarchical control mechanisms and 
incentive structures of that company will also be important and will include the following - 
" Method of payment 
" Processes by which quality of service delivery is monitored and controlled internally 
FORMAL CONTRACT CONTROLLING MECHANISMS 
I. Contract design 
Due to the difficulties of designing comprehensive contracts for primary care, the contract document 
itself will always tend to be incomplete. Its operation will be completed by external factors such as 
those highlighted in the case studies, e. g. either by reliance on individual interpretation and 
negotiation as in the case of the PDS or Lesotho case studies, or by a favourable set of external 
factors which allow the contract to operate in a relatively self contained manner, such as for the 
private capitated scheme. In the absence of these favourable factors, even extensive attempts to 
completely specify a contract may backfire and simply result in greater levels of transaction costs. 
However incomplete, each contract will nevertheless still contain important information and create 
incentives. The payment mechanism in particular will create a set of financial incentives to which 
providers are likely to respond. Where sanctions are specified, it is less clear to what extent they will 
270 
influence behaviour, as they may not be perceived to be enforceable or realistic. However, they may 
still act as an important deterrent in some cases. 
Generalisable conclusions about contract design: 
1) Written contracts for primary care services in LMICs are unlikely to provide strong control over 
the behaviour of service providers. Because they will tend to be incomplete, they will also be 
heavily influenced by a range of external factors determining the nature of their operation. 
2) In some circumstances contracts will tend towards what was identified in the literature review as 
a relational contract, but this is determined by the circumstance in which they operate and may 
not automatically be the case. As dependence of the purchaser on one provider increases, the 
operation of the contract is likely to become more relational. This may be more common in 
situations where the purchaser is in the public sector, because of the nature of the market likely 
to develop and their obligation to deliver services under all eventualities. 
3) In circumstances where external factors do not favour a classical type of contract, trying to 
specify a complete contract and monitor it by means of formal reporting mechanisms is unlikely 
to be effective and may simply increase transaction costs. 
4) Given the questionable enforcability of sanctions in many settings, contract design that focuses 
on incentives rather than sanctions may be more effective in controlling the behaviour of 
providers. However, it should be recognised that incentives and sanctions are conceptually very 
similar, a sanction simply being a negative incentive, and it is therefore not incentives per se that 
are desirable, but the move toward a system of incentives that can be relatively `self enforcing' 
in comparison to sanctions. 
In each case the type of incentives which are appropriate and requirements for them to operate 
effectively need to be considered. Financial incentives such as payment for the achievement of 
targets (such as immunisation rates) require monitoring and administrative capacity similar to 
sanctions. These may not be appropriate in a setting where monitoring and capacity are 
acknowledged to be weak. In contrast, the combination of capitation payment and bearing of 
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some risk for the cost of referrals described in the private capitated scheme case is an example of 
a more `self enforcing' package of incentives. Without formal monitoring the contractual 
mechanism offers its own constant incentives, neither to overtreat patients (as this would 
increase costs), nor to undertreat, as patients may chose to leave the system or the cost of 
referrals may increase. Such a set of incentives is successful without recourse to monitoring by 
an external purchaser. Furthermore, non financial incentives may also increase the quality of 
services offered by appealing to other aspects of providers' motivation, and these would also be 
of a more `self enforcing' nature. What form these might take is discussed further under 
recommendations for future research. 
5) Providers of primary care under many types of contract may neglect preventive services, both 
because of the nature of demand for them and because it is difficult to design a payment 
mechanism which encourages providers to give them due attention. Capitation payment offers 
one route to encourage providers to give due attention to preventive as well as curative care, but 
can only be used in circumstances where the population to be covered can be registered and 
subsequently kept track of. 
II. Monitoring 
Monitoring of contracts for primary care is problematic due to the nature of the service, capacity 
problems and the likelihood that contracts will be incompletely specified. All the case study 
contracts in this study were operating with incomplete monitoring. In the PDS and Lesotho cases, 
provision was made for monitoring by the purchaser, largely by reports submitted by the service 
provider but also with the threat of check-ups at the service delivery site. However, in both cases the 
ineffectiveness of this approach was acknowledged. Monitoring by the community, or users, was 
consistently suggested as the most effective form of monitoring likely, although there were also 
varying opinions about the adequacy of this approach. In the case of the PDS and Lesotho contracts, 
such an approach to monitoring was problematic as communication between users and the purchaser 
was not particularly well established and it was doubtful whether consumers were sufficiently 
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empowered to exercise their feelings of dissatisfaction. In all cases, the adequacy of this approach in 
ensuring the delivery of technically good quality care, as opposed to procedurally good quality care, 
must be questioned. 
The varying degrees of capacity in the different case studies appeared to have little impact on solving 
the problem of monitoring, suggesting that sufficient resources may not solve the problem, or that the 
level of resources that would be required is not cost-effective. The cost of monitoring a primary care 
service adequately in terms of personnel, systems and contract enforcement may be too high and of 
too questionable value for any purchaser in a resource poor LMIC setting to be willing to undertake. 
Generalisable conclusions about monitoring: 
1) Formal monitoring of primary care service delivery in an LMIC setting is likely to be beset with 
difficulties, even in situations with adequate capacity, and should not be relied upon as a 
foundation for determining how a contract will operate 
2) Monitoring of rural service delivery is most problematic. Here, patients and community members 
may be in the best position to fulfil an important monitoring function if issues around their 
empowerment and the manner in which they judge services could be addressed 
3) Where the service provider is a company, internal systems of control and quality monitoring may 
provide an important back up to the purchaser's own monitoring efforts. 
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INFORMAL CONTRACT CONTROLLING MECHANISMS 
The section above concluded that contracts for primary care services in LMICs are likely to be 
incompletely controlled by the formal mechanisms of contract design and monitoring. They will 
therefore to some extent rely on other mechanisms (other than contract design and monitoring) to 
determine the manner in which they operate. The case studies reported in this thesis suggest several 
key informal controls on incomplete contracts. 
First, trust was a possible substitute for contract specification and monitoring and to some extent 
must underlie all contractual relationships. From comments in this study, trust appears to be built by 
a shared sense of identity, motivations and beliefs, a positive history and good communication. In 
contrast, feelings of alienation from the other party's identity and beliefs and a lack of 
communication appear to undermine the development of trust. The study found that trust did not 
automatically underlie the operation of all contracts except in a very minimal form; to explain the 
operation of some of the PDS contracts studied by reference to trust would have been blatantly 
incorrect. Competence trust of the purchaser in the provider was common but often the only form of 
trust discernible. Terms such as hope and indifference (Puffitt 1998) may be just as relevant in 
describing what underlies some contractual relationships in LMICs. 
Potentially more relevant in many LMICs, dependence was highlighted as the factor often explaining 
contractual relationships that were not operating to the satisfaction of either party. It arose from a 
combination of poor market competition and the necessity of having certain services 
provided/purchased under an existing arrangement. Dependence could shape the entire nature of the 
contract relationship by reducing the importance of short term events and increasing the importance 
of the continuation of the relationship, exactly what MacNeil described as a 'relational' contract. In 
LMICs especially in rural areas, this is likely to guarantee the continuation of a contract and 
knowledge of this dependence influences all aspects of the behaviour of both contracting parties. 
Demonstrating its strong link to the nature of the market, the likelihood of dependence between 
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purchaser and provider is strongest where there is a single purchaser, such as in the case of the public 
sector contracting out to private providers, and in rural areas where there are few providers. 
Last, controlling mechanisms on the behaviour of providers will also act as informal controls on what 
happens in an incomplete contractual relationship. The lessor the role of the contract, the greater the 
role of an individual's decisions about how to deliver services. Therefore the factors reviewed under 
the human/organisational context heading above are also highly relevant as informal controlling 
mechanisms of contracts. 
Generalisable conclusions about informal contract controlling mechanisms: 
1) Incomplete contracts may rely on informal controls to determine their operation, such as trust and 
dependence between the contracting parties as well as influences on the motivation of individual 
service providers 
2) Trust is not fundamental to the operation of incomplete contracts, and may only be present in 
minimal form in some cases 
3) Dependence, closely related to the nature of the market into which contracts are let, can act as the 
key control on behaviour under a contractual relationship 
4) As the role of formal mechanisms of control such as contract design is lessened in determining 
behaviour under a contract, the influence of individual motivation and internal hierarchical 
controls of the provider are increased. 
SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS 
This research therefore can conclude the following: 
1. The manner in which contracts for primary care operate in LMICs is both complex and highly 
varied. In many cases contracts are likely to be incomplete and relational, with their operation 
largely determined by factors outside of the contract design. Such factors are partly socially 
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determined, partly historical and partly environmental. In order to appreciate the dynamic of 
contracting, such contextual factors must be taken into consideration. 
2. A useful framework of factors for examining the potential influences on an existing or potential 
contractual relationship includes the environmental context (nature of the service to be 
contracted, nature of the market, capacity of the purchaser), the human/organisational context 
(motivation and perceptions of individuals involved in the contract, hierarchical controls upon 
them) formal contractual controls (contract design and monitoring) and informal contractual 
controls (trust, dependence, provider's motivations). 
3. Use of a case study approach such as described in this thesis can generate conclusions about the 
potential nature of this framework of factors in different circumstances. It is not able to draw 
direct conclusions about the nature of any contract beyond the three described in the case studies. 
Care must be taken not to attempt to generalise the specific of these case studies directly to other 
contracts. 
About such factors, this research can conclude the following: 
Formal contractual controls 
4. Contract design for primary care services can adopt different approaches, for instance focusing 
on services to be delivered or inputs to be provided. This may reflect what is known about the 
type of service that is to be delivered or the capacity or training of those specifying the contract. 
Equally a range of payment mechanisms may be adopted. Despite this range of approaches, 
contracts are likely to have two common factors. The first is that primary care contract 
specification is likely to be incomplete. This is due to the nature of services required being too 
broad and unpredictable to make it worthwhile specifying every eventuality in detail. The second 
is that providers will respond to the financial incentives created, whether these be incentives to 
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deliver good quality comprehensive care or less desirable incentives such as those which a fcc for 
service system may create. 
5. Monitoring of service delivery by the purchaser is extremely problematic due to difficult access 
to the site of delivery, shortages of capacity and the asymmetries of information inherent in 
primary care delivery which make even on-site monitoring, were it possible, of questionable 
accuracy. This is especially true in rural, remote settings as may be common in some LMICs. 
The only group in a position to carry out a monitoring function consistently may be the users of 
the service, and consumer monitoring of this type has several potential weaknesses. First 
consumers may not be able to judge the technical quality of the service. Second monitoring by 
users is only effective if they either report problems or are able to leave the provider in the case 
of poor quality. Neither of these actions may be feasible in some cases. A further alternative to 
formal monitoring is trust, but this cannot be relied upon to exist in all eventualities or to be 
created without considerable time and resources devoted to its general ion. 
External factors and informal contractual controls 
6. Adequate capacity is a necessary condition for any policy of contracting to function adequately as 
it acts as a vital support to all the purchaser's roles. It underlies the performance of all functions 
related to purchasing services by contract (contract specification, negotiation, monitoring and 
payment). In most situations in LMICs, capacity is likely to be scarce and this will undermine 
the efficient functioning of contracts. However, capacity should not be seen a3 the answer to all 
contractual problems. Its existence does not guarantee that all of the functions mentioned above 
can be carried out comprehensively. Asymmetries of information inherent in. health care and 
contracts for health care will still make monitoring or specifying primary care service contracts 
problematic. 
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7. The nature of the market into which contracts are introduced is a key determinant of the likely 
nature of the contractual relationship that will result. Both the demand and supply side of the 
market are important. In cases where there is a single purchaser and few potential providers a 
situation of mutual dependence may arise. Such dependence in turn has consequences for the 
way in which all the functions of a contract will operate (see point 9). In cases where the 
purchaser is the public sector, it is common that there will be one purchaser offering large 
contracts to service a relatively high volume of patients. Even if there are several potential 
providers, in areas of LMICs where the demand for private services is limited there is likely to be 
a concentration in the market as unsuccessful bidders leave after the first bidding process. 
Therefore, unless contracts are structured differently, there is an inherent tendency towards 
uncompetitive markets in many areas of public sector contracting in LMICs. This is again likely 
to be particularly true in rural areas. 
8. In markets where it is possible to have multiple purchasers and providers and to define the 
population to be covered by the contract, it is possible to create a system of incentives for the 
provider which are more self enforcing. Capitated payment encourages adequate attention to 
preventive care, as does sharing the cost of referrals to higher levels of care. A choice of 
provider for the consumer goes some way to ensuring that the quality of care delivered is 
acceptable in at least some ways. In combination with some form of hierarchical control of 
technical quality of care this type of system may represent one that is less reliant on close 
monitoring and specification by the purchaser. 
9. The `dependent' form of contracting likely to arise in uncompetitive market settings also has 
profound implications for the manner in which contracts operate. Whilst providers still respond 
to the financial incentives of the contract, penalties, sanctions and monitoring will all take on a 
lesser role in recognition of there being no effective exit from the contractual relationship. 
Formal control over the contract is correspondingly lessened and the role of the informal control 
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of dependence is likely to become dominant. Trust may be present, but it is equally possible that 
the contract simply exists due to lack of alternatives to get the service provided. 
10. Once it is recognised that contracts are likely to be incompletely specified and monitored the 
question of what else is controlling the behaviour of service providers becomes relevant. Not all 
service providers are motivated or controlled in the same way. The identity of the service 
provider with whom a contract is made is therefore a further key determinant of the nature of the 
contract. This study reviewed three different examples - one of individuals operating as 
independent, self-employed professionals, one of a commercial company with on-site 
management and one of a commercial company with extremely strong hierarchical and on-site 
management by both personnel and computer system. If contracts are made with self employed 
individuals, controls on their behaviour are weaker and the purchaser is more reliant on their 
individual motivations to define the quality of services that they will deliver. If contracts are 
m,, tde with hierarchical companies, there may exist considerable internal controls on the quality 
of services provided as an additional check on the behaviour of each individual provider. 
CONTRIBUTION TO THEORY 
What do the above conclusions represent in terms of contribution to the theory outlined in chapter 2? 
First, this study offers a rich set of data about the nature of `real life' contracts for primary care in an 
LMIC, something which so far has been lacking from the debate about their desirability and the form 
that they are lik 1y to take. The data in this thesis do not shed light on the desirability of contracting 
for primary care services in general, but do contribute an insight into the way in which contracts may 
operate in different types of LMIC setting. Factors that are likely to be influential in determining the 
nature of contracts and how they interact with one another have been highlighted. Many are similar 
to those arising from the developed country literature, but their relative importance and consequences 
for contracting may be greater. In particular, as well as being subject to the same problems of 
asymmetries of information and principal-agent relationships as any contract, reservations about 
279 
applying some assumptions from microeconomic theory to markets for health care in LMICs (e. g. 
such as expressed by Clague 1997; Schick 1998) are found to be highly appropriate. 
Literature reviewed in chapter 2 outlined neo-classical and institutional approaches to explaining how 
contracts operate. Findings of these case studies confirm the value of the institutional approach 
which stresses the role of external factors in determining how contracts operate. MacNeil's (1974) 
classification of different types of contracts according to the attributes of the transaction, and his 
assertion that in many settings relational contracts may be the most appropriate approach, provided a 
useful framework for interpreting the results of the case studies. In line with MacNeil's work, this 
study highlighted the variety of forms that contracts can take and confirmed the need to look to 
context and external factors to explain this. Given the highly varied, hybrid situations in which 
contracts may arise in an LMIC setting, this is perhaps even more important than in a developed 
country setting. A variety of contractual relationships may arise, for instance in urban areas the 
potential for competitive contracting exists, as was demonstrated by the private capitated schem.: case 
study. The most appropriate approach to contracting in an LMIC setting is therefore highly context 
specific and may range across the whole spectrum from classical to relational contracts. 
An examination of the conditions of these contracts highlighted where publicly purchased contracts 
in particular were likely to depart from the classical model, mainly due to issues around the 
competitiveness of the market and capacity of the purchaser, echoing the same reservations about 
public sector contracting as were raised in some UK literature (Walsh et al 1997; Le Grand and 
Bartlett 1993; Roberts 1993) and much of the existing literature on contracting in developing 
countries, which questions the likelihood of adequate capacity being available (Mills 1998). Whilst 
capacity to gather and process information was acknowledged as a drawback to effective contracting, 
this study also highlighted that some problems inherent to contracting primary care services (e. g. 
those raised by nature of the service and in some settings, nature of the market) are more fundamental 
than those caused by a shortage of capacity. Second, the assumption of competitive markets was also 
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found to be extremely questionable in many LMIC settings, and Walsh et al's (1997) observation 
that the public authority purchaser has a tendency to monopoly was echoed. 
Such findings clearly call into question much of the justification offered for introducing contracts 
into LMICs by multilateral and bilateral donors (WHO 1999; World Bank 1997a; World Bank 
1997b) which often stress the benefits of competition between providers and how transparency of 
public expenditure may be increased by the use of contracts. Arguments for contracting which 
underlie this approach were outlined by Broomberg (1994) early in chapter 2, and findings of this 
study directly contradict many of them, suggesting: 
a) that in many settings there will be little competition on the provider side 
b) that a single public purchaser is likely to further concentrate providers in LMIC markets 
c) that government capacity to enter into and manage contractual relationships with the public sector 
is likely to be weak. 
In addition, the asymmetries of information inherent to the nature of primary care delivery were 
found to be high. 
More influential attributes of the transaction were found to be those leading to a form of bilateral 
dependence between the contracting parties. This has been stressed in the existing literature by 
authors such as Williamson (1975; 1985) and Axelrod (1984), highlighting that the likelihood of 
continued future interaction radically affects the nature of any transaction. In recognition of the quite 
extreme form that this may take in some LMICs, a key contribution to theory arising from this study's 
consideration of the external factors impacting on the nature of contracts in LMICs is to highlight the 
potential importance of dependence. In many settings this may be a key concept for explaining much 
of the dynamic of public sector contracts with private providers and this in turn has implications for 
the body of theory which suggests that governments face a "make or buy" decision when deciding 
whether to contract out a service. In at least one of the cases reported here, there was no such 
decision for the government purchaser, and the pursuit of a contract with the private sector was more 
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an attempt to buy in specific expertise, which cannot be drawn into the public sector, than to try to 
contract out a service which could have been delivered by the public sector. This findings echoes 
results from other studies of the motivation for entering into contracts in LMICs reported in Bennett, 
McPake and Mills (1997). 
As Allen (1995) observed, payment appeared to be the most effective contractual incentive in 
determining service delivery. Beyond this, the study echoed the findings of Hart (1995), Allen 
(1995) and Mills (1998) on the deficiencies of written contracts as mechanisms to adequately control 
service delivery or form the basis for monitoring of service delivery. Its findings were also in line 
with Allen (1995), Williamson (1985) and MacNeil (1974) in finding a minimal role for court 
ordering in the enforcement of contracts. In addition, it highlighted the tendency of for-profit 
providers to concentrate on delivering curative services under a fee for service system, and the 
difficulty, when specifying contracts, of separating primary care services from other elements of the 
public sector health care delivery system on which they rely. 
The study also highlighted a range of external influences in determining these incomplete contracts, 
of a different nature from the institutional frameworks stressed in the existing developed country 
literature (such as by Deakin and Wilkinson 1995). Whilst such formal institutional frameworks 
were found to be of little relevance, this increased the influence of the social context in which 
individuals operated in determining their behaviour. Such social influences are in line with those 
stressed by Hodgson (1988), and highlight the importance of Williamson's (1975) acknowledgement 
of the role played by `human factors'. The data presented in this study suggest that influences on an 
individual's performance as a health service provider include social, personal and financial factors 
and can be very varied. Whilst issues such as opportunism need to be considered, the role of 
professional ethics and personal obligations may be at least as relevant in understanding an 
individual's motivation. In line with Williamson's description of the firm as a governance structure 
(1985), the study also demonstrated how, in contrast to the varied influences upon the behaviour of 
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an individual, hierarchical control can act as a controlling mechanism when the provider under 
contract is a firm. 
The study suggested that the role of trust in contracting in LMICs may be less fundamental than 
suggested for developed countries. Trying to apply an overall concept of "trust" to the situations of 
these case studies was problematic and more nuanced interpretations such as those offered by Sako 
(in Goddard and Mannion 1998) were found to be more useful in operationalising the concept for this 
study. It was concluded that trust exists as a very basic underpinning of contracts but its role beyond 
that in some LMICs settings can be quite marginal. This does not discount from the potential value 
of trust as a controlling mechanism in contracts, but recognises that context and history may 
undermine its development and that factors such as dependence may override its importance. 
Findings from this study therefore recognise the potential value of trust but echo the cautious 
approach expressed by authors such as Puffitt (1998) and Newman (1998) in the developed country 
literature. 
Following the literature review, options such as trust, detailed monitoring or detailed contract 
specification were suggested as alternative approaches to managing contracts, but the findings of this 
study has question the feasibility of any of these approaches in some LMIC settings. The study's 
principal contribution to theory has been to highlight both the importance of external factors and 
informal controlling mechanisms to incomplete contracts in LMICs, and to provide some 
infoi. nation on what these factors/mechanisms are in different settings. 
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POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
Recommendations are made for LMICs considering a policy of using contracts with the private 
sector, followed by some more specific to the case study contracts examined in this study. 
Policy implications for LMICs 
1. The findings of this study have stressed that contracts in different settings will take a variety of 
shapes and operate in different ways. It is not argued that any form of contract is found to be 
better or more effective than another, but that each unique set of circumstances will require a 
different approach. 
As the phrase `contracting' covers this wide variety of systems and outcomes, policy-makers need 
to consider 1) whether contracts are likely to be a good idea in that setting (evaluate the options of 
`make or buy') and 2) what type of contract is likely to arise in that circumstance and on what 
controlling mechanisms it is likely to rely. The implications for service provision under that type 
of contract then need to be considered. 
For instance, if it is recognised that in a specific setting the purchaser's control will be weak, 
consideration needs to be given to the motivation of the provider with whom the contract is being 
made and the nature of the institutional environment in which the contract will operate which will 
determine many of the informal controls upon it (history, professional controls etc. ). 
2. The market into which a contract will be introduced must be recognised as a key determinant of its 
likely nature. In rural areas, markets are unlikely to be functioning in a competitive manner and 
this implies that the type of contractual relationship that will develop will be relational/dependent. 
Government may attempt to lower barriers to entry to rural practice by lowering the asset 
investment required e. g. by building facilities and contracting out their operation. In some 
settings, other ways in which the market could be segmented include decentralising the purchasing 
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function, making each contract smaller so that there is less tendency toward a bilateral monopoly. 
The use of vouchers may be possible in urban areas where there is a choice of providers, so that 
service users can each make their own purchasing decision. This is discussed further under 
suggestions for further research. 
3. Capacity to write and manage contracts is a necessary condition for any contracting policy to 
function well. Governments must acknowledge this and take measures to build such capacity if 
they chose to enter into contracts with the private sector. Contracting should not be seen as a way 
of by-passing a lack of public sector capacity, and basic capacity for the administration and 
payment of contracts must be in place. 
4. Consideration should be given to the nature of the provider that contracts can be made with, and 
the nature of their motivation, and controls upon that. The likely choice ranges from self- 
employed individuals, through NGOs to commeieial companies. Each type of provider will have 
a different set of controlling mechanisms upon their behaviour, both individual and in the case of 
NGOs/companies, hierarchical. In some settings it will be possible to rely on strong hierarchical 
controls within the provider company, in others (such as the PDS) it will be necessary to consider 
the nature of influences upon each individually operating provider. In some cases, strongly 
controlled commercial companies delivering primary care services (such as that examined under 
the private capitated scheme) may be increasingly interesting as providers of primary care services 
on the state's behalf. 
5. Difficulties in adequately specifying primary care services to be contracted out, in particular how 
these fit in with existing public sector services, suggest that care should be given to defining the 
service that is being contracted out. Governments should try to contract out primary care services 
in the broadest, most comprehensive blocks possible. This will minimise the scope for private 
providers to say that certain services are not their responsibility. 
285 
Although the desirability of contracting out services to the private sector per se was not the 
subject of this study, this issue of service specification highlights a key problem of contracting out 
primary care services generally, which is how to divide up responsibility between the public and 
private sectors and still maintain a comprehensive service delivery system. Private sector 
providers supplying care on the state's behalf remain reliant on a functioning public sector for 
many support and referral services. The feasibility for the public sector of carving out a portion of 
their responsibility for service delivery to be handed to the private sector, whilst having to 
maintain overall responsibility for all the related support services, is questionable and highlights a 
dilemma at the heart of the desirability of contracting out clinical primary care services. 
6. The likelihood that formal monitoring will be ineffective as a control on service delivery should 
be recognised. New, more effective approaches to monitoring service delivery by private 
providers need to be developed. In some settings, government may chose to explore using peer 
groups and consumers as means to monitor service delivery. In others, providers may have 
systems of internal control established which could be drawn on as additional monitoring 
mechanisms. 
7. Contract design should reflect the nature of the contract being entered into: 
" For instance, in cases where it is recognised that the contract will be of a relational/dependent type 
with individual service providers, contracts can be designed in a way that recognises that service 
delivery is largely at their discretion, focusing on building trust between purchaser and provider 
and emphasising the important role of professional discretion. In such a situation, care should be 
taken not to undermine mutual respect between the contracting parties by an overly legalistic 
approach to the contract, and to keep communication and emphasis on co-operation high between 
government and these private contractors. 
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" In alternative cases, for instance where there are greater opportunities for monitoring, stronger 
hierarchical controls or a more competitive market, a more comprehensive, detailed contract 
design may be feasible and appropriate. 
" In all types of contract, care must be given to consider the type of payment mechanism and any 
targets set in the contract and the incentives that these create. 
8. Given that the role of informal controls on contractual behaviour may often be as important as the 
written contract, purchasing authorities should consider how to strengthen alternative routes of 
control such as trust and informal incentives on providers to provide a good service. 
Specific recommendations and policy implications for the case study contracts 
1. In the case of the PDS contract, the findings of this study suggest the following steps would 
lessen current uncertainty and improve its operation: 
" Recognition of the dependence between purchaser and provider in many towns would 
emphasise the importance of building trust and establishing a package of financial and non- 
financial incentives which would aim to be self-enforcing to motivate each PDS to deliver 
good quality services. 
" Re-design of the contract could include a change in the payment mechanism to make 
allowance for reimbursement of capital spending and put more explicit emphasis on 
reimbursing the delivery of preventive services (although this requires the desired role of the 
PDS vis a vis public sector clinics to be clarified). 
" Outside of the contract, measures could be taken to improve communication between the 
PDS and provincial authorities, and to emphasise PDS' importance in public sector health 
care delivery. The removal of suspicion and uncertainty regarding the future of the contract 
would be a first step in improving relations and building a more co-operative approach. 
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0 The potentially valuable role of communities in monitoring the acceptability of the scrviccs 
delivered by PDS should be recognised and steps taken to increase the channels of 
communication between them and the provincial purchaser. 
9 The Eastern Cape province should acknowledge the need to invest in basic capacity to 
manage the administration of the contract, although such a recommendation against the 
backdrop of an acute shortage of resources for the health sector as a whole may be rather 
meaningless. 
2. In the case of contracts similar to the Lesotho model, the findings of this study suggest that here 
too the degree of dependence between purchaser and provider needs to be recognised. Where 
such dependence is high the role of formal contractual controls is lessened, although the 
specification of services to be delivered and the payment mechanism remain important. A 
contract such as the Lesotho example would benefit from: 
0 Clearer definition of the service provider's role vis a vis existing public sector services. 
0 Some upper limits on expenditure on the inputs specified in the contract to aid in controlling 
its costs. 
0 Experimentation with a capitated payment system in remote areas such as this contract's 
setting, where it may be feasible to register the eligible population. 
" Reducing written reporting requirements which were not considered an effective check on 
service delivery, and may simply have increased transaction costs. 
0 Encouragement of greater involvement of the local community and any nearby public sector 
facilities as monitors of the acceptability of the services delivered. 
3. For the private capitated scheme the main issue of relevance is their potential to deliver care on 
behalf of the public sector. Their existing internal capacity for management and control of 
service delivery suggests that in urban settings such providers may represent an attractive option 
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for purchasers, as a service that would be relatively easy to monitor and control and that is 
currently delivered at low cost. However, the following hurdles need to be acknowledged: 
" Whether the purchasing authority would be able to define the population to be covcrcd, 
thereby duplicating the benefits of a capitated payment system recorded in this study, or 
whether fee for service would have to be introduced. In this latter case, the impact of this on 
the nature of service delivery may be dramatic. 
0 To what extent such clinics should complement or substitute existing public sector services. 
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
1. Various recommendations can be made for the development of research methodology in this field. 
Studies recording the interaction between purchasers and providers over a longer time period, both 
by observation of interaction and collection of documents passing between the contracting parties, 
would decrease the current heavy reliance on interviews as the only way to access the nature of 
interaction between contracting parties. Second, given that the motivation and beliefs of each 
individual appear to play such an important role in the determining of a contractual relationship 
the development of methods to better assess these factors would also be advantageous. 
2. Given the emphasis in the study's findings on the potential role of individual patients as monitors 
of service delivery, research into the role of service users as prospective purchasers and monitors 
should consider: 
" The necessary conditions for a decentralised system of patients purchasing their own primary care 
services. In particular the use of vouchers could be examined in terms of their administrative 
requirements, the requirements of the market setting, their acceptability for patients, and the 
desirability of their impact on service delivery. 
" An examination of the type of monitoring mechanism that patients can fulfil, including a) On what 
criteria do they judge services? Are these appropriate? How can these be used or changed? b) 
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How can service users be empowered to act as better informed and more cffcctivc monitors of 
service delivery? 
3. Given the emphasis in the study's findings on the importance of individual motivation as a 
determinant of the nature of service delivery, research into some of the informal controls on 
individuals working under contract would increase understanding of the range of motivations that 
individual health care providers have and how incentives can be built into contract design or other 
contractual process which appeal to these and may be more `self enforcing'. Potentially this is a 
large and varied research agenda, which could include: 
" consideration of the institutional and environmental conditions that arc conducivc to the 
development of trust between contracting parties 
" what other positive influences on non-financial motivation exist and how these can be better 
incorporated into contracts 
0 tP e role of professional bodies as a control on the behaviour of providers 
0 lessons from private sector practices (not necessarily in the health sector) for motivating and 
controlling professionals. 
4. In addition, research into the controls on health care providers working in a more hierarchical 
setting would shed light on the desirability of relying on the internal control mechanisms of 
private provider companies as an option to increase control over private service providers. 
5. More research defining the necessary conditions for the public sector to use capitation payment in 
primary care contracts with the private sector would be helpful in defining the range of options 
open to governments considering a policy of contracting in different settings. 
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Appendix I 
DESCRIPTION OF PUBLIC SECTOR SITES 
Data from the four following public sector sites were used to provide a comparison with the PDS data 
in chapter 7. Some characteristics of each of these sites are briefly described below: 
Public sector site no. 1 
Large community health centre attached to the outpatient department of a provincial hospital in a 
large rural town in the Western Cape. This facility only offered curative primary care services. 
Patients here were seen first by a primary health care nurse and then if necessary referred to private 
doctors who attended the clinic twice a day. These doctors had previously been the PDS in that town, 
but the system had recently been `converted' to a purely public sector delivery system. 
Public sector site no. 2 
Large community health centre delivering comprehensive primary care services in a rural town in the 
Western Cape. Arranged along similar lines as site no. 1 with nurses screening patients and if 
necessary referring to private doctors who visited the clinic twice a day to see referrals. As above 
this system was the result of a `conversion' of the previous PDS system. 
Public sector site no. 3 
Large community health centre in a rural town in the Eastern Cape, offering comprehensive primary 
care services. This facility was staffed by primary health care nurses and visited daily by a 
Community Service Doctor. The PDS system in this town had been terminated the previous year due 
to fraud. 
Public sector site no. 4 
Small rural facility in the Eastern Cape offering comprehensive primary care services. This clinic 
was staffed by two primary care nurses and had no access to a doctor. The PDS had left the town the 
previous year and it had not been possible to attract another doctor to the town. 
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Appendix II 
INTERVIEW SCHEDULES 
1. Interview with provider 
[Background (relevant only if the contractor has more than one contract)] 
Describe the contracts for primary care that your organization has with both the public and 
private sectors 
How important is primary care contracting for your organization? What proportion of your 
turnover does it represent? What about contracts with the public sector? 
Explain the history of primary care contracting in your organization (overall and with the 
public sector) 
Describe the different categories/types of primary care contract, including nature of services 
provided, who the purchaser is, and what services are provided 
How do decisions to contract with the public sector arise? Do communities have any role in 
the decisions? What other stakeholders have influenced contracting decisions? 
Note: from here on, all questions are about contracts with the public sector 
Staff 
What staff are involved in managing your primary care contract(s)? (list by job and grade) 
What are their responsibilities both in general and in relation to contracting? 
What proportion of their time do they spend on contracting in general? On the contract of 
interest? 
Who are they responsible to? 
Describe their education level and experience 
Is staff turnover a problem? Does your relationship with the contractor depend especially on 
any individuals in particular, either in this organisation and in the contractor organisation? 
Do you think you have the right staff skills and experience to manage contracting? Is ability 
to contract increasing (likely to increase) with experience? Would you like some additional 
skills - if so, what? Would you want these in your organization or to be able to draw on them 
from a higher level? 
The current contract 
Before the contract started, what sort of relationships did you have with the purchaser? 
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Who initiated discussions over a possible contract: you, the purchaser, or other body? 
What were your reasons for wanting this contract? What analyses did you do before deciding 
to accept the contract (eg cost estimation)? 
Why do you think the purchaser wanted this contract? What are/were his motivations? Do 
you trust him? 
When was the contract awarded? 
Was this a first or subsequent contract? If the latter, what was the duration of the initial 
contract? On what basis was the initial contract awarded - competitive tender, direct 
negotiation, or some other mechanism? Would you say that the nature of the contract is 
changing over time, if so, how? 
On what basis was current contract awarded - competitive tender, direct negotiation, or some 
other mechanism? ((Were there changes between the previous and the current contract? )) 
If competitive - do you know who were your main competitors, how many competitors there 
were, why you won the contract? Do you think that the process of competition was valid (c. g. 
not a costly waste of time? ) 
If direct negotiation, could you describe the process? Who were involved/consulted (including 
communities; other stakeholders) 
Any explanations for why this form of contracting was used? Do you think this mechanism has 
any advantages over any of the other possible approaches to awarding contracts? 
How would you describe your current relationship with the purchaser? 
Has your relationship with the purchaser changed over the period of the contract(s)? If so, in 
what way? 
Do you think the purchaser has any alternatives now to the current contract to get the service 
provided? 
Scope and nature of contract, review mechanisms and contract duration 
What are the contractor's responsibilities in terms of provision of services? Are those the ones 
you would ideally want? 
What specific inputs/outputs are specified in the contract; in what level of detail are these 
specified? Are any standards of quality or other standards defined in the contract? Is there any 
attempt to allow for variations in casemixlseverity of conditions treated? 
What are the contractor's responsibilities, as defined in the contract or as agreed implicitly, with 
respect to: 
Capital items 
Was investment in land, buildings, equipment etc. required? If so, what was the scale of this 
investment? If not, who owns the capital stock at present? Who is responsible for maintenance 
of buildings and equipment; what happens at termination of contract? Do you think that service 
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development is constrained in the absence of longer-term contracts? For instance, are there any 
investments in specific assets that you would make if there was greater security/duration in your 
contract(s)? 
Staff 
Who employs the various categories of staff? If contractor - does purchaser have any influence 
over staffing decisions; if purchaser, does contractor exert any influence? 
Supplies 
Does the contract place any constraints on the contractor in terms of costs, the use of particular 
inputs (e. g. staff, supplies, drugs etc. ) etc? 
Overall, do you think you have the appropriate resources (staff, buildings, equipment) to deliver 
an adequate service (eg as compared to public sector facilities) 
Do you feel that your company/organisation is exposed to any risks that are not spel led out in 
the contract? 
Contract review mechanisms 
Are any performance monitoring or review mechanisms built in to the contract? What are these 
and how frequently is your performance supposed to be reviewed? How time consuming do 
you find this review process? 
Are any penalties for breach of contract specified? What are these penalties? Are they 
enforceable? Have there been contract related disputes or breaches of contract in the past, in this 
or other contracts? Were penalties applied in these or other cases? 
Are problems on the whole resolved amicably, or is there an atmosphere of distrust between you 
and the purchaser? 
What is the duration of the current contract? What is planned to happen at the end of the 
contract term? [If relevant: Do you think the contract will be put out to competitive tender, or 
will another mechanism be used? What would you prefer? ] 
Reimbursement mechanisms 
What is the payment mechanisms specified in the contract? 
Are there any minimum or maximum payment levels specified? 
how do these payment mechanisms affect the riskiness of the contract from your perspective? 
Do you think these payment mechanisms influence the way in which you provide services? Do 
you think for-profit/ not-for-profit providers would behave similarly? (ask about which ever the 
contractor is not) 
How was the price of the contract decided? 
Do you think the current price of the contract is a fair price? 
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How do you handle price increases? 
Apart from the direct costs of providing the services, what other costs arc associated with each 
contract? (e. g. staff time, accounting and legal fees, consultancy fees, travel costs). Which is 
the most significant of these? 
Do they tend to be incurred during the negotiation or the implementation and monitoring phase 
of a contract? 
In addition, were there any transitional costs e. g. setting up new information systems? 
Attitudes to risk, and responses to contractual incentives 
What do you see as the existing or potential risks in the present contractual situation as well as 
specifically in the current contract? 
Do you see the existing distribution of risk as 'fair'? 
Is this contract generally regarded as posing high, medium or low risk to you? Could you give 
reasons for this? 
Management systems 
Describe the management systems in place for managing the contracting process 
What mechanisms do you use to ensure high staff productivity? 
Have you had any problems with billing? 
Are you happy with your cost control systems? What are they? What routine cost analyses 
can you produce? 
Do you have a system for quality assurance? If so, what is it? 
What information do you give the purchaser about what you are doing? In what form? How 
frequently? Is this information which you have to collect especially, or is it also useful for 
management purposes? 
Do you think the purchaser uses this information to monitor your performance? Arc there 
other ways in which he monitors performance? How frequently? What happens if he detecu3 
problems? What action can he take? 
Have you had any (other) problems in managing the contract? (e. g. getting paid on time). If 
problems arose, how were these resolved? 
Do you get support from higher/lower management levels in negotiating and managing the 
contract? Is there any confusion over who does what? 
Are communications good with higher/lower levels? 
Do you have any mechanisms for involving or consulting communities and/or users about the 
contracted service? 
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What is the financial status of the whole company? 
Performance of the contract 
What do you think are the main benefits and disadvantages to your organisation of contracting 
services? 
What do you think are the effects of these contracting arrangements on the costs of services, and 
on the quality of care? 
Do the current contracting arrangements encourage you to provide services efficiently? If so, 
which aspects of the contract are most important for this? 
Could elements of the contract be improved to enhance efficiency; to improve quality? 
Do you think your performance is better or worse than the performance of similar public 
services in terms of cost, quality, range of services, responsiveness to users? Why? Do you 
organise services differently? 
Has the decision to contract had any effect on equity: e. g. in terms of access of disadvantaged 
groups? if so, has access increased or decreased? 
How well do you think you are meeting the needs of disadvantaged groups? Does you do 
better/worse/the same as a similar public service? 
What would an ideal contract look like from your perspective? 
Attitude to increased use of contracts to deliver PIIC 
[If relevant: Would your organisation be interested in more PHC contracts with public 
purchasers? If so, why? ] 
Do you think there are many private sector organisations and providers interested in contracts 
with the public sector? Would it be possible to attract in suppliers not currently working in 
this field (e. g. commercial companies) 
How competitive do you think you are relative to your competitors in this market? 
Do you think current laws and regulations are adequate or need changing - especially if more 
use is made of contracting? 
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3. Interview with Purchaser 
Background 
Describe what contracts for primary care services exist in your province/district 
Can you estimate what proportion of primary care visits are provided by contractors? And/or 
what proportion of primary care expenditure goes to contractors? 
Explain the history of primary care contracting in your province/district 
Describe the different categories/types of primary care contract, including nature of services 
provided, who the contractor is, and what services are provided (if there are di fcrent 
payment mechanisms, explain why they arc used) 
How do decisions to contract arise? Do communities have any role in the decisions? What 
other stakeholders have influenced contracting decisions? 
Are you happy with current regulations affecting the practice of private primary care 
providers? Do they need changing? If so, how? 
Do the contracts affect your ability to plan HIC services for the whole province/district? 
Staff 
What staff are involved in managing primary care contracts? 
What are their responsibilities both in general and in relation to contracting? 
What proportion of their time do they spend on contracting in general? On the contract of 
interest? 
Who are they responsible to? 
Describe their education level and experience 
Is staff turnover a problem? Does your relationship with the contractor depend especially on 
any individuals in particular, either in this organisation and in the contractor organisation? 
Do you think you have the right staff skills and experience to manage contracting? Is ability 
to contract increasing (lii: ely to increase) with experience? Would you like some additional 
skills - if so, what? Would you want these in your organization or to be able to draw on them 
from a higher level? 
Which do you think is more demanding for your staff. to manage contracting or to manage 
direct provision? Why? 
The current contract 
[If relevant: 
Before the contract started, what sort of relationships did you have with the contractor? ] 
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Who initiated discussions over a possible contract: purchaser, provider, or other body? 
What were your reasons for agreeing this contract? Did you do any analyses before deciding 
to contract (e. g. cost estimation)? 
Why do you think the contractor wanted this contract? What are/were his motivations? Do 
you trust him? 
How would you describe your current relationship with the contractor? 
Were there any other alternatives open to you to get this service provided? If so, why did you 
reject them? 
When was the contract awarded? 
Was this a first or subsequent contract? If the latter, what was the duration of the initial 
contract? On what basis was the initial contract awarded - competitive tender, direct 
negotiation, or some other mechanism? 
On what basis was current contract awarded - competitive tender, direct negotiation, or some 
other mechanism? Were there changes between the previous and the current contract? 
If competitive - open or closed tender; how many competitors, who were the competitors, what 
factors entered into the decision to award the contract? How was the decision made? 
If direct negotiation, could you describe the process? Who were involved/consulted (including 
communities; other stakeholders) 
Any explanations for why this form of contracting was used? Does this mechanism have any 
advantages over any of the other possible approaches to awarding contracts? 
Has your relationship with the contractor changed over the period of the contract(s)? If so, in 
what way? 
Are there any alternatives now to the current contractor? 
Scope and nature of contract, review mechanisms and contract duration 
What are the contractor's responsibilities in terms of provision of services? Are those the ones 
you would ideally want? Do they correspond with the goals of publicly provided services? 
What specific inputs/outputs are specified in the contract; in what level of detail are these 
specified? Are any standards of quality or other standards defined in the contract? 
What are the contractor's responsibilities, as defined in the contract or as agreed implicitly, with 
respect to: 
Capital items 
Was investment in land, buildings, equipment etc. required? If so, what was the scale of this 
investment? If not, who owns the capital stock at present? Who is responsible for maintenance 
of buildings and equipment; what happens at termination of contract? 
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Staff 
Who employs the various categories of staff? If contractor - does purchaser have any influence 
over staffing decisions; if purchaser, does contractor exert any influence? 
Supplies 
Does the contract place any constraints on the contractor in terms of costs, the use of particular 
inputs (e. g. staff, supplies, drugs etc. ), etc.? 
Overall, do you think the contractor has the appropriate resources (staff, buildings, equipment) 
to deliver an adequate service (e. g. as compared to public sector facilities) 
Contract review mechanisms 
Are any performance monitoring or review mechanisms built in to the contract? What are these 
and how frequently is contractor performance supposed to be reviewed? How time consuming 
is this monitoring activity? 
Are any penalties for breach of contract specified? What are these penalties? Are they 
enforceable? Have there been contract related disputes or breaches of contract in the past, in this 
or other contracts? Were penalties applied in these or other cases? 
Are problems on the whole resolved amicably, or is there an atmosphere of distrust between you 
and the contractor? 
What is the duration of the current contract? What is planned to happen at the end of the 
contract term? Will the contract be put out to competitive tender, or will another mechanism be 
used? What would you prefer? What information/conditions would you want to see before you 
were willing to enter into longer term contracts? 
Reimbursement mechanisms 
What is the payment mechanisms specified in the contract? 
Are there any minimum or maximum payment levels specified? 
How do these payment mechanisms affect the riskiness of the contract from the department's 
perspective? 
Do you think these payment mechanisms influence the way in which the contractor provides 
services? Do you think this would differ between for-profit and not-for-profit providers? 
How was the price of the contract decided? 
Do you think the current price of the contract is a fair price? 
How would you respond if the contractor said the price should increase? 
Has finding the money for the contract been a problem? 
Apart from the price of the contract, what other costs are associated with each contract? (e. g. 
staff time, accounting and legal fees, consultancy fees, travel costs). Which is the most 
significant of these? 
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Do they tend to be incurred during the negotiation or the implementation and monitoring phase 
of a contract? 
In addition were there any transitional costs e. g. setting up new information systems? 
Attitudes to risk, and responses to contractual incentives 
What do you see as the existing or potential risks in the present contractual situation as well as 
specifically in the current contract? 
Do you think that contracting with a non-profit organisation is/would be less "risky" than with a 
for-profit organisation? Why? 
Do you see the existing distribution of risk as `fair'? 
Is this contract generally regarded as posing high, medium or low risk to you? Could you give 
reasons for this? 
Management systems 
Describe the management systems in place for managing the contracting process 
What information do you get from the contractor about what he is doing? In what form? 
How frequently? 
What is the main method which you use to measure service delivery? How effective do you 
think it is? 
Do you use this information to monitor the performance of the contractor? Are there other 
ways in which you monitor performance? How frequently do you monitor? What happens if 
you detect problems? What action do you/can you take? 
Have you had any (other) problems in managing the contract? (e. g. paying on time, 
controlling the total cost, getting information on performance, getting contractors to improve 
their performance). If problems arose, how were these resolved? 
Are you able to compare the contractor's performance with the performance of similar 
services that are publicly provided? (is there the information to do so? ) 
How do you think the costs to you of the contracting process compare with those of 
providing services directly? 
Do you get enough support from higher/lower management levels in negotiating and 
managing the contract? Is there any confusion over who does what? 
Are communications good with higher/lower levels? 
Do you have any mechanisms for involving or consulting communities and/or users about the 
contracted service? 
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Performance of the contract 
What do you think are the main benefits and disadvantages to your organisation of contracting 
services? Do you see other potential benefits which haven't been realised yet? 
What do you think are the effects of these contracting arrangements on the costs of services, and 
on the quality of care? 
Do the current contracting arrangements encourage the contractor to provide services 
efficiently? If so, which aspects of the contract are most important for this? 
What elements of the contract could be improved to enhance efficiency; to improve quality? 
Do you think contractor performance is better or worse than the performance of similar 
public services in terms of cost, quality, range of services, responsiveness to users? Why? 
Does the contractor organise services differently? 
Has the decision to contract had any effect on equity: cg in terms of access of disadvantaged 
groups? if so, has access increased or decreased? 
How well is the contractor meeting the needs of disadvantaged groups? Does he do 
better/worse/the same as a similar public service? 
What would an ideal contract look like from your perspective? 
Attitude to increased use of contracts to deliver PIIC 
Would you like to see contracts used more frequently for primary care services? If so, why? 
Who would be your preferred contractors? 
Do you think there are many providers of this type interested in contracts? Would it be 
possible to attract in suppliers not currently working in your area (eg commercial 
companies)? 
Do you think the current framework of laws and regulations are adequate or need changing - 
especially if more use is made of contracting? 
3. Interviews with key informants, national policy-makers and prospective purchasers and 
providers 
a) national policy-makers 
Please describe how you see the government's policy towards interaction with the private 
sector since 1994, particulary with regard to contracting out primary care services: what have 
been the main influences on it? (ideology/analysis/capacity/particular people). Is it an 
adequate response? what do you see as the pros/cons of using the private sector at PIIC level? 
What is the role of the provinces in making/implementing this policy? Do you think they 
agree/disagree? 
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'A 
Please describe any existing interaction with private PIIC providers: what is driving it? 
(policy/lack of choice/history), what are its advantages and disadvantages? Are there 
any types of services or situations that you feel arc more suited to contracting to 
primary care providers? 
What would you say could be possible benefits of collaboration with private sector? What 
problems? 
What are the constraints on the government side? 
Who would be potential private sector contractors? How would you describe their 
motivations? 
What are your perceptions of the following in the private sector if they had contracts to 
deliver primary care: quality of service, efficiency, monitoring possible, degree of trust, 
likelihood of fraud? 
Would overall quality, efficiency and accessibility of primary care services in SA be helped 
or hindered by increased involvement of private sector? If so, under what conditions? If not, 
why? 
b) prospective purchasers 
Do you think you have the right staff skills and experience to manage contracting? 
Which do you think will be more demanding for your staff: to manage contracting or to 
manage direct provision? Why? 
Would you like to see contracts used more frequently in primary care? If so, why? 
Who would be your preferred contractors? 
c) key informants outside of public sector (professional associations, prospective private sector 
providers) 
Please describe organisation/ role 
How do you see the government's policy (for South Africa, since1994) towards contracts for 
primary care with the private sector? .... what do you think is driving this? 
What have been the moves of the private sector? What are the motivations driving this? 
What would you see as particular successes/failures in government/private sector interaction 
at present, what is causing these? 
What would you say are particular strengths in the private sector which the government could 
draw upon? 
Which issues are particularly problematic in idea of government contracting out services 
(prompt if appropriate - Contracts? Specification? Monitoring ? Motivations of pritivate 
sector? ) 
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If interviewee is from an organisation that is a prospective contractor... 
Would you/your organisation wish to contract with government? If so, why? If not, why not? 
What do you perceive as the likelihood of this happening? Obstacles? 
Why do you think the government would be interested in contracting with the private sector? 
Why DON't you think the government would be interested in contracting with the private 
sector? 
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Appendix III 
SCORES FOR ASSESSING STRUCTURAL QUALITY 
Please score all the following categories as shown 
Category 1: Infrastructure 
1. Electricity 
Score 
(a)None 0.1 
(b)Power fails more than 6 times/year and no backup system 2 
(c)Power fails up to 6 times/year and no backup system 4 
(d)Power failures occur- there is a working backup system 8 
(e)Reliable power supply or automatic backup system 10 
2. Toilet 
Score 
(a)No Toilets 0.1 
(b)Less than 3 toilets per 100 patients per day 2 
(c)Adequate toilets (3 + per 100 patients) but no wheelchair access toilet 8 
(d)Adequate toilets including one wheelchair access 10 
3. Refrigerator 
Score 
(a) No refrigerator, not functioning or functioning at incorrect temperature 0.1 
(b) Functioning refrigerator, alternative fuel supply but no spare cylinder I 
(c) Functioning refrigerator, alternative fuel supply and spare cylinder 9 
(d) Electric refrigerator 10 
4. Emergency Kit 
Score 
(a) No emergency kit available 0.1 
(b) Emergency kit on site but incomplete or inaccessible 3 
(c) Complete emergency kit available and accessible 10 
5. Drug Storage 
Score 
(a)No drug cabinet or room 5 
(b)"Lockable" cabinet/room 10 
6. Storage of waste (sharps) 
Score 
(a) Unsafe (storage or removal) 4 
(b) Safe (storage and removal) 10 
7. Cleanliness 
Score 
(a) More than one area of the facility is dirty 2 
(b) One area of the facility is dirty 7 
(c) All areas in the facility are clean 10 
315 
Category 2: Access 
1. Access by disabled patients 
Score 
(a) Disabled cannot enter or move within the facility independently 3 
(b) Disabled cannot enter facility alone but once in can move freely OR 
disabled can enter alone but cannot move freely within facility 5 
(c) Disabled have free access to entry and movement within facility 10 
2. Emergency instruction after-hours 
Score 
(a) No after-hours instructions/contact/phone 8 
(b) Instructions clearly visible 10 
3. Facility opening times 
Score 
(a) Facility opens less than 40 hours over fewer than 5 days 3 
(b) Facility opens less than forty hours but over 5 days 6 
(c) Facility opens at least forty hours over 5 days or more 8 
(d) Facility opens more than forty hours over 6 days and/or includes 10 
some evenings 
4. Range of routine services Score 
(a)Facility offers less than 75% of the "core" core package 0.1 
(b) Facility offers between 75% and 100% of the "core" core package 7 
(c) Facility offers 100% of the "core" core package 10 
(see essential packages for different facilities in table at end) 
Category 3: Management and staffing 
1. Continuing education (seminars, conferences, courses etc) 
Score 
(a) No formal continuing education programme available 3 
(b) Informal, infrequent (every two months or longer), continuing education 
programme, or only for certain staff categories 7 
(c) Formal, structured continuing education programme available to all categories of staff 
10 
2. Patient load per FTE consulting staff (doctor, PIICN) 
Score 
(a) Over 45 or under 15 patients are seen per day per FTE consulting staff I 
(b) Between 40-45 or 15-28 patients are seen per day per FTE consulting staff 7 
(c) Between 28 and 40 patients are seen per day per FTE consulting staff 10 
3. Patient load per FTE professional staff (doctors, PHCNs, professional nurses, enrolled nurses) 
Score 
(a) Over 45 or under 15 patients are seen per day per FTE professional staff I 
(b) Between 40-45 or 15-28 patients are seen per day per FTE professional staff 7 
(c) Between 28 and 40 patients are seen per day per FTE professional staff 10 
4. Record Systems 
(a) Not possible to link a patient to his/her records 
(b) Possible to link a patient to his/her records 
Score 
I 
10 
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Category 4: Patient environment 
1. Waiting Time 
Score 
(a) Over 60 minutes 3 
(b) 45-60 minutes 5 
(c) 30-45 minutes 8 
(d) Under 30 minutes 10 
2. Waiting Area 
Score 
(a) Some patients have to wait outside with no shelter from sun/rain, 
no seating 3 
(b) Some patients wait outside but with shelter AND seating 7 
(c) Patients are all accommodated inside but some have to stand/sit on floor 8 
(d) Patients are seated inside on most days 10 
3. Patient Privacy (e. g. for reproductive health and curative services) 
Score 
(a) No audial or visual privacy I 
(b) Visual privacy but little/no audial privacy 6 
(c) Complete audial and visual privacy 10 
4. Health Education Materials 
Score 
(a) None on display or available 3 
(b) Inappropriate materials available 4 
(c) Appropriate materials on display only 8 
(d) Appropriate materials on display and available to take home 10 
Category 6: Drugs, supplies, equipment and laboratory services 
1. Essential Drugs List 
Score 
(a) No copy of the Essential Drugs List is available 2 
(b) A copy of the Essential Drugs List is available 10 
2. Essential equipment 
Score 
(a) One or more of the essential equipment (list below) is not available 0.1 
(b) Essential equipment is all available 10 
3. Supplies 
Score 
(a) One or more of the essential supplies are not available 0.1 
(b) All essential supplies are available 10 
4. Drugs 
Score 
(a) One or more of the essential drugs shown below, or its equivalent, is not available 
0.1 
(b) All drugs appropriate for the services offered at the clinic are available 10 
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Category 7: Tracer Drugs 
I. STDs Score 
(a) Basic STD drugs are not available 0.1 
(b) All drugs listed are available 10 
II. TB 
(where providing chronic treatment) Score 
(a) Basic TB drugs are not available 0.1 
(b) All appropriate drugs at the clinic are available 10 
III. Diabetes 
(a) Basic diabetes drugs are not available 0.1 
(b) All appropriate drugs at the clinic are available 10 
IV. Hypertension 
(a) Basic hypertension drugs are not available 0.1 
(b) All appropriate drugs at the clinic are available 10 
V. Asthma 
(a) Basic asthma drugs are not available 0.1 
(b) All appropriate drugs at the clinic are available 10 
Category 8: Diagnostic Testing and Laboratory services 
1. Syphilis Screening 
Score 
(a) Syphilis screening is not available 0.1 
(b) Syphilis screening is available for ANC but not on-site 7 
(c) On site syphilis screening is available 10 
2. Diagnostic testing 
Score 
(a) TB, Haemaglobin or BGL testing is not available 0.1 
(b) TB, Haemaglobin and Blood glucose tests are all available but 
not all of the tests shown on the list below 7 
(c) All of the tests shown below are available 10 
" Haemaglobin testing 
" Blood Glucose testing 
" Urine Microscopy 
" TB Microscopy 
" TB Culture 
" Other microscopy and culture 
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Proposed Essential Package of PIIC services 
Community Services " mass immunisation campaigns 
" organise DOT for TB, follow-up chronic 
diseases 
" home based care 
" occupational health services 
" school health services 
" environmental health services 
Outreach 
" curative care 
" geriatric and chronic care 
" ante-natal and post-natal care 
" immunisations/child health and growth 
monitoring 
" family planning 
" psychiatry 
" other (please specify) 
Clinics and mobile services " child preventive and curative services 
" reproductive health 
i. ante/post natal 
ii. family planning 
iii. medical TOP 
iv. sexual abuse 
v. cervical cancer screening 
" STD care 
" HIV/AIDS care 
" chronic disease: TB, mental ill-health, 
diabetes, hypertension and others 
" acute curative 
Community health centre " all of the above 
" specialised services: eye care, dental, 
dermatology 
" services for disabled people 
" 24 hour emergency care/casualty 
" short-stay facility 
" maternity 
" x-ray and laboratory 
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Appendix IV 
STANDARD COSTING METHODOLOGY 
The aim of the costing analysis was to generate comparable costs between different study facilities. 
Costs of providing primary care services in each facility were analysed. Recurrent and capital costs 
were calculated separately and summed to give the total cost at each facility. Total costs were 
divided by utilisation figures to give an average cost per visit. Total costs were also apportioned to 
different service categories (e. g. STD visit, chronic visit) to give a total cost per type of visit. 
Costs were determined for the 1997/98 financial year. Recurrent and capital costs were calculated 
separately and summed to give the total cost at each facility. In terms of recurrent costs, both internal 
and external costs were included (e. g. costs of medical supplies where the government supplies these 
free of charge and diagnostic tests where an outside laboratory service is used). The main sources of 
recurrent cost data were financial records, accounts, patient records and stock books at each facility. 
Capital costs were estimated by completing a checklist of all equipment and furniture used in each 
facility, as well as measuring the size of all buildings and assessing what portion of each was used to 
render primary care services to state patients. Current market prices for the equipment and furniture 
were obtained from the local suppliers. Capital costs were annualised using a discount rate of 8% 
and the assumption that the expected years of life was 30 years for buildings, and 5 years for medical 
equipment, furniture and vehicles. 
Transport and vehicle running costs were calculated using AA rates (RO. 68 per km). These rates are 
assumed to cover recurrent costs like fuel, oil and maintenance. 
In the case of the PDS and Lesotho facilities, costs which were applicable to the delivery of primary 
car ; services to public patients had to be separated out for each facility. This entailed estimating the 
proportion of each cost that should be attributed to the public side of the practice. Senior clinical 
staff in were asked to make such estimates for each cost category and where possible this estimate 
was verified by checking the ratio between public and private patient visits. 
Apportioning capital costs was less problematic as waiting rooms and consultation rooms tended to 
be separate for public and private patients. The only areas which were shared tended to be the 
administrative office(s) and sometimes the area used for drug storage. In these cases both estimates 
and observation were used to determine what the split should be. 
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Costing the services of self-employed doctors such as the PDS was problematic. As they were self- 
employed, their salary had to be estimated. As a preliminary estimate, the total payment 
(consultation fees, dispensing fee and travel allowance) that they received from the state for seeing 
primary care patients was taken, and expenses which they incurred in running their public practice 
subtracted. These included salaries, other staff related expenses, administrative and building 
operating costs, transport costs and capital costs. 
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Appendix V 
COSTS PER VISIT AT INDIVIDUAL PDS FACILITIES (RAND) 
WCPDS ECPDS 
A B C D E F G H J 
Internal admin and management 
Building operating costs 
Diagnostic tests 
Transport/vehicle running costs 
1.78 
0.96 
0.59 
0.41 
0.56 
1.25 
1.32 
0.08 
0.99 
1.22 
0.58 
0.06 
1.20 
3.53 
1.27 
0.12 
0.97 
0.84 
0.49 
0.08 
2.35 
5.10 
0.83 
0.32 
1.44 
1.87 
0.38 
0.15 
0.50 
1.47 
0.29 
0.27 
1.10 
5.70 
0.98 
0.32 
Recurrent cost excluding staff and drugs 3.73 3.21 2.84 6.12 2.38 8.61 3.84 2.54 8.10 
Clinical staff 24.69 12.01 16.67 15.75 27.05 9.22 26.20 26.52 13.22 
Medical and surgical supplies 15.57 18.45 12.36 15.95 14.41 5.38 8.59 8.19 14.16 
Total recurrent cost 43.99 33.67 31.86 37.81 43.84 23.21 38.62 37.24 35.47 
Building costs 
Medical equipment 
Furniture and equipment 
Vehicle costs 
0.48 
0.02 
0.05 
1.52 
0.60 
0.08 
0.02 
5.10 
0.48 
0.07 
0.03 
4.32 
0.77 
0.25 
0.02 
3.26 
0.75 
0.04 
0.07 
2.96 
4.54 
0.18 
0.16 
5.04 
0.77 
0.02 
0.03 
2.31 
0.81 
0.05 
0.06 
2.69 
5.85 
0.20 
0.25 
3.46 
Total capital cost 2.07 5.80 4.90 4.29 3.82 9.92 3.14 3.61 9.76 
Total cost 46.06 39.47 36.77 42.10 47.66 33.13 41.76 40.86 45.24 
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